The Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 922-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kaye ◽  
Steven A. Solomon

The United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) of 1980 regulates the use in armed conflict of certain conventional arms deemed to cause excessive suffering to combatants or indiscriminate harm to civilian populations. In December 2001, CCW high contracting parties concluded a Second Review Conference of the Convention in Geneva. Unlike the First Review Conference of 1995-1996, which focused on land mines and blinding laser weapons, the Second Review Conference attracted modest public and media attention. This difference was due in part to the fact that the conference principally focused on an improvement of the Convention thatwasjuridicalin nature, lacking an “optical” quality typically associated with proposals to restrict particular weapon systems. Even so, the conference generated substantial governmental interest and a remarkable development in international humanitarian law: expansion of the scope of application of the Convention, previously limited to conflicts between sovereign states, to noninternational armed conflicts. This expanded scope, if widely observed, should influence the use of particular weapons in internal armed conflicts. More important, the expansion reinforces the trend toward reducing the distinction between international and noninternational armed conflicts for purposes of the rules governing the conduct of hostilities. This trend carries implications both for which weapons are used in warfare and how, and for the international criminalization of violations of the rules of noninternational armed conflict.

1990 ◽  
Vol 30 (279) ◽  
pp. 551-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Plattner

Having reached the tenth anniversary of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, adopted on 10 October 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the 1980 Convention), we can measure the progress brought about by the treaty within the limits which the law sets for the suffering caused by war. Paradoxically, however, we are witnessing an increasing number of situations which, in form at least, fall outside the scope of application of the 1980 Convention, namely non-international armed conflicts.Yet international humanitarian law on methods and means of combat includes general rules applicable to all armed conflict, and hence to non-international armed conflicts too. The provisions of the 1980 Convention are an application of those general rules to the means of combat which the treaty is intended to regulate. The question thus arises whether some of the rules of conduct laid down in the 1980 Convention are applicable to all armed conflicts, whether international or non-international. In the present study, we shall attempt to reply at least to some extent to that question.


Author(s):  
L. C. Green

The second session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable to Armed Conflicts met in Geneva from February 3 until April 18, 1975. The purpose of this session of the Conference was the adoption — or perhaps more correctly the successful drafting — of two Protocols to be added to the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949, in order to protect further the victims of international and non-international conflicts respectively; it was also to consider proposals directed to the humanization of methods of warfare, including the prohibition or restriction of conventional weapons considered to be purely indiscriminate or likely to cause an amount of suffering disproportionate to the purpose of the armed conflict.


1994 ◽  
Vol 34 (302) ◽  
pp. 450-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Gasser

In its Final Declaration of 1 September 1993, the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims inter alia urged all States to make every effort to:“Consider or reconsider, in order to enhance the universal character of international humanitarian law, becoming party or confirming their succession, where appropriate, to the relevant treaties concluded since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular:—the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol I);—the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977 (Protocol II);—the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and its three Protocols;—The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict”.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 827-852 ◽  
Author(s):  
VAIOS KOUTROULIS

AbstractThis article examines several questions relating to international humanitarian law (jus in bello) with respect to the conflicts against the Islamic State. The first question explored is the classification of conflicts against the Islamic State and the relevant applicable law. The situation in Iraq is a rather classic non-international armed conflict between a state and a non-state actor with third states intervening alongside governmental forces. The situation in Syria is more controversial, especially with respect to the coalition's airstrikes against the Islamic State on Syrian territory. If the Syrian government is considered as not having consented to the coalition's operations, then, according to this author's view, the coalition is involved in two distinct armed conflicts: an international armed conflict with the Syrian government and a non-international armed conflict with the Islamic State. The second question analyzed in the article bears on the geographical scope of application of international humanitarian law. In this context, the article examines whether humanitarian law applies: in the entire territory of the state in whose territory the hostilities take place, in the territories of the intervening states, and in the territory of a third state.


Author(s):  
Kleffner Jann K

This chapter addresses the scope of application of international humanitarian law. International humanitarian law regulates, and as a rule applies in times of, armed conflicts. Accordingly, it is also referred to as the law of armed conflict or jus in bello. The three interchangeable terms denote the only branch of public international law that is specifically designed to strike a balance during armed conflicts between preserving humanitarian values, on the one hand, and considerations of military necessity, on the other by protecting those who do not or no longer directly participate in hostilities and by limiting the right of parties to the conflict to use armed force only to the amount necessary to achieve the aim of the conflict, which is to weaken the military potential of the enemy. While international humanitarian law specifically regulates situations of armed conflicts, it does not automatically supersede all other areas of public international law in the event of an armed conflict. The chapter then focuses on the law enforcement aspects, the continued relevance of rules of international law of peace during armed conflict, and the relevance of humanitarian law in peacetime and post-conflict military operations.


