Government Strength and Financial Reforms

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Di Comite ◽  
Thomas Lambert
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Boileau ◽  
Tianxiao Zheng

Abstract We study how financial reforms affect the extent of consumption smoothing in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of an emerging economy. Consistent with the empirical literature and reform efforts in South Korea and South Africa, we emphasize the relation between consumer credit and durable purchases, and model reforms as the relaxation of the collateral constraint on lower income households. We find that the relaxation of the collateral constraint accounts for a substantial share of the decline in consumption smoothing experienced in South Korea and South Africa.


2013 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo R. Arriola

Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business—the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business—as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector—significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Paweł Pisany

Abstract This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable’s core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author’s own “institutional game.” Finally, we assess Amable’s achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable’s methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker’s horizons and promote consistent solutions.


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