Operational Art, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, and the Operational Employment of the U.S. Army's Objective Force

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kennth A. Szmed ◽  
Jr.
2021 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 01-09
Author(s):  
Bruno Carvalho ◽  
Jéssica Barreto ◽  
Victor Gaspar ◽  
Ana Carolina Farias

This the English version of our latest report on the document "U.S Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power (USAS)". Our main goal was to briefly indicate the impact of this document on Brazil, both politically and strategically. We contextualise the U.S strategic maritime documents since the 9/11 attacks, highlight the main concepts of the current USAS and elaborate on the consequences for Brazil. Our key finding was that, from a political standpoint, the USAS brings challenges to Brazil when qualifying enemies such as Russia and China. On the other hand, the focus on interoperability and new technologies might contribute to Brazil’s future maritime strategy. This brief analysis is divided into three parts: the first intends to contextualise the U.S strategic maritime documents since the 9/11 attacks; the second aims to summarize the USAS’ most relevant concepts for Brazil’s Sea Power, and the third part elaborates on the overall consequences for Brazil.


SAIS Review ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-231
Author(s):  
John Dailey
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-71
Author(s):  
Kenneth W. Estes ◽  
Romain Cansière

Major Joseph DiDomenico’s study of U.S. Army influence on U.S. Marine Corps tank doctrine appeared in the Summer 2018 issue of this journal, titled “The U.S. Army’s Influence on Marine Corps Tank Doctrine.” Mobilizing an impressive array of primary and secondary sources, DiDomenico laid considerable credit for the Corps’ improvements to its nascent World War II tank and amphibious tractor doctrine on the Army’s Armor School at Fort Knox as well as the improved Army doctrinal publications that had emerged by 1944. Major DiDomenico excoriated the Marine Corps’ neglect of “critical vulnerabilities for armor supporting amphibious operations.” The benchmark for Marine Corps tank doctrine’s failures to “synthesize” Army tank doctrine for Marine Corps missions is unsurprisingly the Battle of Tarawa. According to DiDomenico, the failures registered at Tarawa “indicated an institutional ignorance in the operational art of combined arms.” This article presents some common misconceptions of Marine Corps tank policy and doctrine and aims to correct those misconceptions.


1987 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Friedman
Keyword(s):  

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