ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE APPLICATION OF MISSILE LAUNCH DETECTION SYSTEMS

Analysis of combat losses of aircraft in local armed conflicts in recent decades shows that most cases of aircraft hits are related to the impact of guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles equipped with homing warheads. The use of modern guided missiles equipped with homing warheads is one of the main threats to aircraft of various types. This is due to the fact that modern guided missiles are characterized by high speed, maneuverability, accuracy of aiming and difficulty of detection. Solving the problem of protecting aircraft from guided missiles consists of several stages: detection of missile launch; confirmation that the detected missile is heading directly toward the protected object; missile identification and decision-making on the most effective countermeasure system employment. At present, there are no missile launch detection systems that guarantee a 100% probability of threat detection, but an analysis of aviation combat losses in local armed conflicts in recent decades convincingly shows that the number of combat losses of aircraft equipped with such systems is much lower than those in which missile launch detection is carried out visually. For example, most of the Soviet Union's losses during the war in Afghanistan and the United States‟ losses during Operation “Desert Storm” in Iraq were related to the use of portable anti-aircraft missile systems, which missiles were equipped with infrared homing warheads. Realizing the scale of the threat posed by such missiles, most of the world's leading countries have significantly increased the expenses on development new or improvement existing countermeasures. As a result, the aggregate losses of coalition forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria since 2001 clearly suggest that these costs have paid off, with losses from the use of portable anti-aircraft missile systems significantly reduced, while the total number of combat sorties increased. Therefore, in the face of all the challenges and threats posed to Ukraine due to the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, conducting research in the interests of aviation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to improve the effectiveness of missile detection systems for ensuring timely detection of threats, warning of aircraft crew and activation in the automatic mode the means of countermeasures is as relevant as ever.

The Broadway Melody of 1991

The Will Rogers Follies was Tune’s most opulent show, far different from the sleek, stylized minimalism of his recent musicals, with a score by Cy Coleman (music) and Betty Comden and Adolph Green (lyrics), and a book by Peter Stone, by this time a frequent Tune collaborator. The story of Will Rogers, the beloved, Oklahoma-born star of radio, vaudeville, and films, and one of the most popular headliners of the Ziegfeld Follies, was told as a series of routines played out on the stage of the Follies. This look back at a bygone theatrical era played to Tune’s strengths, and his staging recalled show business antecedents from the stage and screen updated with present-day flourishes. Tune’s staging feats were even more impressive because they were performed on a grand staircase that covered the entire expanse of the stage. The Will Rogers Follies opened during a moment of resurgent patriotism in the wake of the success of Operation Desert Storm. Following a decade in which British hits like Cats, Les Misérables, and The Phantom of the Opera dominated the Broadway musical, an air of jingoism and a determination to reclaim Broadway for American musicals hovered over the success of The Will Rogers Follies in 1991.

The Desert War: Marine Corps Aviation in Desert Storm, January-February 1991

When Iraqi military forces under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, U.S. Marine Corps Aviation went to war on short notice and in a big way. More than 40 squadrons deployed to the Persian Gulf to participate in Operation Desert Shield (2 August 1990–17 January 1991), a buildup of troops in Saudi Arabia by a Coalition of 35 nations led by the United States, and Operation Desert Storm (17 January–28 February 1991), the combat phase of the Coalition’s campaign to liberate Kuwait. Desert Storm tested new Marine aviation procedures, doctrine, equipment, weapons, aircraft, and training that had been introduced after the end of the Vietnam War almost two decades earlier. It also tested a new Joint way of fighting that was established by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Invading Iraq

This chapter evaluates the positions taken and the arguments made by observers of Saddam Hussein's Iraq during the decade-long interval between the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (the US invasion of Iraq) in 2003. It focuses on the clash of views between those who believed that Hussein's Iraq could not be contained at a reasonable cost as long as Saddam himself remained on the scene (containment pessimists), and those who believed that containment was both feasible and sustainable, because the great disparity in resources between the United States and Iraq meant that the United States could pressure Iraq for years to come, if need be, without resorting to drastic methods, such as withdrawal or a resort to open warfare (containment optimists). To buttress their case, containment pessimists argued that containment could not be counted on to last indefinitely because of the asymmetry between what was at stake for Saddam and his regime, and for the United States and its allies, in the years after Iraq's defeat in the first Persian Gulf War (1990–91). For Saddam Hussein and the rest of his repressive apparatus, the stakes were nothing less than survival. Optimists, on the other hand, conceded that containment was not perfect, but in their view perfection was not needed to bring down Saddam and his regime.

The CIA and the (First) Persian Gulf War

Spying on secretive dictatorships is difficult. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was, in the run up to the first Gulf War, a very hard target. This chapter examines how the CIA tried to overcome this problem. It examines the US’s engagement with Saddam Hussain and Iraq from the 1970s, and considers how the CIA understood Saddam following his rise to power in 1979. It culminates with Desert Storm, and how a mix of technical intelligence collection and analysis changed opinions about the likelihood Iraq invading neighbouring Kuwait. Document: Iraq’s Saddam Husayn: The Next Six Weeks