The Value of Using Market Share Data for Analysis in Competition Law

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emile Tihomiroff McHarsky-Todoroff
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Share Data

Super platforms, big data, and competition law: the Japanese approach in contrast with the USA and EU

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiaki Takigawa
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Platforms ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Essential Facility ◽  
Share Data ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Data Portability ◽  
Efficiency Effects

ABSTRACT This article examines antitrust issues concerning digital platforms equipped with big data. Recent initiatives by the Japanese competition agency are highlighted, comparing them with those by the USA and EU competition authorities. First examined is whether competition among platforms would result in a select few super platforms with market power, concluding that AI with machine learning has augmented the power of super platforms with strong AI-capability, leading to increased importance of merger control over acquisitions by platforms. Next scrutinized is the argument for utility-regulation to be imposed on super platforms, concluding that wide support is limited to data portability, leaving competition law as the key tool for addressing super platforms, its core tool being the provision against exclusionary conduct, enforcement of which, initially, concerns whether to order super platforms to render their data accessible to their rivals. Passive refusal-to-share data needs to be scrutinized under the essential facility doctrine. Beyond passive refusal, platforms’ exclusionary conduct requires competition agencies to weigh the conduct’s exclusionary effects against its efficiency effects. Finally addressed is exploitative abuse, explaining its relation to consumer protection, concluding that competition law enforcement on exploitative abuse should be minimized, since it accompanies risk of over-enforcement.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

Identifying competitors from market share data: a technique and an application

1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Rothschild ◽  
P. Swann ◽  
M. Taghavi
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Share Data

Industrial structure of the federal sector: Evidence from bureau market share data

Public Choice ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 611-627
Author(s):  
Kathleen A. Carroll
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Industrial Structure ◽  
Federal Sector ◽  
Share Data

Competition Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Butt ◽  
Tim Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Exclusive Dealing ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Corporate Groups ◽  
Competition Commission ◽  
The Government ◽  
Competitive Economy ◽  
Mergers And Acquisition

Large corporate groups have dominated Indonesia’s corporate landscape for decades, and are controlled by a relatively small number of elite families. This chapter looks at laws that were introduced after Soeharto’s fall to create a more competitive economy, and establish the KPPU, Indonesia’s competition commission. The chapter begins with an account of the key provisions of the Competition Law, including the rules relating to monopolies, monopsonies, oligopolies, cartels, market share, dominant position, exclusive dealing, and mergers and acquisition. It then provides an assessment of the KPPU’s structure and powers, its performance, and its relations with the government, as well as problems with the enforcement of its decisions. The chapter includes several case studies, including the Donggi-Senoro case.

Alternatives to the Traditional Retail Store Audit: A Field Study

1984 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-61
Author(s):  
V. Kanti Prasad ◽  
Wayne R. Casper ◽  
Robert J. Schieffer
Keyword(s):  
Field Study ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Product Category ◽  
Retail Store ◽  
Market Data ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Share Data

A field study was conducted to empirically compare market share data yielded by weekend selldown and store purchases audit methods with those provided by the traditional store audit method, for the beer product category. In one of the two test cities, market shares based on the weekend selldown audit method were statistically different for many major brands from those based on the traditional store audit method. Market share figures computed from the store purchases and traditional store audit methods, however, were statistically comparable in both test cities. The study points to the importance of focusing attention on the conditions under which the traditional store audit method and its economical alternatives may or may not yield comparable market data.

How to Include Pirated Goods in the Market Boundaries for the Purposes of Antitrust Law?

2018 ◽  
pp. 3-23
Author(s):  
Anton Morozov ◽  
Andrey Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Counterfeit Goods ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Original Product ◽  
Counterfeit Products ◽  
The Right

In many cases of competition law enforcement counterfeit goods are not included within the product-market boundaries on an equal basis with the original product. However, existing literature highlights that illegal copies should be included in market boundaries, since from the consumer's viewpoint counterfeit is a substitute of an original good. In this article, we determine the conditions under which counterfeit products should be included either in market shares of original producers or when counterfeit manufacturers should be recognized as right holder competitors. We conclude that in case of strong network effects counterfeit product should be included in the market share of the right holder. On the contrary, when network effects are weak, pirates or counterfeit manufacturers should be considered as competitors of original product producers.

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

Part III Vertical Agreements Outside Regulation 330/2010, 10 Economics and Self-Assessment of Vertical Agreements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
Specific Approach ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Economic Thinking ◽  
Vertical Restrictions

This chapter addresses vertical agreements outside the scope of Regulation 330/2010 on account of the market shares of the parties. Regulation 330/2010 applies only to vertical agreements between parties that each do not exceed a market share limit of 30 per cent. Such parties must conduct a self-assessment to determine whether their agreements fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU and, if they do, whether they meet the conditions for exemption stated in Article 101(3) TFEU. The Vertical Guidelines commands a case-specific approach. This chapter repeats the overarching principles that apply to every self-assessment; describes the framework of analysis suggested by the Vertical Guidelines; summarizes the positive and negative effects of vertical restraints and presents the economic thinking that is underpinning the competition law treatment of vertical restraints; and finally summarizes the pointers contained in the Vertical Guidelines with respect to certain distribution formulas and certain vertical restrictions.

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