The impact of the type of private health insurance on equity in health care: Drawing on policy implications through the experience of developed countries

AbstractEquity in health care financing is recognised as a main goal in health policy. It implies that payments should be linked to capacity to pay and that households should be protected against catastrophic health expenditure (CHE). The risk of CHE is inversely related to the share of out-of-pocket payments (OOP) in total health expenditure. In Portugal, OOP represented 26% of total health expenditure in 2010 [one of the highest among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries]. This study aims to identify the proportion of households with CHE in Portugal and the household factors associated with this outcome. Additionally, progressivity indices are calculated for OOP and private health insurance. Data were taken from the Portuguese Household Budget Survey 2010/2011. The prevalence of CHE is 2.1%, which is high for a developed country with a universal National Health Service. The main factor associated with CHE is the presence of at least one elderly person in households (when the risk quadruples). Payments are particularly regressive for medicines. Regarding the results by regions, the Kakwani index for total OOP is larger (negative) for the Centre and lower, not significant, for the Azores. Payments for voluntary health insurance are progressive.

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Voluntary private health insurance, health-related behaviours and health outcomes: evidence from Russia

The European Journal of Health Economics ◽

10.1007/s10198-020-01252-2 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Andrey Aistov ◽

Ekaterina Aleksandrova ◽

Christopher J. Gerry

Keyword(s):

Health Care ◽

Health Insurance ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Private Health Insurance ◽

Health Behaviours ◽

Ex Post ◽

Ex Ante ◽

Supplemental Health Insurance ◽

Self Assessed Health ◽

The Impact

AbstractThis paper contributes to the discussion around ex-post (increased utilisation of health care) and ex-ante (changes in health behaviours) moral hazard in supplemental private health insurance. Applying a range of methodologies to data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey—Higher School of Economics we exploit a selection mechanism in the data to compare the impact of workplace provided and individually purchased supplemental health insurance on the utilisation of health care, on a range of health behaviours and on self-assessed health. We find compelling policy-relevant evidence of ex-post moral hazard that confirms a theoretical prediction and empirical regularity found in other settings. In contrast to other empirical findings though, our data reveals evidence of ex-ante moral hazard demonstrated by clear behavioural differences between those with self-funded supplemental health insurance and those for whom the workplace finances the additional insurance. We find no evidence that either form of insurance is related to improved self-assessed health.

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