Why is the U.S. Afraid of the International Criminal Court

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Wiley
2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 967-969
Author(s):  
Arthur W. Rovine

Late last year, in a letter to Congressman Tom DeLay, majority whip of the House of Representatives, twelve former high government officials expressed their support for a bill introduced by Senator Jesse Helms in June 2000, entitled "American Servicemembers' Protection Act."1 The bill, if enacted, would prohibit any agency of the U.S. government from cooperating with the international criminal court (ICC), and proscribe U.S. military assistance to any nation that becomes a party to the treaty of Rome,2 with the exception of NATO members and certain other allied countries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.


Author(s):  
Sara Ochs

Propaganda warfare, while novel in nomenclature, is far from new in practice. In an era dominated by constant news, battles for public opinion complement physical attacks. In fact, “winning modern wars is as much dependent on carrying domestic and international public opinion as it is on defeating the enemy on the battlefield.” The fight for public opinion has become so valuable to military initiatives that the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual specifically recognizes propaganda directed towards “civilian or neutral audiences” as a “permissible means of war.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 862-907
Author(s):  
Jake Romm

Former Office of Legal Counsel lawyer John Yoo’s criminal liability for the U.S. Torture Program has been a topic of debate ever since the so-called ‘Torture Memos’ came to light. The debate has primarily focused on the criminal case against Yoo under domestic U.S. law or under abstract notions of ‘international law’. In light of the International Criminal Court’s investigation into the situation in Afghanistan there is reason to hope for a possible indictment of Yoo. This article fills in a gap in the literature surrounding Yoo’s culpability by straightforwardly delineating the prima facie case against John Yoo under the Rome Statute.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-173

On September 10, 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered an address fiercely criticizing the International Criminal Court (ICC). Bolton challenged the legitimacy of the ICC and expressed particular concern over its inquiry into potential war crimes committed by members of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. He identified retaliatory measures the United States would undertake if the ICC “comes after us, Israel or other U.S. allies.”


1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric D. Smaw

In what follows, I present a combination of philosophical and political perspectives on human rights and the establishment of an international criminal court. I present the United States’ pragmatic objections to establishing an international criminal court. Contrary to the United States’ pragmatic objections, I argue in favor of an international criminal court. Ultimately, I attempt to illustrate that the international criminal court will have protective measures designed to prevent political abuses of justice. When working properly, these protective measures will satisfy the U.S.’s pragmatic concerns. Thus, I conclude, the U.S. ought not abandon its longer history of supporting the establishment of an international criminal court.


2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alain Pellet

In their eagerness to justify the “United States perspective” on the Kampala definition of the crime of aggression and on the International Criminal Court (ICC), Koh and Buchwald tend to invent imaginary enemies and to ascribe to them views that they do not actually hold. In so doing, the authors weaken a thesis that, in some respects, is not devoid of interest. From at least two points of view, however, their article is paradoxical, if not pathetic—exactly like the U.S. position.


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