scholarly journals KANT, SCHOPENHAUER E O FIM DO SUJEITO

2012 ◽  
Vol 40 (126) ◽  
pp. 25
Author(s):  
Rogério Miranda de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

Estas reflexões têm como objetivo principal mostrar que, tanto em I. Kant quanto em A. Schopenhauer, é lícito falar de um fim do sujeito. Com relação ao autor da Crítica da razão pura, tal asserção poderia embater-se contra a objeção segundo a qual toda a filosofia kantiana se desenvolve segundo uma racionalidade e uma sistematicidade que, dificilmente, permitiriam que se perdesse a evidência de uma representação embasada na autoconsciência. Todavia, esta racionalidade encerra mais ambiguidades e paradoxos do que uma primeira leitura poderia supor. Quanto a Schopenhauer, é propriamente em virtude do seu conceito de vontade – uma vontade irracional e cega – que a fortiori se é levado a reivindicar um fim do sujeito.Abstract: These reflections aim at showing that in Kant as well as in Schopenhauer speaking about the subject’s end is justified. Concerning the author of Critique of Pure Reason, such an affirmation might be objected to on the grounds that the whole Kantian philosophy is developed through a rationality and systematization that would hardly allow the loss of a representation based on self-consciousness. Nonetheless, such a rationality contains more ambiguities and paradoxes than a first reading would suppose. As for Schopenhauer, it is exactly by virtue of his concept of will – a blind and irrational will – that one can a fortiori claim the end of subject.

scholarly journals Breakthrough in Chinese Kant Scholarship. Interview with Prof. Deng Xiaomang

2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-150
Author(s):  
Jens Karlsson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Confucian Culture ◽  
The Reformation ◽  
Philosophical Texts ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

Prof. Deng Xiaomang’s translations of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (2002), the Critique of Practical Reason (2003), and the Critique of Pure Reason (2004), were the first Chinese editions of Kant’s three Critiques translated in their entirety from the German originals. This interview tracks his scholarship, placing it within the broader scope of historical and contemporary Kant scholarship in China. Among the topics addressed, the reception of Kantian philosophy among the so called “New Confucians”, as well as the utility of Kantian thought as a tool for the reformation of traditional Confucian culture, are given considerable attention. Professor Deng also shares some thoughts on the process of translating classical German philosophical texts into Chinese and provides an overview of his scholarship as a translator and thinker.

scholarly journals Post-Neo-Kantianism. What is this?

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Jan Noras
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Philosophical Concept ◽  
History Of ◽  
Kantian Philosophy

The article attempts to define the concept of “post-neo-Kantianism” based on the nature of its relationship to the concept of “neo-Kantianism”. Concerning this matter, the author poses the following tasks: to characterize the phenomenon of neo-Kantianism, to point out the problems of its definition, to identify the relevance of the term “post-neo-Kantianism” and its relation to the philosophy of I. Kant in particular. The author emphasizes the need to introduce this term in the classification of philosophy of the XX century with the appropriateness of building the model of “Kantianism - Neo-Kantianism - Neo-Neo-Kantianism - Post-Neo-Kantianism”, where each new stage is determined by the nature of the reflection of thinkers of a certain period over the fundamental philosophical problems articulated in Kant's “Critics”. Among the post-Neo-Kantians, A. Noras names thinkers traditionally considered to be german phenomenologists, such as E. Husserl and M. Heidegger: it is from the philosophical concept of Husserl that one can speak of the emergence of post-Neo-Kantianism, and the semantically correct interpretation of Heidegger, according to author, is most clearly understood in the framework of Baden Neo-Kantianism. Investigating the phenomenon of post-Neo-Kantianism, the need is established for answering a question regarding the preceding Neo-Kantian tradition, within which there is still a number of contradictions unresolved in the history of philosophy regarding the classification of Neo-Kantian schools and the distinction between the two periods of Neo-Kantianism: early (classical) and late (“correct”). Neo-Kantianism shows the relevance of Kantian philosophy, highlighting the ongoing debate about understanding the Kantian “Critique of Pure Reason”. Post-Neo-Kantianism plays an important role in terms of the perspectives of modern Kant studies, which include Gottfried Martin, Manfred Brelage, or Hans-Michael Baumgartner.

Beck, Jacob Sigismund (1761–1840)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eckart Forster
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Kantian Philosophy ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

Beck played a brief but important role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy. A former student of Kant, he published at his teacher’s instigation three volumes of ‘Explanatory Abstracts’ of Kant’s major writings. In the third volume Beck presented what he regarded as the ‘Only Possible Standpoint’ from which Critical Philosophy had to be judged if misunderstandings of Kant’s work were to be avoided. His ‘Doctrine of the Standpoint’ involved a ‘reversal’ of the method of the Critique of Pure Reason and the elimination of the ‘thing-in-itself’ from Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

Kants kritische Psychologie als Aufklärung

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-273
Author(s):  
Hyeongjoo Kim ◽  
Carina Pape
Keyword(s):  
Important Change ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Complete Rejection ◽  
Age Of Enlightenment

In his famous essay from 1784, Kant denied that we "live in an enlightened age"; yet he claimed that we "live in an age of enlightenment". If we should answer the question if we live in an enlightened age now, we could basically give the same answer. The enlightenment as an ongoing process can be found throughout Kant's whole work. This article focuses on how the concept of enlightenment can be applied to the Kantian psychology, which marks an important change of theory of the soul within modern western metaphysics. Kant's idea of enlightenment and 'critique' will be illustrated with reference to the "Paralogisms" of the Critique of Pure Reason. Finally, an analysis of some passages of the "Paralogisms" shall demonstrate that Kant's critique of the previous metaphysical doctrine of the human soul should not be understood as a complete rejection of this doctrine; rather, Kant's critique of what is called rational psychology should be understood as a critical transformation.

Kant’s Material Condition of Real Possibility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
Rational Theology ◽  
Material Condition

In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects.

Epilogue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction

This brief chapter summarizes central findings regarding the role of parenthetical sentences in practical discourse. But it also provides historical context. It suggests that a precursor of parentheticalism may be found in Kant, especially in Kant’s views about the “I think,” especially as they are expressed in the B-Version of the “Transcendental Deduction” and the B-Version of the chapter on Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Das Recht in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Reinhard Brandt
Keyword(s):  
David Hume ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Introductory Note ◽  
Pure Intuition

AbstractRecent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” (Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be?

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