Choice: its increase and its value

Much has been made in recent years of increasing the choice of the citizen-consumer.This article argues that the concept of ‘increasing choice’ is far more problematic than at first appears and has little intrinsic value in itself.Choice is only to be valued in itself in the sense that the process of choices or decision-making plays a part in our own preferences.To justify the introduction of the market process on the grounds of increasing choices is doubly wrong; first, increasing choices is not in itself valuable and, secondly, what is valuable about tha market has little to do with choice.

Republican freedom, rights and the coalition problem

Republican freedom is freedom from domination, whereas negative freedom is freedom from interference. Proponents argue that republican freedom is superior, since it highlights that individuals can lose freedoms even when they are not subject to interference, and claim republican freedom is more ‘resilient’. I examine the debate through the ‘coalition problem’ for republican freedom. Ssince there is always a coalition of others who could dominate any agent in any sphere, all agents are subject to domination, and hence no one can ever have republican freedom. Pettit’s simple solution to this reductio ad absurdum distinguishes potential from actual coalitions: individuals are only dominated by actual not potential coalitions. The simple solution highlights moralization problems as it demonstrates that domination cannot be purely institutionally defined, but requires consideration of dispositions and expectations about others’ behaviour. I argue that the differences between the ‘free man’ and ‘unfree person’ paradigmatic to republican arguments are best captured not by the difference between domination and interference but, rather, from familiar distinctions between different types of rights and freedoms. Resilience is a practical matter that might track some of these familiar distinctions.

Social choice and the grammar of rights and freedoms

The techniques of social choice and game theory are increasingly being used to analyse concepts in political theory. Although these techniques may prove invaluable for teasing out contradictory formulations, puzzles and problems with traditional concepts, formal writers often begin their analysis with simplistic intuitive accounts rather than building on earlier traditions in analytic political theory. This is particularly apparent in social-choice and game-theory analysis of rights and freedoms. This chapter reviews these approaches and demonstrates that by ignoring the grammar of rights and freedoms, social-choice and game-theory analysis goes wrong from the very beginning. Formal writers need to take more account of the history of their subject, as developed in the analytic theory tradition.

Shaping future luck

People plan strategies to enable them to get what they want. Obviously, luck plays a part in achieving their desires. The question becomes: can one plan for that luck? As luck is normally defined and understood, the answer would be no. However, if luck is defined on the basis of obtaining what one wants without trying, as suggested by Brian Barry, then it is possible to consider a strategy of planning for luck. Indeed, one may plan only for luck and, with foresight in developing one’s future luck, this may be more efficient than other strategies. This chapter explains how this may be so through an examination of power based on cooperative game theory.

Resources, power and systematic luck: a response to Barry

Brian Barry attacks the ‘resource account’ of power, providing a set of definitions through which power should be analysed. While there might be different, equally good, ways of defining power, I argue that my formulations are superior to those of Barry, as they produce fewer anomalies and provide a better foundation for empirical research. The chapter defends the resource account against Barry’s criticisms and argues for the utility of the ideas of luck and ‘systematic luck’.

Rational choice and community power structures

This chapter applies Dowding’s analysis of power to the community power debate. It demonstrates the importance of the collective action problem to our understanding of power in society, showing that both pluralists and their radical critics misinterpret power in society by ignoring collective action problems. It demonstrates the nature of luck and systematic luck in the power structure.

Luck and leadership

Some leaders are perceived as powerful, some as weak. Luck plays a large role in those perceptions. In strategic situations, some leaders appear stronger through luck rather than greater resources or ability. That perception then feeds back into the strategic game as reputation, which in turn gives them greater ability. The perception becomes the reality. Furthermore, context can make some appear strong and others weak. Even if the apparently weak get their way more often, that perception feeds into how leaders are regarded, further strengthening or weakening them.

Luck, equality and responsibility

Egalitarians claim that inequality in society is only justified to the extent that it results from choices freely and responsibly made. Inequality resulting from brute bad luck is not justified. I argue that luck, and therefore responsibility, are defined in terms of the reward structure. Luck and responsibility are epiphenomena of the incentives that people have to choose from the opportunity sets available. Egalitarians should therefore look more directly at the degree of inequality that is acceptable and examine more closely the classes of actions they want to leave to individual responsibility even where these will lead to greater inequality. State action should concentrate upon reducing inequality between classes of people; it cannot be expected to reduce all inequalities between people, even though many will have only peripheral relationships to responsibility.

Power, capability and ableness: the fallacy of the vehicle fallacy

Sen’s capabilities are reducible to individual power. Morriss’s important distinction between ability and ableness is pertinent to the correct analysis of measuring capabilities. Morriss argues that reducing power to resources constitutes the vehicle fallacy. The vehicle fallacy is not a fallacy if resources are measured relationally – for example, the power of money is relative to its distribution. It follows that strategic considerations must enter into the very essence of the concept of power. While the term ‘resources’ in this essay is broader than in Dworkin’s account, the argument suggests that Sen’s capabilities account of egalitarian justice is not, after all, so different from Dworkin’s resource account.

Agency and structure: interpreting power relationships

Many debates over the ‘true’ nature of power relationships concern the importance given to agents or to structures in describing those relationships. Those who discuss the power structure or system tend to concentrate upon structures; those who write about the power of agents or power relationships tend to concentrate upon actors. The agency–structure relationship goes deep into many seemingly different issues in very different approaches to power. I argue that whilst the agency–structure divide is false, our interpretation of the world – the way in which we describe it – means we cannot fully transcend the structure–agency divide using natural language. Whether we choose to use the language of structures or of agents depends upon the questions we are seeking to answer and the commitments we wish to make in assigning responsibility. Ultimately, structural and agential accounts can describe the world in non-contradictory ways, though the choice of description demonstrates the sorts of commitments the describer has towards changing the world.