1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

scholarly journals The Necessity of ASEAN Competition Law: Rethinking

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 218
Author(s):  
Udin Silalahi ◽  
Dian Parluhutan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Integration ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Domestic Market ◽  
Unfair Competition ◽  
Member States ◽  
Asean Member ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Competition Laws

As outlined in the AEC Blueprint, all ASEAN member states (AMSs) will endeavour to introduce competition policy by 2015. At present 7 (seven) AMSs, namely: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Myanmar have the national competition laws to supervise anti-competitive conduct in the domestic market. But the question is what if happened unfair competition between ASEAN member states, due to the agreement or businesses activities by business actors that harm competition? ASEAN has an ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy (ARGCP) that developed by ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC) as framework for member states to develop its own competition law or policy and as a guideline in measuring that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises and the structure of industry and markets. Regional Guideline is just to help AMSs in increasing of awareness of important policy, not to sustain the competition among ASEAN member countries. Until now there is no ASEAN Competition Law and Institution to oversee competition among ASEAN member countries. In this era, ASEAN economic integration it is a certainty that anti-competitive among AMSs will happen.

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Concerted Practice ◽  
Collective Dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

How to Include Pirated Goods in the Market Boundaries for the Purposes of Antitrust Law?

2018 ◽  
pp. 3-23
Author(s):  
Anton Morozov ◽  
Andrey Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Counterfeit Goods ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Original Product ◽  
Counterfeit Products ◽  
The Right

In many cases of competition law enforcement counterfeit goods are not included within the product-market boundaries on an equal basis with the original product. However, existing literature highlights that illegal copies should be included in market boundaries, since from the consumer's viewpoint counterfeit is a substitute of an original good. In this article, we determine the conditions under which counterfeit products should be included either in market shares of original producers or when counterfeit manufacturers should be recognized as right holder competitors. We conclude that in case of strong network effects counterfeit product should be included in the market share of the right holder. On the contrary, when network effects are weak, pirates or counterfeit manufacturers should be considered as competitors of original product producers.

COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN ASEAN

2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 241-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. SIVALINGAM
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Economic Structure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Early Adoption ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Asean Countries ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

The focus of this paper is on competition policy and law in the ASEAN countries. The paper begins with a descriptive evaluation of competition policy in the ASEAN countries. We then look at the effect of economic structure on the probability of early adoption of competition law among the ASEAN countries after which the competition laws of the ASEAN countries are evaluated in terms of objectives, jurisdictional exception, horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, definition and abuse of dominant position and mergers. We find that the competition laws of the four ASEAN countries that have implemented competition law are not completely harmonized.

The Online Transportation Network in Indonesia: A Pendulum between the Sharing Economy and Ex Ante Regulation

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 260-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas
Keyword(s):  
Public Transportation ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Transportation Networks ◽  
Transportation Network ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Transportation Industry ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Ex Ante

The prominent role of innovation in the emerging digital market in Indonesia presents new challenges for current competition law and policy. Traditionally reliant on market definition for the analysis, the present competition law may not yet have sufficiently taken innovation into consideration. In the competition policy area, while innovation has not taken a clear role in tailoring suitable regulations or approaches, markets have attempted to adapt themselves to the new changes in order to meet rising demand. The present state of policy is illustrated by the development oj online transportation networks like those provided by Uber and GrabCar, services similar to those that have been traditionally offered by taxi companies. While regulation asymmetry has been accused of not allowing a level playing field for conventional taxis versus online transportation networks, the concept of the sharing economy seems to address today's policy approach in Indonesia, which favors ex ante regulation on public transportation service provision in the country. This paper examines the applicable regulations in the transportation network industry and discusses how competition policy might cope with this issue and in what cases competition law might deal with innovation brought by online transportation network in the public transportation industry in Indonesia.

Part III Vertical Agreements Outside Regulation 330/2010, 10 Economics and Self-Assessment of Vertical Agreements

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Self Assessment ◽  
Specific Approach ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Economic Thinking ◽  
Vertical Restrictions

This chapter addresses vertical agreements outside the scope of Regulation 330/2010 on account of the market shares of the parties. Regulation 330/2010 applies only to vertical agreements between parties that each do not exceed a market share limit of 30 per cent. Such parties must conduct a self-assessment to determine whether their agreements fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU and, if they do, whether they meet the conditions for exemption stated in Article 101(3) TFEU. The Vertical Guidelines commands a case-specific approach. This chapter repeats the overarching principles that apply to every self-assessment; describes the framework of analysis suggested by the Vertical Guidelines; summarizes the positive and negative effects of vertical restraints and presents the economic thinking that is underpinning the competition law treatment of vertical restraints; and finally summarizes the pointers contained in the Vertical Guidelines with respect to certain distribution formulas and certain vertical restrictions.

27. Competition Law:

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Monopoly Power ◽  
The Core ◽  
Per Se ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document