Power Theory of Exchange and Money

Modern exchange theories model a large market, but do not explain single exchanges. This paper considers the phenomenon of single exchange and formulates the general exchange problem in the form of a system of two equations, subjective and objective. Subjective equilibrium is given by the Walras–Jevons marginal utility equation. Objective equilibrium equations by Walras and Jevons are averaged over all transactions in the market and can only give a rough general picture without explaining the specific price of an individual exchange. An exchange micro-condition must be found that, when averaged, will give the Walras market equilibrium macro-condition. The study of the internal structure of exchange leads to the need to consider power. The concept of generalized power is introduced. It is generalized power that serves as the primary comparable and measurable objective basis of exchange. The power theory of exchange provides the objective price-equation. It is demonstrated that money is a measure of generalized power in exchange and a certification of generalized power in subsequent exchanges. This methodology is based on an interdisciplinary analysis of an abstract exchange model in the form of a system of equations. The proposed theory is able to uniformly explain any exchange, including a single one, which is impossible with the existing theories of exchange.

Power Theory of Exchange and Money

Modern exchange theories model a large market, but do not explain single exchange. The paper considers the phenomenon of single exchange and formulates the general exchange problem in the form of a system of two equations, subjective and objective. Subjective equilibrium is given by the Walras-Jevons marginal utility equation. Objective equilibrium equations by Walras and Jevons are averaged over all transactions in the market and can only give a rough general picture without explaining the specific price of an individual exchange. An exchange micro-condition must be found that, when averaged, will give the Walras market equilibrium macro-condition. The study of the internal structure of exchange leads to the need to consider power. The concept of generalized power is introduced. It is generalized power that serves as the primary comparable and measurable objective basis of exchange. The power theory of exchange provides the objective price-equation. It is demonstrated that money is a measure of generalized power in exchange and a certification of generalized power in subsequent exchanges. The proposed theory is able to uniformly explain any exchange, including a single one, which is impossible with the existing theories of exchange.

Power Theory of Exchange and Money

Modern exchange theories model a large market, but do not explain single exchange. The paper considers the phenomenon of single exchange and formulates the general exchange problem in the form of a system of two equations, subjective and objective. Subjective equilibrium is given by the Walras-Jevons marginal utility equation. Objective equilibrium equations by Walras and Jevons are averaged over all transactions in the market and can only give a rough general picture without explaining the specific price of an individual exchange. An exchange micro-condition must be found that, when averaged, will give the Walras market equilibrium macro-condition. The study of the internal structure of exchange leads to the need to consider power. The concept of generalized power is introduced. It is generalized power that serves as the primary comparable and measurable objective basis of exchange. The power theory of exchange provides the objective price-equation. It is demonstrated that money is a measure of generalized power in exchange and a certification of generalized power in subsequent exchanges. The proposed theory is able to uniformly explain any exchange, including a single one, which is impossible with the existing theories of exchange.

P1155REMOVAL OF PHOSPHATE AND CREATININE DURING PD WITH DIFFERENT GLUCOSE CONCENTRATIONS

Background and Aims Adequate removal of creatinine and phosphate is one of the key objectives in peritoneal dialysis (PD). Whereas the mechanism of creatinine removal is well known, there are gaps in understanding regulation of phosphate removal. Clinical studies show that although the size of both molecules is similar, their removal might behave differently (Badve et al CJASN 2008). Several, but not all, studies have suggested that peritoneal phosphate clearance is larger when using CAPD than APD prescriptions, suggesting the dwell time or duration is an important determinant of phosphate clearance. The aim of the study was to investigate specifically the effect of dwell duration at the level of single PD exchange with different glucose concentrations on peritoneal phosphate clearance. Method A prolonged 8-hour PET was carried out in 32 clinically stable PD patients with each of three glucose-based solutions: 1.36% (G1), 2.27% (G2), and 3.86% (G3) with temporary drainage at 1 and 4 hours of peritoneal dwell. Dialysate and blood samples were taken to measure infused and drained volume and concentration of phosphate and creatinine in dialysate and blood. Clearances were calculated for a single exchange for each solution and for 4-hour (4H) and 8-hour (8H) dwell periods. For each patient, the 4-hour creatinine D/P ratio for G3 was calculated. The clearance ratio, ClR, defined as the ratio of solute clearance for particular solution to its clearance for the G1 solution, was calculated for both solutes and each solution and dwell durations. Results The obtained values of 4H creatinine D/P ratio for G3 solution were 0.67±0.11 (mean±SD). The values of solute clearances per single exchange expressed in mL/min, are presented in table below. Creatinine and phosphate clearances were found to be solution and dwell duration dependent with p<0.001. The clearances of both solutes were correlated for the same dwell duration or solution (not for creatinine G2 for 4H vs 8H) with p<0.05. Moreover, solute clearances were also correlated with creatinine D/P for 4H but not for 8H. The clearances of phosphate were also correlated with that for creatinine each solution at both dwell durations with p<0.001. Both calculated ClR were found to be dependent on the solution (p<0.001) but not dwell duration. Similar dependence on solution and correlations are valid in one analyze solute mass removal. Conclusion Phosphate and creatinine clearances were found to be well correlated during a long, 8-hour PET proving similarities in their transport. Interestingly, the dependence of both clearances and ClR on solution glucose concentration suggest that the removal of phosphate as well as creatinine depends on the ultrafiltration induced by glucose concentration in dialysis solution.

Alternating and variable controls for the wave equation

The present article discusses the exact observability of the wave equation when the observation subset of the boundary is variable in time. In the one-dimensional case, we prove an equivalent condition for the exact observability, which takes into account only the location in time of the observation. To this end we use Fourier series. Then we investigate the two specific cases of single exchange of the control position, and of exchange at a constant rate. In the multi-dimensional case, we analyse sufficient conditions for the exact observability relying on the multiplier method. In the last section, the multi-dimensional results are applied to specific settings and some connections between the one and multi-dimensional case are discussed; furthermore some open problems are presented.

How should we model property? Thinking with my critics

Inspired by comments made by Allen (2017), Lueck (2017), Ménard (2017) and Smith (2017), this response clarifies and deepens the analysis in Arruñada (2017a). