Euro-sceptical or Euro-phile? A critical analysis of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the process of European integration and decision-making

<p>On 14 January 2014, for the first time in its history, the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) decided to refer a decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This referral, which concerned the issue of the legality of the European Central Bank’s bond-buying practices, must be seen as “historic” with regard to European integration and the relationship between European Union law and German constitutional law, forming part of important decisions of the FCC in this field since its first euro-critical judgment, Solange I, 40 years ago. Considering the high influence the German Federal Constitutional Court has had on the process of European integration, this paper aims at identifying and critiquing the lines of argumentation developed by the FCC in recent years in the field of European integration and decision-making before and after the Lisbon judgment in 2009, paying particular attention to the currently suspended OMT Decision proceedings in order to answer the question if a shift in the jurisprudence of the FCC from a euro-sceptical to a euro-phile approach has taken place.</p>

«La integración europea a través del derecho». La contribución del Tribunal Constitucional Federal (alemán)

Teoría y Realidad Constitucional ◽

10.5944/trc.39.2017.19164 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 103

Author(s):

Andreas Vosskuhle

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

European Integration ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

European Law ◽

The European Union ◽

National Parliaments ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

The Law ◽

Muchos actores están involucrados en la implementación de la idea de comunidad jurídica, entre ellos, los parlamentos nacionales, administraciones y tribunales internos que son responsables de la puesta en práctica del Derecho de la Unión Europea. En este estudio se aborda la labor del Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemán en el desarrollo de la integración europea considerando diez impulsos centrales. Además, para finalizar, se aportarán algunas reflexiones realistas sobre las limitaciones del derecho en la solución de vicisitudes en el marco de la Unión Europea.Many stakeholders are involved in implementing the idea of legal community, including national parliaments, administrations and courts, which for their part are responsible for the implementation of European law. This study addresses the work of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the development of European integration by considering ten central impulses. In addition, to conclude, some realistic reflections on the limitations of the law in the solution of vicissitudes in the framework of the European Union will be provided.

The German Federal Constitutional Court's Ruling on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – Another Step towards National Closure?

German Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s2071832200002972 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 15 (2) ◽

pp. 329-342 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Dagmar Schiek

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

German Law ◽

Case Law ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

European Union Law ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

The Impact ◽

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruling of 14 January 2014 deserves a thorough evaluation on several accounts: It is the first ever reference by the FCC to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it represents a continuation of FCC case law aimed at restricting the impact of European Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justices of the European Union (CJEU) on German law as well as questioning Germany's participation in an ever closer European Union, and it has the potential to dictate the future course of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) Case

International Law Reports ◽

10.1017/ilr.2020.41 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 192 ◽

pp. 451-511

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

Eu Law ◽

The European Union ◽

European Central ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

Basic Law ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

451Economics, trade and finance — European Monetary Union — Fiscal sovereignty — Public debt — Monetary policy — Economic policy — European Union — Asset purchase programme — Quantitative easing — Central banks — European Central Bank — European System of Central Banks — BundesbankTreaties — Treaty-making powers — Constitutional limitations on treaty-making powers — Transfers of powers by States to intergovernmental and other transnational authorities — Whether compatible with constitutional prerogatives of national parliament — Overall budgetary responsibility — Basic Law of GermanyInternational organizations — European Union — Powers — Member States as masters of the treaties — Principle of conferral — Whether Union having competence to determine or extend its own powers — Principle of subsidiarity — Court of Justice of the European UnionRelationship of international law and municipal law — European Union law — Interpretation — Application — Judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Weiss — Principle of proportionality — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether German Federal Constitutional Court having absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — Compatibility with Basic Law of Federal Republic of Germany — Openness of German Basic Law to European integration — Whether purchase programme ultra vires — Whether ultra vires acts applicable in Germany — Whether having binding effect in relation to German constitutional organsJurisdiction — European Union institutions — Whether jurisdiction of German Federal Constitutional Court extending to Court of Justice of the European Union and European Central Bank — Whether acts of EU institutions subject to national constitutional review — Ultra vires review — Review of core identity of national constitution — Whether application of EU law having absolute primacy — Whether absolute duty to follow judgment of Court of Justice of the European Union — The law of Germany

Core of State Sovereignty and Boundaries of European Union's Identity in the Lissabon – Urteil

German Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s2071832200018605 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

pp. 399-418

Author(s):

Elisabetta Lanza

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

State Sovereignty ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

Member States ◽

Treaty Of Lisbon ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

German Federal Constitutional ◽

The Eu

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

The Public Sector Purchase Programme Ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Union Legal Order

Regional Law Review ◽

10.18485/iup_rlr.2020.ch1 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 11-20

Author(s):

Ágoston Mohay

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Public Sector ◽

Legal Order ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

The Public ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court – New Guidance on the Limits of European Integration?

German Law Journal ◽

10.1017/s2071832200018587 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

pp. 367-390 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Armin Steinbach

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Core Competencies ◽

National Level ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

German Federal Constitutional ◽

State Functions

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has found that there are no constitutional objections against the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the FCC imposed limitations to future integration by identifying a number of state functions that are non-amenable to integration and which have to be retained at the national level. This article examines the scope and content of these core competencies. It also discusses to what extent the criteria used by the FCC for the determination of core competencies might reflect a European-wide standard for the determination of limits to the transfer of competencies to the European Union. The article concludes that the judgment clarifies the limitations of the transfer of competencies, even though the criteria used by the FCC cannot claim to produce the set of inalienable sovereign powers that were recognized as such throughout the Union.

Inconsistencies – The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant

European Constitutional Law Review ◽

10.1017/s1574019606002094 ◽

2006 ◽

Vol 2 (2) ◽

pp. 209-226 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Christian Tomuschat

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

The European Union ◽

Arrest Warrant ◽

Basic Law ◽

Democratic Principle ◽

European Arrest Warrant ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

Features European Arrest Warrant – Article 16(2) German Basic Law, which allows exceptionally for the extradition of German nationals, not read in the light of the European Union integration clause in Article 23(1) Basic Law – Complaint of violation of the democratic principle put in perspective – Preservation of the statehood of Germany – Lack of proportionality in and procedural defects of the implementing Act