A Case for Term Limits? Temporal Shifts in Ideological Congruity Between Appointing Presidents and Supreme Court Justices

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemant Sharma ◽  
Colin Glennon
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tyler Cooper ◽  
Amanda Dworkin ◽  
Dylan Hosmer-Quint ◽  
Amanda Pescovitz

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Chilton ◽  
Daniel Epps ◽  
Kyle Rozema ◽  
Maya Sen
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jack M. Balkin

In the early years of the next regime, conservative courts will face off against liberal Democratic politicians. Courts are very unlikely to be able to do much to repair constitutional rot. Constitutional renewal must come from popular mobilizations and demands for reform, including constitutional reform. Growing frustration with the courts will lead to calls for reform of the federal judiciary. Reforms should aim at lowering the stakes of judicial appointments and assisting depolarization. Court-packing proposals achieve neither goal. Three better approaches are (1) instituting regular appointments to the Supreme Court; (2) achieving the equivalent of term limits for Supreme Court justices by changing quorum rules; (3) increasing the Court’s workload (instead of limiting its jurisdiction); and (4) using sunrise provisions that take effect in the future so that partisan advantages are harder to predict. Each of these proposals can be implemented constitutionally through ordinary legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-142
Author(s):  
Daniel Hemel

Proposals for structural changes to the US Supreme Court have attracted attention in recent years amid a perceived “legitimacy crisis” afflicting the institution. This article first assesses whether the court is in fact facing a legitimacy crisis and then considers whether prominent reform proposals are likely to address the institutional weaknesses that reformers aim to resolve. The article concludes that key trends purportedly contributing to the crisis at the court are more ambiguous in their empirical foundations and normative implications than reformers often suggest. It also argues that prominent reform proposals—including term limits, age limits, lottery selection of justices, and explicit partisan balance requirements for court membership—are unlikely to resolve the institutional flaws that proponents perceive. It ends by suggesting a more modest (though novel) reform, which would allocate two lifetime appointments per presidential term and allow the size of the court to fluctuate within bounds.


2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 883-903 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmett Macfarlane

This article critically examines the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the Senate Reform Reference from the perspective of its coherence in interpreting the various amending procedures in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. It analyzes the ways that the underlying logic of the Court’s reasoning, particularly with respect to the method of selecting senators and senatorial term limits, creates ambiguity and risks unintended consequences for future attempts at constitutional amendment. The Court’s explicit refusal to distinguish between the federal government’s unilateral ability to enact a retirement age and its logic that term limits, regardless of length, require the consent of the provinces under the general amending procedure lacks logical consistency and arguably erodes the unilateral amending procedure to a problematic degree. In the context of its reasoning with respect to changes to the method of selecting senators, the Court’s reliance on the amorphous notion of the “constitutional architecture” clouds the definable limits of “method of selection” under section 42(1)(b). The Senate Reform Reference introduces considerable ambiguity into what changes the federal executive can implement with respect to the appointments process itself. The article concludes by exploring the political implications that the decision has for the future of Senate reform specifically and for our ability to amend the constitution generally.


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