Relational contracts and value chain governance: exporter approaches to overcoming transaction costs in Rwanda's coffee sector

Purpose In developing countries, local buyers often rely on relational contracting based on reciprocity and trust. This paper analyzes relational contracting and global value chain (GVC) governance by focusing on how domestic and foreign coffee exporters in Rwanda confront challenges.Design/methodology/approach Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 representatives of Rwandan private, Rwandan cooperative-owned and foreign exporters, and four coffee sector stakeholders.Findings Foreign firms export most Rwandan coffee, and local exporters express concerns about their ability to compete. Rwandan exporters face challenges accessing capital, competing with foreign firms and managing high transaction costs. They use relational contracts to reduce transaction costs, and they benefit from a monopsony zoning regulation that reduces competition. Foreign exporters face regulatory challenges: a government-set coffee price and the zoning regulation. They vertically integrate to reduce costs and lock in suppliers through prefinancing.Research limitations/implications Future research should analyze differences between local and foreign exporters in other contexts to advance understanding of the different challenges faced and contracting approaches used.Originality/value Few GVC governance studies address the role of relational contracts in contexts where enforcement is costly. Considering relational contracts within GVCs can improve value chain analysis, specifically in the developing countries where many GVCs start.

Building an Equilibrium: Rules vs. Principles in Relational Contracts

Effective collaboration within and between organizations requires efficient adaptation to unforeseen change. We study how parties build relational contracts that achieve this goal. We focus on the “clarity problem”—whether parties have a shared understanding of the promises they make to each other. Specifically, (a) a buyer and seller play a trading game in several periods; (b) they know their environment will change but do not know how; and (c) before any trading occurs, they can reach a nonbinding agreement about how to play the entire game. We hypothesize that pairs whose initial agreement defines a broad principle rather than a narrow rule are more successful in solving the clarity problem and in achieving efficient adaptation after unforeseen change. In our baseline condition, we indeed observe that pairs who articulate principles achieve significantly higher performance after change occurred. Underlying this correlation, we also find that pairs with principle-based agreements were more likely to both expect and take actions that were consistent with what their agreement prescribed. To investigate a causal link between principle-based agreements and performance, we implement a “nudge” intervention that induces more pairs to articulate principles. The intervention succeeds in coordinating more pairs on efficient quality immediately after the unforeseen change, but it fails to coordinate expectations on price, ultimately leading to conflicts and preventing an increase in long-run performance after the shock. Our results suggest that (1) principle-based agreements may improve organizational performance but (2) high-performing relational contracts may be difficult to build.

Deals that start when you sign them

This essay explores six sentences from Oliver Williamson – five providing context and the sixth the central topic. Decades ago, Williamson asserted that: (a) ‘substantially the same factors’ (1973: 316) create governance issues not only within organizations but also in interactions between organizations; and (b) relational contracting might be useful in addressing these issues in both domains (1979, Figure II). More recently – in an informal conversation in 2002 – he suggested a perspective on relational contracting that appears valuable in both of these domains: relational contracts as ‘deals that start when you sign them’. The bulk of this essay explores past, present, and potential research on this perspective.

Conceptualisation of Psychological Contract: Definitions, Typologies and Measurement

Background: Psychological contracts, and particularly the honouring of these contracts – are central to employee behaviour and organisational success. The interest of academics and practitioners in this construct is therefore understandable. However, due to the immense amount of information on the topic, a comprehensive review of the literature is necessary. Aim: The aim of this article is to present a critical review on the conceptualisation of the psychological contract, distilling and operationalising the concept, to ensure that debate and future research are linked to a dominant body of knowledge. Setting: Present literature on psychological contracts is fragmented as no conceptual standardisation exists. Method: A comprehensive literature review was conducted to obtain a large quantum of conceptualisations of the construct and evaluate these for breadth of adoption, consensus, and operationalisation. Results: After reviewing reputable sources published between 1960 and 2020, a standard definition proposed, the most recognised typologies specified, and sound measures identified. It was found that Rousseau’s (1995) definition and typologies (transactional and relational contracts) are still widely used, and that the measuring scale for transactional and relational contracts by Millward and Hopkins (1998) demonstrates good psychometric properties and broadly utilised. Conclusion: Since its inception, several amended definitions, typologies, and measurement of the psychological contract have been presented. Nonetheless, the original conceptualisations still seem to prevail. Managerial implications: Researchers and practitioners are now aware of the most widely adopted definitions, typologies and measuring instruments relating to psychological contract and these should guide them in future discussions and research in the field.

The dark side of supply chain digitalisation: supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry, buyer opportunism and governance

PurposeIn this paper, the authors seek to contribute to the supply chain digitalisation literature by investigating a potential dark side of supply chain digitalisation from the viewpoint of the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) suppliers, namely digital capability asymmetry and the partner opportunism of more digitally capable large buyers against SME suppliers. The authors seek to contribute further to the governance literature by investigating the effectiveness of the governance mechanism (legal contracts and relational contracts) in suppressing partner opportunism of this nature.Design/methodology/approachUsing survey data collected from 125 Korean SMEs, the authors employed a hierarchical regression method to test a set of hypotheses focussing on the dark side of supply chain digitalisation and the effectiveness of the governance mechanism.FindingsThe study’s findings suggest that supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry, wherein a buyer has a superior digital capability than its SME supplier, increases the SME supplier's dependence on the more digitally capable buyer, with the result that it is more exposed to buyer opportunism. Moreover, the results suggest that only relational governance is effective in protecting SME suppliers from buyer opportunism of this nature.Originality/valueSo far, the overwhelming majority of supply chain digitalisation research has debated its “bright side”. On the contrary, from the resource dependence theory perspective, this paper explains its dark side by providing empirical evidence on (1) the links between supplier-perceived digital capability asymmetry and a buyer's opportunism through an increased supplier's dependence and (2) the effectiveness of different types of governance in opportunism suppression.