scholarly journals Is Tax Compliance a Social Norm? A Field Experiment

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pietro Battiston ◽  
Simona Gamba
Author(s):  
Christopher Larkin ◽  
Michael Sanders ◽  
Isabelle Andresen ◽  
Felicity Algate

The use of behavioral science interventions, and particularly social norms, in tax compliance is a growing industry for scholars and practitioners alike in recent years. However, the causal mechanism of these interventions is unknown, where effects could be explained by a pro-social desire to support one’s community, conditional cooperation, desire to conform, or fear of reprisals. We conduct a field experiment in local government taxation in the United Kingdom which tests the effectiveness of a social (descriptive) norm against a control condition and against messages that highlight the enforcement process. The social norm outperforms enforcement salience, suggesting that this explanation, although more powerful than the control, does not fully explain compliance effects. This study further provides evidence that social norm type interventions can be effective at the subnational level, a context where previous work has shown they may produce null effects.


2009 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald G. Cummings ◽  
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez ◽  
Michael McKee ◽  
Benno Torgler

Author(s):  
Andreas Olden ◽  
Jan-Emmanuel De Neve ◽  
Erik Ø. Sørensen ◽  
Alexander Cappelen ◽  
Bertil Tungodden ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadja Dwenger ◽  
Henrik Kleven ◽  
Imran Rasul ◽  
Johannes Rincke

We study extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for tax compliance in the context of a local church tax in Germany. This tax system has historically relied on zero deterrence so that any compliance at baseline is intrinsically motivated. Starting from this zero deterrence baseline, we implement a field experiment that incentivized compliance through deterrence or rewards. Using administrative records of taxes paid and true tax liabilities, we use these treatments to document that intrinsically motivated compliance is substantial, that a significant fraction of it may be driven by duty-to-comply preferences, and that there is no crowd-out between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. (JEL C93, D64, H26, H71, K34, Z12)


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Holz ◽  
John List ◽  
Alejandro Zentner ◽  
Marvin Cardoza ◽  
Joaquin Zentner

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (7) ◽  
pp. 2801-2819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristina M. Bott ◽  
Alexander W. Cappelen ◽  
Erik Ø. Sørensen ◽  
Bertil Tungodden

We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter from the tax authorities, we cleanly identify that moral suasion and the perceived detection probability play a crucial role in shaping taxpayer behavior. The moral letter mainly works on the intensive margin, while the detection letter has a strong effect on the extensive margin. We further show that only the detection letter has long-term effects on tax compliance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.


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