scholarly journals International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation

1987 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Atkeson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
International Lending ◽  
Hazard And Risk

scholarly journals International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation

Econometrica ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 1069 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Atkeson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
International Lending ◽  
Hazard And Risk

scholarly journals International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance

2006 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Corsetti ◽  
Bernardo Guimarães ◽  
Nouriel Roubini
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
International Lending ◽  
Catalytic Finance

scholarly journals International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Corsetti ◽  
Bernardo Guimaraes ◽  
Nouriel Roubini
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
International Lending ◽  
Catalytic Finance

Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships

1995 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Gaynor ◽  
Paul Gertler
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Hazard And Risk ◽  
Risk Spreading

scholarly journals LIMITED LIABILITY, MORAL HAZARD, AND RISK TAKING: A SAFETY NET GAME EXPERIMENT

2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 1389-1403 ◽  
Author(s):  
SASCHA FÜLLBRUNN ◽  
TIBOR NEUGEBAUER
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Limited Liability ◽  
Safety Net ◽  
Hazard And Risk

Dynamic Moral Hazard and Risk-Shifting Incentives in a Leveraged Firm

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1333-1367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Rivera
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Risk Shifting ◽  
Optimal Contract ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
Moral Hazard Problem ◽  
Hazard And Risk ◽  
Incentive Constraint ◽  
Monotonic Relation

I develop an analytically tractable model that integrates the risk-shifting problem between bondholders and shareholders with the moral-hazard problem between shareholders and the manager. An optimal contract binds shareholders and the manager, and this contract’s flexibility allows shareholders to relax the manager’s incentive constraint following a “good” profitability shock. Thus, the optimal contract amplifies the upside and thereby increases shareholder appetite for risk shifting. Whereas some empirical studies find a positive relation between risk shifting and leverage, others find a negative relation. This model predicts a non-monotonic relation between risk shifting and leverage and can reconcile these contradictory empirical findings.

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