Wage-setting Institutions and Outcomes

Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
2004 ◽  
pp. 66-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Kapelyushnikov

The paper examines a specific model of wage-setting evolved in Russia under transition. Using new survey data author reveals paradoxical characteristics of wage-setting mechanisms at Russian industrial enterprises: very high union and collective agreement coverage; nearly unilateral control of managers over wage determination; close correlation between earnings and enterprises' performance; voluntary utilization of wage standards established by the state. The special section explores effects of fulfilling a new provision stipulated for by the recently adopted Labor Code to raise minimum wage to the subsistence minimum level. The author concludes that wage-setting in the Russian labor market is at odds with a textbook competitive model and poorly fits into many other sophisticated theoretical schemes (such as labor-managed firms, bargaining models etc.).


2016 ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
R. Kapeliushnikov ◽  
A. Lukyanova

Using panel data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for 2006-2014, the paper investigates reservation wages setting in the Russian labor market. The sample includes non-employed individuals wishing to get a job (both searchers and non-searchers). The first part of the paper provides a survey of previous empirical studies, describes data and analyzes subjective estimates of reservation wages in comparison with various objective indicators of actual wages. The analysis shows that wage aspirations of the majority of Russian non-employed individuals are overstated. However their wage expectations are rather flexible and decrease rapidly as the search continues that prevents high long-term unemployment. The second part of the paper provides an econometric analysis of main determinants of reservation wage and its impact on probability of re-employment and wages on searchers’ new jobs.


Author(s):  
Philippe Askenazy ◽  
Bruno Palier

This chapter describes France as apparently one of the few rich countries to have avoided a significant increase in income inequality in recent decades. However, stable average inequalities mask an asymmetric trend of income between age groups, the elderly improving their situation while the young see theirs worsening. Furthermore, it shows that behind this relatively still surface, a general trend of precarization of more and more ordinary workers is occurring. The importance of wage-setting processes and of regulation of the labour market is brought out, together with the way the tax and transfer systems have operated, in restraining the forces driving inequality upwards. Wage growth, while limited, has thus been reasonably uniform across the distribution and together with the redistributive system have kept household income inequality within bounds. However, in response to high unemployment both regulatory and tax–transfer systems have served to underpin the very rapid growth in precarious working over the last decade, representing a very serious challenge for policy.


Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.


2011 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 596-615
Author(s):  
Aaron Rathmell

This article examines the relation between function and form in the main Australian federal industrial tribunals, drawing on process jurisprudence, in particular the work of Lon Fuller. It suggests that the structures and procedures of the tribunals can be set against Fuller's idealized features of adjudication, in order to draw out their most important and innovative features. Of particular interest are the distinctive ways that the tribunals have mediated the participation of the industrial parties and tackled complicated problems such as wage-setting. The aim is to focus attention on procedural design and encourage research into the tribunals’ contributions to the rule of law in the industrial context. This should also lead to a better understanding of the continuities, discontinuities and dilemmas represented in the new umpire, Fair Work Australia.


2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-356
Author(s):  
Jan Babecký ◽  
Kamil Galuščák ◽  
Diana Žigraiová

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ignacio Giménez-Nadal ◽  
José Alberto Molina ◽  
Jorge Velilla

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