2003 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 345-365
Author(s):  
Steven A. Solomon

Efforts to regulate warfare, including the use of particular weapons, have a long history, dating back, according to some scholars, thousands of years. But international codification of the rules of war in binding multilateral legal instruments only began in the second half of the nineteenth century. Among the first such efforts was one devoted to the prohibition of the use of a particular weapon in wartime. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 on exploding bullets banned the use of explosive projectiles under 400 grammes in weight and is generally recognised as constituting the first significant international instrument prohibiting a specific weapon. It also incorporated into the conventional law of armed conflict the customary principle prohibiting the use of weapons ‘of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’ — a tenet of international humanitarian law and a touchstone for many important international agreements on the use of weapons that have since followed, including the Hague Declaration of 1899 on expanding bullets, the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 and, most recently, the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons of 1980 (hereafter, CCW).


2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-26
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Severinova ◽  

The article analyzes the theoretical and methodological aspects of the formation and development of doctrinal ideas about the meaning of the concept of «armed conflict» in the history of world political and legal thought. The question of the name of the branch of law that regulates armed conflict, by analyzing its historical names such as «law of war», «laws and customs of war», «law of armed conflict», «international humanitarian law» and «international humanitarian law, used in armed conflicts». As a result of this analysis, it can be concluded that it would be most appropriate to use the terms «international humanitarian law» only in a narrow sense or «international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts», which is more cumbersome but most accurately describes the field. It is emphasized that due to the availability of new powerful weapons (economic, political, informational, cultural and weapons of mass destruction), which are dangerous both for the aggressor and for the whole world; the aggressor's desire to downplay its role in resolving conflicts in order to avoid sanctions from other countries and international organizations, as well as to prevent the loss of its authority and position on the world stage; the attempts of the aggressor countries to establish their control over the objects of aggression (including integrating them into their political, economic and security systems) without excessive damage to them is the transformation of methods and means of warfare. It is determined that the long history of the formation of the law of armed conflict has led to the adoption at the level of international law of the provision prohibiting any armed aggression in the world, which is reflected in such a principle as non-use of force or threat of force. At the same time, the UN Charter became the first international act in the history of mankind, which completely prohibited armed aggression and enshrined this principle at the international level, which is binding on all states of the modern world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 252-260
Author(s):  
Bartłomiej Krzan

Abstract The present study analyses climate change from the perspective of the law of armed conflict. Climate may be both a victim and a means of warfare. Arguably, the existing normative framework is broad enough to allow for accommodating climate change. It cannot be denied that the environment is easily harmed, or at least jeopardized in times of armed conflicts. Despite the obvious lack of explicit references in the instruments of international humanitarian law, it may be argued that it is possible to fit climate change in. The accompanying analysis addresses the respective potential and the ensuing hurdles.


Author(s):  
Bothe Michael

This chapter focuses on rules of the law of neutrality concerning the protection of the victims of armed conflicts, which must be considered as part of international humanitarian law. ‘Neutrality’ describes the particular status, as defined by international law, of a state not party to an armed conflict. This status entails specific rights and duties in the relationship between the neutral and the belligerent states. On one hand, there is the right of the neutral state to remain apart from, and not to be adversely affected by, the conflict. On the other hand, there is the duty of non-participation and impartiality. The right not to be adversely affected means that the relationship between the neutral and belligerent States is governed by the law of peace, which is modified only in certain respects by the law of neutrality. In particular, the neutral State must tolerate certain controls in the area of maritime commerce. The duty of non-participation means, above all, that the state must abstain from supporting a party to the conflict. This duty not to support also means that the neutral state is under a duty not to allow one party to the conflict to use the resources of the neutral state against the will of the opponent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 101 (910) ◽  
pp. 357-363

States party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977 have an obligation to take measures necessary to suppress all acts contrary to their provisions. Moreover, States must investigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or on their territory, and other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, such as on the basis of universal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. In accordance with these obligations and the limits they impose, States may adopt certain measures during and in the aftermath of armed conflicts to promote reconciliation and peace, one of which is amnesties. International humanitarian law (IHL) contains rules pertaining to the granting and scope of amnesties. Specifically, Article 6(5) of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) provides that, at the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. Importantly, under customary IHL (as identified in Rule 159 of the ICRC customary IHL study), this excludes persons suspected of, accused of, or sentenced for war crimes in NIACs.


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