Trade Composition and Acquiescence to Sanction Threats

In this article, we argue that the composition of trade is an important determinant of vulnerability to sanctions. Trade composition has changed considerably over the years since World War II, with growth in intra-industry trade: the exchange of similar, often branded, commodities that follows from varied consumer preferences and economies of scale. Conversely, we see relatively less of the traditional inter-industry trade: exchange of distinct and often homogeneous commodities that follows from comparative advantage. We demonstrate that targets maintaining higher proportions of intra-industry trade with senders benefit from greater resilience against economic coercion and thus are less likely to acquiesce to sanction threats. Importantly, however, we contend that bilateral intra-industry trade does not necessarily prevent the onset of sanction threats. Statistical tests of sanction threat cases and directed dyad-years spanning 1962–2005 support our expectations.

Self-Control, Sanction Threats, Temptation, and Crime: Examining Contingencies of Self-Control in a Cross-National Context

Using a representative household survey data, we examine the generality of self-control, the predictive strengths of sanction threats, and the interaction between criminal propensity and sanction threats in explaining criminal probability. Although the data confirm the generality of self-control predictions of deviant/criminal behavior in the Turkish cultural context, the effects appear quite modest and contingent on fear of informal sanctions and temptation. Consistent with the findings of recent studies, a small interaction between self-control and sanction threats suggests that deterrence is greatest among individuals with weak self-control. However, there is no interaction between sanction threats and temptation, suggesting that sanction fear is equally likely among individuals regardless of their level of temptation.

Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion

I contend that a state’s position in the global trade network affects the initiation and outcome of sanction threats. A state is vulnerable, and thus more likely to acquiesce, when its trade has low value to trade partners that are well connected to the global trade network. Conversely, a state has leverage that could motivate the use of sanction threats when its trade has high value to trade partners that are otherwise not well connected. Capturing leverage/vulnerability with an interaction between two network centrality measures, results indicate that vulnerability is associated with acquiescence to sanctions, while leverage is associated with threat initiation.

Rational Choice Theory and Interest in the “Fortune of Others”

Objectives: We test the relationship between other-regarding preferences (concerns for other people) and intentions to drink and drive and whether these preferences condition the effect of sanction threats on willingness to drink and drive. Methods: A sample of university undergraduates played common economic games (dictator and ultimatum games) and responded to a hypothetical scenario about drinking and driving. Ordinary least squares regression models were used with the full sample and then separate samples for those with differing levels of other-regarding preferences (social preferences). Results: Net of other factors including sanction threats, demographics, measures of individual propensity, and previous experience with drinking and driving, those with strong other-regarding preferences (as indicated by responses to dictator and ultimatum games) were less likely to state that they would drive while drunk under the conditions described by the scenario. In support of differential deterrence, the self-interested were deterred by sanction threats, but those with stronger other-regarding preferences were not deterred by the perceived certainty of sanctions. Conclusions: Our findings speak to the importance of more than self-interest in explaining antisocial behavior and thereby expanding the conceptual boundaries of rational choice theory to include more than self-interest.

Nerve Management and Crime Accomplishment

Objective: To examine the theoretical import of nerve management for offender decision-making and crime accomplishment. Methods: Data were culled from in-depth, semistructured interviews with 35 active auto thieves. Results: Nerve management is best considered an intervening exercise in the threat perception process that moderates the fear-offending relationship through its effect on nervousness. Offenders draw from both cognitive and presentational tactics to this end. Such tactics include self-medication, shunting, fatalism, smoothness, and lens widening. Conclusions: Since nervousness is both caused by sanction threats and produces conduct that potentially neutralizes those threats, nerve management is best considered an agentic response that modifies the perception of risk itself.