Impact of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

Author(s):  
Jr Scanlin ◽  
Joseph E.
2011 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 929-951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark B. Salter ◽  
Geneviève Piché

Abstract. In this paper, the authors analyze the empirical process of securitization of the US–Canada border and then reflect on the model proposed by the Copenhagen School. We argue that securitization theory oversimplifies the political process of securitizing moves and audience acceptance. Rather than attributing securitization to a singular speaker addressing a specific audience, we present overlapping and ongoing language security games performed by varying relevant actors during the key period between the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December 2004 and the signing of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) in June 2005, showing how multiple speakers participate in the continuing construction of a context in which this issue is increasingly treated as a matter of security. We also explore the language adopted by participants in the field, focusing on an expert panel convened by the Homeland Security Institute. We conclude that in the securitization of the US–Canada border there are inconsistencies between truth and discourse, as well as significant distinctions between official and bureaucratic discourses, further emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive model of securitization.Résumé. Dans cet article, les auteurs font l'analyse du processus empirique de la sécurisation de la frontière Canado-Américaine à travers la réflexion sur le modèle proposé par l'École de Copenhague. Nous soutenons que cette théorie de sécurisation simplifie trop le processus politique de son initiation et de l'acceptation de l'auditeur. Au lieu d'attribuer la sécurisation à un orateur, s'adressant à un public particulier, nous présentons les jeux de langage continuels effectués par plusieurs acteurs pendant la période suivant la Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) en décembre 2004, jusqu'à l'approbation de la Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) en juin 2005. Nous maintenons que plusieurs orateurs participent dans la construction continuelle du contexte dans lequel l'affaire est de plus en plus comprise dans le cadre de sécurité. Nous explorons aussi le langage employé par les participants dans le champ, observant surtout un groupe d'experts convoqué au Homeland Security Institute. Nous concluons que dans le cas de la sécurisation de la frontière Canado-Américaine il existe des incohérences entre le discours et le réel, ainsi que des distinctions significatives entre les discours officiels et bureaucratiques, mettant l'accent sur l'importance d'un modèle compréhensif de sécurisation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-64
Author(s):  
Olusola Adegbite

Terrorism is perhaps the greatest global security challenge post-World War II and, like several countries, Nigeria is also grappling with this scourge. The remarkable thing is that following pressure from the United States (US) and Western nations, Nigeria took a major step towards counterterrorism with the enactment of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. The Act was later replaced by the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013. Certainly, so far, this legislation remains the nation’s boldest effort in combatting terrorism. However, the Nigerian counterterrorism legal regime still falls short in some material respect, given the absence of a robust strategy and complementary institutional support system. This is not the same case in a country such as the US, where the principal counterterrorism legislation, the Patriot Act, is well complemented by the US National Counterterrorism Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security. Against this background, this Article examines the legal regime governing counterterrorism in Nigeria and the US, with the view of highlighting areas where Nigeria could gain useful insights from the US experience. The expectation is that given the robustness of the US counterterrorism regime, the experience to be gained cannot but further enrich the existing counterterrorism legal regime in Nigeria.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Renke

Judge Richard Posner responded to the issues of post 9/11 domestic United States intelligence system reform through an article published in the New York Times Review of Books, which grew into a book, augmented by a monograph, and updated by another book. As might be expected of Posner, these short works are lucid, provocative, and informative. The New York Times article, "The 9/11 Report: A Dissent,'" is a review of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Preventing Surprise Attacks' elaborates the article's arguments, particularly in light of the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (which adopted the Commission's main recommendations), and engages relevant historical and organizational theory literature. The monograph Remaking Domestic Intelligence, focuses on the role of the FBI in domestic national security intelligence. Uncertain Shield updates Preventing Surprise Attacks by addressing the implementation of the IRTP Act and the report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Certainly these works are valuable for students of American intelligence organization and policy. Posner's treatment of four themes, though, should interest a broader readership. These themes concern (1) the limitations on the capabilities of our intelligence organizations to prevent surprise attacks; (2) the inappropriateness of centralizing the organization of domestic intelligence; (3) the relationship of law enforcement and intelligence gathering; and (4) our attitudes and expectations respecting our safety.


2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ned F. Carmody
Keyword(s):  

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