Managerial Incentives, Moral Hazard and Risk Management

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Mo Kang
Author(s):  
Michael Porter ◽  
Alex Baumgard ◽  
K. Wayne Savigny

Pipelines and other linear facilities that traverse mountainous terrain may be subject to rock fall and rock slide hazards. A system is required to determine which sites pose the greatest hazard to the facility. Once sites are ranked according to hazard exposure, a risk management program involving inspection, monitoring, contingency planning and/or mitigation can be implemented in a systematic and defensible manner. A hazard rating methodology was developed to identify and characterize rock slope hazards above a South American Concentrate Pipeline, and to provide a relative ranking of hazard exposure for the pipeline, an access road and operational personnel. The rating methodology incorporates the geometry of the right-of-way, estimated pipe depth, staff and vehicle occupancy time, failure mechanism and magnitude, and the annual probability of hazard occurrence. This information is used in a risk-based framework to assign relative hazard ratings within rock slope sections of relatively uniform hazard exposure. This paper outlines a general framework for natural hazard and risk management along linear facilities, describes the rock slope hazard rating methodology, and illustrates how the system was applied along a South American Concentrate Pipeline.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hung-Hsi Huang ◽  
Ching-Ping Wang

Abstract Most existing researches on optimal reinsurance contract are based on an insurer’s viewpoint. However, the optimal reinsurance contract for an insurer is not necessarily to be optimal for a reinsurer. Hence, this study aims to develop the optimal reciprocal reinsurance which satisfies the benefits of both the insurer and reinsurer. Additionally, due to legislative restriction or risk management requirement, the wealth of insurer and reinsurer are frequently imposed upon a VaR (Value-at-Risk) or TVaR (Tail Value-at-Risk) constraint. Therefore, this study develops an optimal reciprocal reinsurance contract which maximizes the common benefits (evaluated by weighted addition of expected utilities) of the insurer and reinsurer subject to their VaR or TVaR constraints. Furthermore, for avoiding moral hazard problem, the developed contract is additionally restricted to a regular form or incentive compatibility (both indemnity schedule and retained loss schedule are continuously nondecreasing).


Landslides ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 771-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Klimeš ◽  
J. Stemberk ◽  
J. Blahut ◽  
V. Krejčí ◽  
O. Krejčí ◽  
...  

1994 ◽  
pp. 183-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. P. Yadav ◽  
P. L. Singh ◽  
A. M. Dixit ◽  
R. D. Sharpe

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