<b>MODERATE HOLISM: ANSWERING TO CRITICISM AND EXPLAINING LINGUISTIC PHENOMENA<b/>

Kênio Angelo Dantas Freitas Estrela

doi:10.18224/frag.v28i2.6061

MODERATE HOLISM: ANSWERING TO CRITICISM AND EXPLAINING LINGUISTIC PHENOMENA

Revista Fragmentos de Cultura - Revista Interdisciplinar de Ciências Humanas ◽

10.18224/frag.v28i2.6061 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 28 (2) ◽

pp. 258

Author(s):

Kênio Angelo Dantas Freitas Estrela

Keyword(s):

Semantic Holism ◽

Meaning Holism

In this paper I present a version of meaning holism proposed by Henry Jackman (1999a, 1999b, 2005 and 2015) entitled "moderate holism". I will argue that this moderate version of holism, in addition to responding to much of the criticism attributed to traditional semantic holism (such as translation, disagreement, change of mind and communication), is also extremely useful to explain the occurrence of several, such as vagueness and polysemy. HOLISMO SEMÂNTICO MODERADO E FENÔMENOS LINGUÍSTICOS Neste artigo tenho o objetivo de apresentar uma versão do holismo semântico tradicional proposta por Henry Jackman (1999a, 1999b, 2005 e 2015) intitulada “holismo semântico moderado”. Defenderei que esta versão moderada do holismo, além de responder grande parte das críticas atribuídas ao holismo semântico tradicional (como a tradução, o desacordo, a mudança de opinião e comunicação), também se faz extremamente útil para explicar a ocorrência de diversos fenômenos linguísticos, como, por exemplo: a vagueza e a polissemia.

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Meaning Holism

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0010 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Peter Pagin

Keyword(s):

The Other ◽

Semantic Property ◽

Linguistic Expression ◽

Common View ◽

Semantic Holism ◽

Theory Formulation ◽

Related Idea ◽

Meaning Holism

The term ‘meaning holism’ (together with variants like ‘semantic holism’ and ‘linguistic holism’) has been used for a number of more or less closely interrelated ideas. According to one common view, meaning holism (MH) is the thesis that what a linguistic expression means depends on its relations to many or all other expressions within the same totality. Sometimes these relations are called ‘conceptual’ or ‘inferential’. A related idea is that what an expression means depends, mutually, on the meaning of the other expressions in the totality, or alternatively on some semantic property of this totality itself. The totality in question may be the language to which the expressions belong, or a theory formulation in that language.

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Objections, Replies, and Clarifications

10.1093/oso/9780198814719.003.0014 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Herman Cappelen

Keyword(s):

Not Given ◽

Conceptual Engineering ◽

Meaning Holism

This chapter considers seven objections to the view of conceptual engineering put forward in this book. It responds to a worry about topic presentation. It responds to the charge of having not given a full defense of externalism, or a theory of control, and returns to the aversion to concepts. It then considers some other objections to do with meaning holism, change in thoughts, and confronts the gloomy possibility that engineering makes things worse—that what we think of as amelioration is in fact deterioration.

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Semantic holism

Studia Logica ◽

10.1007/bf00401554 ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 49 (1) ◽

pp. 67-82 ◽

Cited By ~ 9

Author(s):

Nuel D Belnap ◽

Gerald J. Massey

Keyword(s):

Semantic Holism

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Spinoza on Skepticism

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195335828.013.005 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Dominik Perler

Keyword(s):

Historical Context ◽

Preventive Strategy ◽

Semantic Holism ◽

Radical Skepticism ◽

Basic Assumptions

Spinoza never discusses the scenario of radical skepticism as it was introduced by Descartes. Why not? This chapter argues that he chooses a preventive strategy: instead of taking the skeptical challenge as it is and trying to refute it, he questions the challenge itself and gives a diagnosis of its origin. It is a combination of semantic atomism, dualism, and anti-naturalism that gives rise to radical doubts. Spinoza attacks these basic assumptions, opting instead for semantic holism, anti-dualism, and naturalism. This crucial shift of basic assumptions prevents radical skepticism from arising. To be sure, local doubts are still possible, but the possibility of global doubt is ruled out. The chapter examines this preventive strategy, situating it in the historical context and building a bridge to more recent anti-skeptical strategies.

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