Kenya's Credible Commitment to Keep its Date with the ICC

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Thuo Gathii
Keyword(s):  
Credible Commitment

Political Moral Hazard and Credible Commitment

2016 ◽  
pp. 53-76
Author(s):  
Gary J. Miller ◽  
Andrew B. Whitford
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Credible Commitment

scholarly journals Reciprocal Trade Agreements in Asia: Credible Commitment to Trade Liberalization or Paper Tigers?

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Hicks ◽  
Soo Yeon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Primary Objective ◽  
Trade Flows ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Coding Scheme ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Impact

Reciprocal trade agreements (RTAs) have proliferated rapidly in Asia in recent years, an unprecedented phenomenon in a region in which state-led institution-building efforts were largely unsuccessful during the Cold War years. In this article, we investigate the qualitative provisions of RTAs in Asia, focusing on agreements that are professedly geared toward trade liberalization through reciprocal exchanges of trade concessions. We build on the concept of credible commitment—that states “tie their hands” through international agreements and thus signal strong commitment to trade liberalization. We argue that a broad range of agreement provisions will affect an RTA's ability to achieve its primary objective: trade liberalization. We present a coding scheme that measures the strength of a wide variety of provisions in the legal texts of RTAs. Using quantitative analysis, we analyze the impact of various components of Asia's RTAs on participants' trade flows.

Full-Cost Transfer Pricing and Cost Management

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Bouwens ◽  
Bert Steens
Keyword(s):  
Cost Management ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Risk Of Falling ◽  
Full Cost ◽  
Cost Cutting ◽  
Death Spiral ◽  
Transfer Prices ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Full-cost transfer pricing has been criticized for providing production units with insufficient incentives to economize. Our empirical study based on data from a large producer of consumer goods shows that charging full-cost transfer prices to downstream sales units can send upstream production units into a death spiral. However, our results also suggest that production units reduce costs to prevent the death spiral. We observe that managers focus their cost-cutting efforts on unit variable costs and on products with the best sales prospects. These results also suggest that, when production units are at risk of falling into a death spiral, full-cost transfer pricing can serve as a credible commitment device to motivate managers to reduce costs. JEL Classifications: D24; M31; M41; M50. Data Availability: We were given the opportunity to work with a company's proprietary database that contains sensitive and classified data that cannot be disclosed due to a non-disclosure agreement. At the start of our research, the company agreed to be referred to as Carepro, which is fictitious and does not correspond to any other existing company with that same or a similar name.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
Rumela Sen
Keyword(s):  
Regional Variation ◽  
South India ◽  
District Level ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
The North ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Conflict Zone ◽  
Indian State ◽  
North And South ◽  
Theoretical Insight

This chapter introduces the central empirical puzzle and the primary theoretical insight of the book. In course of several rounds of interviews, current and former Maoist rebels in North and South India shared that they were not able to quit the insurgent organization even if they wanted to. This was because they feared that they could be killed post-retirement, unarmed and defenseless, by either their former enemies or by their former comrades, while the Indian state would lose nothing for failing to protect them. This creates a problem of credible commitment in the process of surrender of rebels, which, this book shows, is resolved locally by informal exit networks, more proficiently in the South of India than in the North. This chapter also introduces the district-level data on surrender of Maoists and other testimonies from the conflict zone to illustrate the vast regional variation in retirement of Maoist rebels in North and South India.

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