scholarly journals The Source of Autocratic Recalcitrance to Sanction Threats

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pi Cheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
2000 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 542-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheila Royo Maxwell

During the past decade, court-ordered diversion and treatment procedures have proliferated in response to the problems of court congestion and prison overcrowding. Underlying these court orders are stiff sanctions that are often used to threaten offenders to comply with the court's mandate. Given the widespread use of court orders and their stiff penalties for violations, the effectiveness of sanction threats in enforcing compliance among offenders has rarely been examined. Using a sample of offenders mandated by the courts into drug treatment, this article examines the effects of sanction threat on the offenders' perceptions of threat and their lengths of stay in drug treatment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 617-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Jacobs ◽  
Michael Cherbonneau

Objective: To examine the theoretical import of nerve management for offender decision-making and crime accomplishment. Methods: Data were culled from in-depth, semistructured interviews with 35 active auto thieves. Results: Nerve management is best considered an intervening exercise in the threat perception process that moderates the fear-offending relationship through its effect on nervousness. Offenders draw from both cognitive and presentational tactics to this end. Such tactics include self-medication, shunting, fatalism, smoothness, and lens widening. Conclusions: Since nervousness is both caused by sanction threats and produces conduct that potentially neutralizes those threats, nerve management is best considered an agentic response that modifies the perception of risk itself.


2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 343-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Greg Pogarsky ◽  
Alex R. Piquero ◽  
Ray Paternoster

1999 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
John K. Cochran ◽  
Mitchell B. Chamlin ◽  
Peter B. Wood ◽  
Christine S. Sellers

2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy M Peterson

I contend that a state’s position in the global trade network affects the initiation and outcome of sanction threats. A state is vulnerable, and thus more likely to acquiesce, when its trade has low value to trade partners that are well connected to the global trade network. Conversely, a state has leverage that could motivate the use of sanction threats when its trade has high value to trade partners that are otherwise not well connected. Capturing leverage/vulnerability with an interaction between two network centrality measures, results indicate that vulnerability is associated with acquiescence to sanctions, while leverage is associated with threat initiation.


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