AstraZeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent Filings Violate Competition Law?

Author(s):  
Josef Drexl
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Wojciech Paweł SZYDŁO

Aim: The paper discusses cases in which a refusal by an energy enterprise to connect other enterprises to the network is treated as a prohibited abuse of the enterprise's dominant position and, equally, will represent behavior prohibited by art. 12 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by art. 9 par. 2 item 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Law as well as legal consequences of such refusal. It is important to pinpoint such cases since the EU sectoral regulation does not provide for obligating any undertakings which manage and operate oil pipelines to enter into contracts with other undertakings such as contracts on connecting into their network or contracts on providing crude oil transfer services. Conditions for accessing oil pipelines and selling their transfer capacities are determined by the owners of the networks: private oil companies in the countries across which the pipelines are routed. These conditions are not governed by the EU law.  Furthermore, the very obligation of connecting other entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector in Poland will only arise from generally applicable provisions of the Polish competition law.  Design / Research methods: The purpose of the paper has been reached by conducting a doctrinal analysis of relevant provisions of Polish and EU law and an analysis of guidelines issued by the EU governing bodies. Furthermore, the research included the functional analysis method which analyses how law works in practice. Conclusions / findings: The deliberations show that a refusal to access the network will be a manifestation of a prohibited abuse of a dominant position and will be a prohibited action always when the dominant's action is harmful in terms of the allocation effectiveness. It will be particularly harmful when delivery of goods or services objectively required for effective competition on a lower level market, a discriminatory refusal which leads to elimination of an effective competition on the consequent market, a refusal leading to unfair treatment of consumers and an unjustified refusal. Originality / value of the article: The paper discusses the prerequisites which trigger the obligation to connect entities to own network by energy undertakings operating in the oil transfer sector. The obligation has a material impact on the operations of the oil transmitting undertakings, in particular on those who dominate the market. The regulatory bodies in the competition sector may classify a refusal of access to own network by other enterprises as a prohibited abuse of the dominant position, exposing such undertakings to financial consequences.Implications of the research: The research results presented in the paper may be used in decisions issued by the President of the OCCP and in judgement of Polish civil courts and EU courts. This may cause a significant change in the approach to classifying prohibited practices to prohibited behavior which represent abuse of the dominant position. The deliberations may also prompt the Polish and EU legislator to continue works on the legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-511
Author(s):  
Valentine Lemonnier

Before the Covid-19 pandemic hit, the scheduled passenger air transport sector was already subject to several horizontal concentrations. The mix of free competition and strict regularization in the air transport sector in the EU raises the question whether the current framework will still be able to provide a level playing field to the market participants, notably airlines and airports. The study focusses on how EU competition law has influenced horizontal concentrations (i.e. mergers and horizontal co-operations) in the scheduled passenger air transport sector. The results of the discussion are the basis for a reflection of the effects of different types of horizontal concentrations on the negotiation power of airlines vis-à-vis airports. A third focus of the study is the identification of regulatory weaknesses with regard to airport financing under the Airport Charges Directive (Directive 2009/12/EC), how those weaknesses benefit airlines and how they might interfere with efforts made under the application of competition law.


Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz

Modern Polish competition law has become highly regulated and codified over the twenty five years of its existence and this article will provide readers with information relating to its recent developments of 2015. Separate subsections present a review of provisions on remedies in infringement decisions as well as settlements. A considerable part of this paper is designed to outline the peculiarities that characterize Poland’s new provisions on fines. Further on, the paper introduces readers to newest trends in the area of concentration control between undertakings. In addition, an assessment of recent developments and suggestions for a further development of Polish competition law are reviewed in the EU context. The conscious intention of the author is to analyse whether the EU competition law pattern, often regarded as a model for Member States, has been used to develop Polish competition law. Has the latter been amended to look more, or less like EU competition law? Has Polish competition law shown the capacity to absorb the best elements of EU competition law into itself? How is the outcome aligned with the declared direction of these amendments?


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-383
Author(s):  
Václav Šmejkal

Abstract Distribution cartels in the automotive sector used to be frequently dismantled and sanctioned by the European Commission and the EU Courts still some 15 years ago. In recent years, however, only a few cases have been reported at the national level of EU Member States. Is it because the distribution of new cars really ceased to be a competition problem as the European Commission declared when it removed this part of the automotive business from the specific Block Exemption Regulation for the automotive sector in 2010? The purpose of the present analysis is first to inspect the car distribution cases that emerged in the EU after the year 2000 and, second, to speculate somewhat whether new forms of distribution, brought by the digitalization of marketing and sales, cannot bring about also new risks to cartel agreements and other types of distortions of competition in car sales.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Daniela Lukáčová

Merger control is one of the competition law tools. While competition authorities in EU act primarily on the basis of national legislation, European Commission controls mergers with EU dimension. The jurisdictional tests relate only to the economic size of the parties and do not depend on the market shares of the parties or substantive impact of the transaction, or on whether the concentration will have any effects within the state. Globalization increases the number of multijurisdictional mergers that are subject to control of several competition authorities within or outside the EU. Differences in merger control proceedings in such cases with regard to the timeframe, or the result of the proceeding, could have a negative impact on the economy in another country. Parties to the concentration could decide to neglect the merger notification due to the timeframe, or complications connected with approving of multijurisdictional merger in other countries with jurisdiction. Therefore, the national authorities’ effort to set in their legislation turnover criteria with local nexus could help to control concentrations with potential effect on competition in their country.


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