scholarly journals The Normativity of Meaning: Kripke and McDowell

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (null) ◽  
pp. 213-239
Author(s):  
Kim Young-Kun
Keyword(s):  
Normativity Of Meaning

Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning

2004 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
LIONEL SHAPIRO
Keyword(s):  
Normativity Of Meaning

The Normativity of Meaning Revisited

2019 ◽  
pp. 295-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Johann Glock
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Evolution Of Language ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
Correct Application ◽  
Linguistic Behaviour ◽  
Normativity Of Meaning ◽  
Semantic Normativity ◽  
And Linguistics ◽  
Normative Status

The question of whether meaning is inherently normative has become a central topic in philosophy and linguistics. It also has crucial implications for anthropology and for understanding the evolution of language. This chapter defends the normativity of meaning against some recent challenges. Anti-normativists contend that while there are “semantic principles”—aka explanations of meaning—specifying conditions for the correct application of expressions, these are either not genuinely normative or they are not in fact constitutive of meaning. This dilemma can be defused if one clarifies the notions of norm, rule, and convention, distinguishes different dimensions of semantic normativity, and pays attention to different types of mistakes that can afflict linguistic behaviour. One needs to keep apart: norms of truth and of meaning, regulative and constitutive rules, rules and the reasons for following or disregarding them, pro tanto and all things considered obligations. On that basis the chapter argues that correctness is a normative notion and that constitutive rules in general and explanations of meaning in particular play various normative roles in linguistic practices. Furthermore, while speakers may conform to and occasionally violate semantic principle for defeasible prudential reasons, this is perfectly compatible with the principles having a normative status. The final section discusses the question of whether human communication requires communally shared rules or conventions and the age-old problem of circularity: how could such conventions be essential to language, given that the latter appears prerequisite for establishing and communicating conventions in the first place?

scholarly journals Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning

Philosophia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaroslav Peregrin
Keyword(s):  
Normativity Of Meaning

scholarly journals What is the Normativity of Meaning?

Inquiry ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Whiting
Keyword(s):  
Normativity Of Meaning

The Normativity of Meaning

2017 ◽  
pp. 43-77
Author(s):  
Thomas McNally
Keyword(s):  
Normativity Of Meaning

scholarly journals The normativity of meaning and the hard problem of intentionality

Inquiry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (7) ◽  
pp. 742-754
Author(s):  
Anandi Hattiangadi
Keyword(s):  
Hard Problem ◽  
Normativity Of Meaning ◽  
The Hard Problem

scholarly journals Una concepción pragmatista sobre las reglas

Daímon ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pedro Antonio García Jorge
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Normativity Of Meaning ◽  
Metaphysical Priority

La defensa de la normatividad del significado ha derivado en el debate sobre la prioridad metafísica de las reglas o del significado (cfr. Glüer & Wikforss, 2018). Sin embargo, la defensa de la prioridad de las reglas no es más que una variante del intelectualismo y, por ende, está sujeta a las mismas críticas que éste, mientras que la defensa de la prioridad del significado deja sin respuesta a la pregunta metasemántica ¿cómo es qué el lenguaje es significativo? Una concepción pragmatista sobre las reglas permite superar el debate evitando el intelectualismo y proporcionando una respuesta a la pregunta metasemántica. Defending the normativity of meaning has led to the debate about the metaphysical priority either or rules or meaning (cfr. Glüer & Wikforss, 2018). On the one hand, defending priority of rules is just a variant of intellectualism and, therefore, it is subject to the same criticisms. On the other hand, defending priority of meaning leaves unanswered the meta-semantic question: how is it that language is significant? A pragmatic conception of rules makes it possible to overcome the debate by avoiding intellectualism and providing an answer to the meta-semantic question.

Cognitive Psychology and the Metaphysics of Meaning

2019 ◽  
pp. 183-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Johnston ◽  
Sarah-Jane Leslie
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Personal Identity ◽  
Prototype Theory ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Know How ◽  
Cue Validity ◽  
Normativity Of Meaning ◽  
Explanatory Structure ◽  
Method Of Cases

This chapter distinguishes the clusters of psychologically real heuristics that govern our use of terms—the “psi-concepts”—from the “phi-concepts” or meanings that are the semantic determinants of the extensions of the terms in question, and hence of the truth-conditions of the sentences that contain those terms. Concerning the psi-concepts the chapter proposes a new, empirically motivated, and philosophically consequential amendment to both the theory-theory and the prototype theory, namely the generic encoding hypothesis: the heuristics which typically guide our use of terms by exploiting prevalence, cue-validity, and causal explanatory structure are properly formulated in generic terms. The chapter then explores the philosophical consequences of the generic encoding hypothesis, exploring its destructive impact on the method of cases (with particular attention to its use in the philosophy of personal identity), philosophical analysis, the “normativity of meaning,” and the idea that we know how to use terms by grasping meanings.

The Normativity of Meaning

2002 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 57-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Millar
Keyword(s):  
Rule Following ◽  
Allan Gibbard ◽  
Normativity Of Meaning ◽  
Answering Questions

In a discussion of rule-following inspired by Wittgenstein, Kripke asks us to consider the relation which holds between meaning plus by ‘+’ and answering questions like, ‘What is the sum of 68 and 57?’. A dispositional theory has it that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then you will probably answer, ‘125’. That is because, according to such a theory, to mean plus by ‘+’ is, roughly speaking, to be disposed, by and large, and among other things, to answer such questions with the correct sum. Kripke wants to emphasize, by contrast, that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then, faced with the question, ‘What is 68 + 57?’ you ought to answer, ‘125’. One could sum up the assumption about meaning which appears to underpin this criticism of dispositional theories in terms of the slogan that meaning is normative. Allan Gibbard gives us a way of reading that slogan which is suggested by Kripke's brief remarks:The crux of the slogan that meaning is normative … might be another slogan: that means implies ought. To use roughly Kripke's example, from statements saying what I mean by the plus sign and other arithmetic terms and constructions, it will follow that I ought to answer ‘7’ when asked ‘What's 5 + 2?’.

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