Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 235-259
Author(s):  
Frank Sauer
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
United Nations Convention ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Weapons Systems

AbstractThis article explains why regulating autonomy in weapons systems, entailing the codification of a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, is such a challenging task within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is difficult because it requires new diplomatic language, and because the military value of weapon autonomy is hard to forego in the current arms control winter. The article argues that regulation is nevertheless imperative, because the strategic as well as ethical risks outweigh the military benefits of unshackled weapon autonomy. To this end, it offers some thoughts on how the implementation of regulation can be expedited.

scholarly journals Salience and the emergence of international norms: Napalm and cluster munitions in the inhumane weapons convention

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elvira Rosert
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
International Norms ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Cluster Munitions ◽  
Conventional Weapons

AbstractThis article theorises salience – defined as the amount of attention granted to an issue – as an explanatory factor for the emergence and non-emergence of norms, and shows how salience affects existing explanations such as issue adoption by norm entrepreneurs, mobilisation, social pressure, and framing. The relevance of salience is demonstrated by exploring the question of why the norm against incendiary weapons was adopted in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1980, and why the norm against cluster munitions was not, even though both weapons were deemed particularly inhumane and thus, put on the agenda when the CCW negotiations started in 1978. Drawing on secondary sources and on original data from public and institutional discourses, I study the influence of salience on the emergence of the anti-napalm norm and the non-emergence of the anti-cluster munitions norm in the period of 1945–80. The results demonstrate that and how the discrepancy in salience of the napalm and the cluster munitions issues mattered for the outcomes of the two norm-setting processes.

Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law

1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 325-348
Author(s):  
Marian Nash Leich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Conventional Weapons ◽  
Contemporary Practice

On January 7, 1997, President William J. Clinton transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the following Protocols to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: (A) the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-traps and Other Devices, adopted at Geneva on May 3, 1996 (Protocol II, or amended Mines Protocol); (B) the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, adopted at Geneva on October 10, 1980 (Protocol III, or the Incendiary Weapons Protocol) ; and (C) the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, adopted at Geneva on May 3, 1996 (Protocol IV).

scholarly journals Space for Change: The ASAT Tests in Outer Space in Light of the UN Liability Convention

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-102
Author(s):  
Adam Strobeyko
Keyword(s):  
Space Exploration ◽  
Outer Space ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Special Care ◽  
Shared Environment ◽  
Conventional Weapons

As space exploration is gathering pace, special care must be attributed to preserving outer space as a shared environment that can be explored freely by humankind. Currently, there exists no comprehensive legal framework regulating the use of conventional weapons in outer space. This has been made evident by repeated tests of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) which took place in the XXI century and produced massive amounts of debris, possibly interfering with the rights of other states to explore space freely. This article examines the rules provided by the UN Liability Convention and their application to ASAT tests in outer space. The author reviews academic suggestions in the field and concludes that a multilateral and comprehensive legal framework needs to be established in order to guarantee unrestrained exploration of space.

The Geneva Humanitarian Law Conference 1975

1976 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 295-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. C. Green
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Red Cross ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
Conventional Weapons

The second session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable to Armed Conflicts met in Geneva from February 3 until April 18, 1975. The purpose of this session of the Conference was the adoption — or perhaps more correctly the successful drafting — of two Protocols to be added to the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949, in order to protect further the victims of international and non-international conflicts respectively; it was also to consider proposals directed to the humanization of methods of warfare, including the prohibition or restriction of conventional weapons considered to be purely indiscriminate or likely to cause an amount of suffering disproportionate to the purpose of the armed conflict.

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