A legal perspective: Autonomous weapon systems under international humanitarian law

Author(s):  
Neil Davison
2008 ◽  
Vol 90 (870) ◽  
pp. 303-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamie Allan Williamson

AbstractUnder international humanitarian law commanders have been entrusted with the task of ensuring respect for that body of law by their subordinates. This responsibility includes not only the training in IHL of those under their command, but also the taking of necessary measures to prevent or punish subordinates committing violations of IHL. Failure by a commander to do so will give rise to criminal liability, often termed superior responsibility. The following article reviews some of the issues arising from the application and development of this form of responsibility, from both a practical and a legal perspective.


1. The use of weapons in outer space – be it through kinetic or non-kinetic means, using space- and/or ground-based weapon systems – could have significant impacts on civilians on earth. This is because technology enabled by space systems permeates most aspects of civilian life, making the potential consequences of attacks on space systems a matter of humanitarian concern.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 483-514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Backstrom ◽  
Ian Henderson

AbstractThe increasing complexity of weapon systems requires an interdisciplinary approach to the conduct of weapon reviews. Developers need to be aware of international humanitarian law principles that apply to the employment of weapons. Lawyers need to be aware of how a weapon will be operationally employed and use this knowledge to help formulate meaningful operational guidelines in light of any technological issues identified in relation to international humanitarian law. As the details of a weapon's capability are often highly classified and compartmentalized, lawyers, engineers, and operators need to work cooperatively and imaginatively to overcome security classification and compartmental access limitations.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 922-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kaye ◽  
Steven A. Solomon

The United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) of 1980 regulates the use in armed conflict of certain conventional arms deemed to cause excessive suffering to combatants or indiscriminate harm to civilian populations. In December 2001, CCW high contracting parties concluded a Second Review Conference of the Convention in Geneva. Unlike the First Review Conference of 1995-1996, which focused on land mines and blinding laser weapons, the Second Review Conference attracted modest public and media attention. This difference was due in part to the fact that the conference principally focused on an improvement of the Convention thatwasjuridicalin nature, lacking an “optical” quality typically associated with proposals to restrict particular weapon systems. Even so, the conference generated substantial governmental interest and a remarkable development in international humanitarian law: expansion of the scope of application of the Convention, previously limited to conflicts between sovereign states, to noninternational armed conflicts. This expanded scope, if widely observed, should influence the use of particular weapons in internal armed conflicts. More important, the expansion reinforces the trend toward reducing the distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts for purposes of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. This trend carries implications both for which weapons are used in warfare and how, and for the international criminalization of violations of the rules of noninternational armed conflict.


2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjølv Egeland

Robots formerly belonged to the realm of fiction, but are now becoming a practical issue for the disarmament community. While some believe that military robots could act more ethically than human soldiers on the battlefield, others have countered that such a scenario is highly unlikely, and that the technology in question should be banned. Autonomous weapon systems will be unable to discriminate between soldiers and civilians, and their use will lower the threshold to resort to the use of force, they argue. In this article, I take a bird’s-eye look at the international humanitarian law (ihl) pertaining to autonomous weapon systems. My argument is twofold: First, I argue that it is indeed difficult to imagine how ihl could be implemented by algorithm. The rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions all call for what are arguably unquantifiable decisions. Second, I argue that existing humanitarian law in many ways presupposes responsible human agency.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document