Coherence as an Alternative to Strategic Complementarity at an Entrepreneurial Firm

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Jay Jay Bock
Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1098
Author(s):  
Keiichi Morimoto

Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs. On the determination of a finite optimal committee size, the direction and degree of strategic interactions matter. When the strategic complementarity among members is strong, a finite optimal committee size exists. In contrast, it does not exist under strategic substitution. This mechanism is applied to the design of monetary policy committees in a New Keynesian model in which a committee conducts monetary policy under imperfect information.


2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hasan Bakhshi ◽  
Hashmat Khan ◽  
Pablo Burriel-Llombart ◽  
Barbara Rudolf

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang Hui ◽  
Bingxiang Li ◽  
Mingmin Li

Purpose To satisfy the demand of initial investor for above-average capital return and the expectation of entrepreneurial management to establish their own business, this paper aims to explore a dynamic equity allocation model in which the shareholding ratio of the technology-based entrepreneurial firm changes with its growth and profit. Based on the dynamic equity allocation model, the authors design a financing structure which not only ensures timely and adequately obtaining the fund but also avoids equity dilution and safeguards the integrity of equity. Design/methodology/approach The paper selects high-tech companies listed in China as the sample for empirical research to identify the role of stock incentive and uses model deduction to find the equitable quantized benchmark for entrepreneurial management equity allocation. The study uses capital exclusivity as an entry point to perform theoretical analysis and demonstrates how the equity allocation of a technology-based entrepreneurial firm changes dynamically as the presentation speed of entrepreneurial management’s human capital exclusivity accelerates. The paper then constructs a conceptual model to design the financing structure of the technology-based entrepreneurial firm. Findings The study finds that stock incentive upwardly regulates debt financing and downwardly regulates equity financing. Based on characteristics of technology-based entrepreneurial firms, the paper suggests that the immediate surplus capital increment can signify the increasing presentation speed of human capital exclusivity, and it is proposed as an equitable quantized benchmark for equity allocation to entrepreneurial management. Based on the dynamic equity allocation model, the paper designs an internal equity and external debt financing structure. Originality/Value The conclusions enrich the theoretical foundation for entrepreneurial management to participate in residual claim and provide practical guidance for equity allocation and financing structure design in the context of mass entrepreneurship and innovation. The paper also sets up a conceptual framework for solving two major issues of the technology-based entrepreneurial firm: timely acquisition of external funding and lasting maintenance of entrepreneurial management stability.


2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 181-212
Author(s):  
Jonathan C. Glover ◽  
Hao Xue

ABSTRACT Teamwork and team incentives are increasingly prevalent in modern organizations. Performance measures used to evaluate individuals' contributions to teamwork are often non-verifiable. We study a principal-multi-agent model of relational (self-enforcing) contracts in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It specifies a minimum joint bonus floor the principal is required to pay out to the agents, and gives the principal discretion to use non-verifiable performance measures to both increase the size of the pool and to allocate the pool to the agents. The joint bonus floor is useful because of its role in motivating the agents to mutually monitor each other by facilitating a strategic complementarity in their payoffs. In an extension section, we introduce a verifiable team performance measure that is a noisy version of the individual non-verifiable measures, and show that the verifiable measure is either ignored or used to create a conditional bonus floor.


Author(s):  
Mariola Laguna ◽  
Karolina Walachowska ◽  
Marjan J. Gorgievski-Duijvesteijn ◽  
Juan A. Moriano

The innovativeness of individual employees is a vital source of competitive advantage of firms, contributing to societal development. Therefore, the aim of this multilevel study was to examine how entrepreneurial firm owners’ authentic leadership relates to their employees’ innovative behaviour. Our conceptual model postulates that the relationship between business owners’ authentic leadership (as perceived by their employees) and their employees’ innovative behaviour is mediated by employees’ personal initiative and their work engagement. Hypotheses derived from this model were tested on data collected from 711 employees working in 85 small firms from three European countries: the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. The results of the multilevel modelling confirmed our model, showing that when business owners are perceived as more authentic leaders, their employees show higher personal initiative and are more engaged at work and, in turn, identify more innovative solutions to be implemented in the organization. A cross-national difference was observed: employees from Spain (in comparison to Dutch and Polish employees) reported engaging less frequently in innovative behaviour. These research findings suggest that the innovative behaviour of employees can be boosted through leadership training, improving the quality of relationships between leaders and subordinates, and strengthening employees’ personal initiative and work engagement.


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