scholarly journals Freedom from Nuclear Weapons? IHRL And IHL Perspective vs the State-Centred Approach

2020 ◽  
pp. 137-153
Author(s):  
Julia Kapelańska-Pręgowska

23 years after the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, a general treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons has been adopted. It may be anticipated that the TPNW will probably not enter into force very soon, and when it does, it will neither be universally accepted, nor will it significantly influence thepractice of the nuclear weapon States. It is therefore justified to analyse the problem under consideration, not from a State-oriented perspective, but from a human and environmentally centred one. The article argues not only that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, but it would also violate international human rights law. The article further dwells upon the customary international law aspects of the problem under consideration.

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 449-472 ◽  
Author(s):  
VAIOS KOUTROULIS

AbstractThe equal application of international humanitarian law (jus in bello) to all parties to an international armed conflict is a cornerstone principle of jus in bello. In his article, Professor Mandel casts doubt on the legal basis of this principle. Reacting to this claim, this contribution demonstrates that the ‘equality of belligerents’ is a principle firmly grounded in both conventional and customary international law. Moreover, its legal force withstands the test of international jurisprudence, including the International Court of Justice's controversial Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.


2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 663-680
Author(s):  
Stuart Casey-Maslen

AbstractInternational human rights law is an as-yet underused branch of international law when assessing the legality of nuclear weapons and advocating for their elimination. It offers a far greater range of implementation mechanisms than does international humanitarian law (IHL), and arguably strengthens the protections afforded to civilians and combatants under IHL, particularly in non-international armed conflict. Of particular relevance are the rights to life, to humane treatment, to health and to a healthy environment, associated with the right to a remedy for violations of any human rights.


Author(s):  
Reuben Cronjé ◽  
Sarah McGibbon

The recent demise of arch-terrorist Osama bin Laden at the hands of United States (US) Navy Seals has given rise to furious debate as to the legality thereof. The broadest question to ask is whether bin Laden’s killing can be justified in terms of international law. Indeed, it is not even clear which legal paradigm should be utilised to answer this conundrum. In this article it will be shown that the American term, ‘war on terror’, does not fit neatly into the definition of either an international or non-international armed conflict and is therefore not comfortably governed by the rules of either. The concept of selfdefence, desperately needing clarification, will then be proposed as something which operates outside these two paradigms. The aforementioned discussions will lead to an analysis of whether the correct over-arching legal system to apply is international humanitarian law (the law of war) or international human rights law; or whether these two can legitimately operate concurrently. Finally, some brief thoughts will be added regarding the legality of the actual killing of bin Laden.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyassu Gayim

Laws regulate conducts by responding to social and political requirements. This holds true for the law of nations as well. Contemporary international law follows two separate tracks when it comes to regulating human rights and humanitarian questions. If international human rights law and international humanitarian law are intended to protect the dignity and worth of human beings, as it is often said, why follow separate tracks? Does humanity really exist? If it does, how does it relate to human rights? If the two are distinct, where do they converge? This article highlights these questions by revisiting the contours of international law.


Author(s):  
Paul David Mora

SummaryIn its recent decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Italy had failed to respect immunities enjoyed by Germany under international law when the Italian courts allowed civil actions to be brought against Germany for alleged violations of international human rights law (IHRL) and the law of armed conflict (LOAC) committed during the Second World War. This article evaluates the three arguments raised by Italy to justify its denial of immunity: first, that peremptory norms of international law prevail over international rules on jurisdictional immunities; second, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for serious violations of IHRL or the LOAC; and third, that customary international law recognizes an exception to immunity for torts committed by foreign armed forces on the territory of the forum state in the course of an armed conflict. The author concludes that the ICJ was correct to find that none of these arguments deprived Germany of its right under international law to immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the Italian courts.


2019 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Knut Traisbach

This chapter is a comment on a reflection by Frédéric Mégret on the limits of the laws of war. It proposes a jurisprudence of limits that focuses less on absolute ideals but on the compromising and enabling space ‘in-between’ these absolutes. Relying on Hannah Arendt’s views on different conceptions of humanity, the comment critically engages with a thinking in terms of inherent opposing interests and oscillations between them. A conception of limits as reproducing inherent absolutes is disabling and passive. Instead, limits can be understood as facilitating a space that enables us to judge and to act, also through compromise. International humanitarian law and international human rights law, perhaps more than other areas of international law, depend on preserving and actively seeking this politically relevant space.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Marie Kamatali

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has experienced a decrease in international conflict and a significant increase in non-international armed conflict (niac). Despite this change, however, international law has been very slow in adapting its laws that initially were crafted with international armed conflict in mind to the new niac environment. There is a growing recognition that international humanitarian law (ihl) is not well equipped to deal with issues of human rights violations committed during niac. New efforts to make international human rights law (ihrl) applicable in such conflicts have, however, raised more questions than answers. There is still no consensus on whether international human rights law applies to niac. Furthermore, the question on whether non-international armed groups are bound by international human rights obligations remains controversial. This article tries to analyze where international law stands now of these questions. It proposes steps international law could follow to move from its current rhetoric to a more practical solution on these questions. The three solutions proposed are: individual agreements to respect human rights during armed conflict, the possibility of an icj advisory opinion and the option of a protocol additional to international human rights treaties relating to their application in niac.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.


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