International co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the question of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1975 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Redick

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.


MRS Bulletin ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 340-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siegfried S. Hecker

Raj et al. describe the promise of nuclear energy as a sustainable, affordable, and carbon-free source available this century on a scale that can help meet the world's growing need for energy and help slow the pace of global climate change. However, the factor of millions gain in energy release from nuclear fssion compared to all conventional energy sources that tap the energy of electrons (Figure 1) has also been used to create explosives of unprecedented lethality and, hence, poses a serious challenge to the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide. Although the end of the cold war has eliminated the threat of annihilating humanity, the likelihood of a devastating nuclear attack has increased as more nations, subnational groups, and terrorists seek to acquire nuclear weapons.


Author(s):  
Kun-Mo Choi ◽  
Robert D. Hurt ◽  
Thomas E. Shea ◽  
Richard Nishimura

In designing future nuclear energy systems, it is important to consider the potential that such systems could be misused for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons. INPRO set out to provide guidance on incorporating proliferation resistance into innovative nuclear energy systems (INS). Generally two types of proliferation resistance measures are distinguished: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic features consist of technical design features that reduce the attractiveness of nuclear material for nuclear weapon program, or prevent the diversion of nuclear material or production of undeclared nuclear material for nuclear weapons. Extrinsic measures include commitments, obligations and policies of states such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards agreements. INPRO has produced five basic principles and five user requirements for INS. It emphasizes that INS must continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapon program. It also addresses as user requirements: 1) a balanced and optimised combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, 2) the development and implementation of intrinsic features, 3) an early consideration of proliferation resistance in the development of INS and 4) the utilization of intrinsic features to increase the efficiency of extrinsic measures. INPRO has also developed criteria, consisting of indicators and acceptance limits, which would be used by a state to assess how an INS satisfies those user requirements. For the first user requirement, the most important but complex one, INPRO provides a 3-layer hierarchy of indicators to assess how unattractive a specific INS would be as part of a nuclear weapon program. Attributes of nuclear material and facilities are used as indicators to assess intrinsic features. Extrinsic measures imposed on the system are also assessed. Indicators to assess defence in depth for proliferation resistance include the number and robustness of barriers, and the redundancy or complementarity of barriers. The cost of incorporating proliferation resistant features is used to assess the cost-effectiveness of any particular INS in providing proliferation resistance. The stages in the development of an INS at which proliferation resistance is considered in the process are assessed. Awareness of extrinsic measures by designers and use of intrinsic features for verification illustrate how intrinsic features facilitate extrinsic measures. An INPRO-consistent methodology to assess the proliferation resistance of an INS is still under development, with feedback expected from the case studies undertaken by Argentina, India, Russia and the Republic of Korea.


1984 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-351
Author(s):  
Michael Antrim

Michael Antrim teaches in Omaha, Nebraska, the home of the Stategic Air Command. In this chronicle, he describes a science week he designed for high school students which includes class lessons, field trips, guest speakers, and experiments on nuclear power and nuclear weapons.


1976 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-122
Author(s):  
I. D. Morokhov ◽  
K. V. Myasnikov ◽  
V. M. Shmelev

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