East Asia: The Commercial Peace

China has ended the post–Cold War peace in East Asia by claiming, contrary to international law, sovereignty over most of the western Pacific Ocean, by rapidly increasing its military capability, and by bullying its neighbors. China’s aggressive policies stem from the Chinese version of nationalism, which sees China as having the right to exercise dominance in the region. Chinese aggression stems also from Xi Jinping’s desire to maintain public support for, or at least tolerance of, the dictatorship of his Communist Party—which the slowing of economic growth threatens—by presenting himself as China’s champion against foreign enemies. China has also increased the threat to the region through its support for North Korea, with its nuclear weapon program.

Understanding Effectiveness of International Sanctions

Thomas Biersteker took part in 2019 Gerda Henkel Forum: Values and Interests in Communication Between Russia and The West held in MGIMO-University in late April this year and on the margins of the Forum he was kind enough to give an interview to our editor Vadim Belenkov on effectiveness of targeted international sanctions. Professor Biersteker is a renowned expert on this issue, he co-edited a book «Targeted Sanctions» recently published by Cambridge University Press. The interview shows that targeted sanctions involve restrictive measures against a narrowly-defined range of individuals and firms. Professor Biersteker explained in detail the difference between sanctions with the purpose of coercion, constraining and signaling. He reaffirmed his claim that effectiveness of sanctions should be studied separately for each type of purposes. In the interview professor Biersteker updated some of the findings published in his book three years ago. In 2016 constraining and signaling sanctions were effective at the same level, 27 % of the time. Today data reveal that effective constraining fell by 4 % points and effective signaling rose by 2 % points. Effectiveness of coercion remains at 10 %. The average effectiveness of sanctions across three types is about 20 %. Taking into consideration the difficulty of conflicts and issues over which sanctions are applied – North Korea’s nuclear program, Iran’s potential development of nuclear weapon program, ethnic and religious conflicts in Africa, the Middle East – 20 % should not be considered a small figure. Biersteker also reaffirmed the «sanctions paradox» found in 1999 by Daniel Drezner that very often the countries against which sanctions would be most likely effective are those that are most interdependent whereas sanctions are usually applied in situations when they are less likely to be effective.

User Requirements and Criteria for Proliferation Resistance in INPRO

In designing future nuclear energy systems, it is important to consider the potential that such systems could be misused for the purpose of producing nuclear weapons. INPRO set out to provide guidance on incorporating proliferation resistance into innovative nuclear energy systems (INS). Generally two types of proliferation resistance measures are distinguished: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic features consist of technical design features that reduce the attractiveness of nuclear material for nuclear weapon program, or prevent the diversion of nuclear material or production of undeclared nuclear material for nuclear weapons. Extrinsic measures include commitments, obligations and policies of states such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards agreements. INPRO has produced five basic principles and five user requirements for INS. It emphasizes that INS must continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapon program. It also addresses as user requirements: 1) a balanced and optimised combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, 2) the development and implementation of intrinsic features, 3) an early consideration of proliferation resistance in the development of INS and 4) the utilization of intrinsic features to increase the efficiency of extrinsic measures. INPRO has also developed criteria, consisting of indicators and acceptance limits, which would be used by a state to assess how an INS satisfies those user requirements. For the first user requirement, the most important but complex one, INPRO provides a 3-layer hierarchy of indicators to assess how unattractive a specific INS would be as part of a nuclear weapon program. Attributes of nuclear material and facilities are used as indicators to assess intrinsic features. Extrinsic measures imposed on the system are also assessed. Indicators to assess defence in depth for proliferation resistance include the number and robustness of barriers, and the redundancy or complementarity of barriers. The cost of incorporating proliferation resistant features is used to assess the cost-effectiveness of any particular INS in providing proliferation resistance. The stages in the development of an INS at which proliferation resistance is considered in the process are assessed. Awareness of extrinsic measures by designers and use of intrinsic features for verification illustrate how intrinsic features facilitate extrinsic measures. An INPRO-consistent methodology to assess the proliferation resistance of an INS is still under development, with feedback expected from the case studies undertaken by Argentina, India, Russia and the Republic of Korea.