IT'S THEIR MESSAGE, STUPID! Targeting the True Center of Gravity in the U.S. War on Terrorism

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J. Wilson
Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Ganesan

In 2002, the Malaysian government underwent significant political consolidation. Despite Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's sudden announcement in June of his resignation, he will remain in office until October 2003, after which Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi will replace him as prime minister. The government's political consolidation derived partly from its war on terrorism, which allowed it to marginalize the mainstream opposition. Additionally, opposition parties themselves are in disarray. Economically, the country performed well, and unorthodox measures introduced after the Asian financial crisis have begun to pay off. In foreign affairs, Malaysia achieved good accommodation with the U.S. but suffered from hiccups in its bilateral relations with regional neighbors.


Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali A. Jalali

The year 2002 was one of rebirth and rebuilding in Afghanistan following a drawn-out civil strife that ended with the downfall of the Taliban regime in the U.S.-led coalition war on terrorism. But the struggle for peace proved to be much tougher than winning the war. International financial support and political backing helped Afghanistan move toward creating a broad-based government, improving security across the country, and rebuilding its devastated economy. However, the enormous humanitarian and development challenges involved require a sustained and multifaceted response as well as a long-term international commitment to assist the war-torn country in restoring peace, normalcy, and economic stability.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zain Pasha

Even before his inauguration, President Barack Obama made it clear that he believed torture was morally reprehensible and promised that under his administration the U.S. would no longer practice torture. Accordingly, on April 16th, 2009 Mr. Obama and the U.S. Department of Justice authorized the release of C.I.A memos detailing the methods of torture that were authorized under the George W. Bush administration. The release of the C.I.A. memos elicited an almost immediate reaction from former Vice President Richard Bruce Cheney, who in an interview with Fox News on April 21st, 2009 criticized Mr. Obama for failing to disclose documents detailing the “success” of torture in garnering intelligence that was vital to the U.S. War on Terrorism.3 Mr. Obama’s efforts to discredit torture as a justifiable tool for preserving U.S. national security and Mr. Cheney’s rebuke of those efforts attest to the importance and contentious nature of the debate about whether torture is in the U.S national interest. Using this debate as motivation, I answer the question of whether or not the use of torture is in the U.S. national interest. To do this, I first chronicle the history of U.S. torture practices since the Cold War to provide a reference point for the rest of the paper. Second, I empirically demonstrate the negative impact of these practices on international U.S. credibility, the War on Terrorism and U.S. presidential approval ratings. Third, I consider the theoretical value of torture in context to its empirical utility as an intelligence-gathering tool, and vis-à-vis possible alternatives, to ultimately make a qualitative assessment of torture’s actual utility for preserving U.S. national security. Finally, I compare the international and domestic consequences of U.S. torture (section 2) to its actual utility (section 3) to ultimately conclude that torture is not in the U.S. national interest.


2019 ◽  
pp. 452-468
Author(s):  
Robert Paul Churchill

The United States is now relying on Reaper and Predator drone strikes as its primary strategy in the continuing War on Terrorism. This paper argues for the rational scrutiny drone warfare has yet to receive. It is argued that drone warfare is immoral as it fails both the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum conditions of Just War theory. Drone warfare cannot be accepted on utilitarian grounds either, as it is very probable that terrorists will acquire drones capable of lethal strikes and deploy them against defenseless civilians. Moreover, by examining the psychological bases for reliance on drone warfare, as well as the message the United States is sending adversaries, we need to be concerned that, rather than reduce the likelihood of terrorists strikes, the U.S. reliance on drones strikes threatens to institutionalize terrorism as the status quo for the foreseeable future.


2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Carter ◽  
Costello Jr ◽  
III Peter A. ◽  
William D. Kendrick ◽  
Dana J. Pittard

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