What role do the emotions play in cognition?

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason L. Megill

This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.

Author(s):  
Joanna Pozzulo

This chapter discusses familiarity from a cognitive psychological lens. For example, it examines cognitive theories of familiarity. It discusses the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis, heuristics, and valence and how each of these can lead to a sense of familiarity. The chapter also discusses face processing and face recognition. Typically, people process faces either holistically or featurally; this chapter describes how face familiarity is either enhanced or hindered by the way in which faces are processed. Given the understanding of how familiarity impacts people’s ability to process and recognize a face, the chapter discusses how familiarity also influences facial recognition irrespective of the eyewitness paradigm. The chapter then discusses research concerning exposure duration and remember–know–guess and familiarity. It concludes with a discussion of face recognition in a legal context.


2020 ◽  
Vol 07 (02) ◽  
pp. 217-230
Author(s):  
Lisa Miracchi

The Frame Problem is the problem of how to design a machine to use information so as to behave competently, with respect to the kinds of tasks a genuinely intelligent agent can reliably, effectively perform. I will argue that the way the Frame Problem is standardly interpreted, and so the strategies considered for attempting to solve it, must be updated. We must replace overly simplistic and reductionist assumptions with more sophisticated and plausible ones. In particular, the standard interpretation assumes that mental processes are identical to certain kinds of computational processes, and so solving the Frame Problem is a matter of finding a computational architecture that can effectively represent relations of semantic relevance. Instead, we must take seriously the possibility that the way in which intelligent agents use information is inherently different. Whereas intelligent agents are plausibly genuinely causally sensitive to semantic properties as such (to what they perceive, desire, believe intend, etc.), computational systems can only be causally sensitive to the formal features that represent these properties. Indeed, it is this very substitution of formal generalizations for genuinely semantic ones that is responsible for the way current AI systems are brittle, inflexible, and highly specialized. What we need is a more sophisticated way of investigating the relationship between computational information processing and genuinely semantic information use. I apply the generative methodology I have developed elsewhere for cognitive science and AI research to show how the Frame Problem can be appropriately updated.


Author(s):  
Andrew Bacon

According to a fairly widespread assumption, there is some definite collection of completely factual or fundamental propositions upon which all truths supervene and which are unaffected by vagueness. This assumption manifests itself in formal models of vagueness as well—for example, the supervaluationist who represents propositions as sets of world-precisification pairs may divide logical space into propositions that only depend on the world-coordinate. This chapter argues that this assumption leads to paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, and, ultimately, should be rejected in favour of a weaker notion of fundamentality or factuality. It suggests an alternative picture in which there is vagueness ‘all the way down’: logical-space can be divided into basic propositions that settle all precise matters, but it is vague where those divisions lie.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gałecki

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-107
Author(s):  
Y. Domanskii

Using an excerpt from Stanisław Lem’s Solaris, this article explores the idea that, in a literary text, a fictional world and the world of physical reality may interact to form such a reality that can paradoxically turn out to be more real than what we believe to be the actual reality. It is also shown that the fictional world realized in a literary text may bring the reader to certain conclusions about the world in which he or she lives. Thus, even if literature is in­capable of affecting reality, it can change the way the latter is perceived. A fictional world is not just a reality — it is a reality of a higher order.


Author(s):  
W. J. Torres Bobadilla ◽  
G. F. R. Sborlini ◽  
P. Banerjee ◽  
S. Catani ◽  
A. L. Cherchiglia ◽  
...  

AbstractIn this manuscript, we report the outcome of the topical workshop: paving the way to alternative NNLO strategies (https://indico.ific.uv.es/e/WorkStop-ThinkStart_3.0), by presenting a discussion about different frameworks to perform precise higher-order computations for high-energy physics. These approaches implement novel strategies to deal with infrared and ultraviolet singularities in quantum field theories. A special emphasis is devoted to the local cancellation of these singularities, which can enhance the efficiency of computations and lead to discover novel mathematical properties in quantum field theories.


Author(s):  
Walter Mahler ◽  
Sandra Reder

Twenty one adults looked at emotional (sad, happy, fearful) or neutral faces. EEG measures showed that emotional significance of face (stimulus type) modulated the amplitude of EEG, especially for theta and delta frequency band power. Also, emotional discrimination by theta was more distributed on the posterior sites of the scalp for the emotional stimuli. Thus, this frequency band variation could represent a complex set of cognitive processes whereby selective attention becomes focused on an emotional-relevant stimulus.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.A. Ryabichenko

This study examines the role of ethnic minorities’ values in preferences for different acculturation strategies. We used Berry’s bidimensional model of acculturation, and Schwartz’s refined theory of 19 basic values. We hypothesized that individual values associate with acculturation preferences of ethnic minorities’. The sample consisted of two groups of adolescents, Russians and Poles, aged from 15 to 21 years old (N = 298). Using k-means clustering we assigned participants in four acculturation clusters: in- tegration, assimilation, marginalization, and separation. Profiles, which correspond to the four Schwartz higher-order values across clusters and groups, were compared through ANOVA measures. The analysis has shown that participants in the assimilation cluster scored significantly higher on Self-Enhancement than participants in the integration cluster. The article was prepared within the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) and supported within the framework of a subsidy by the Russian Academic Excellence Project '5-100'.


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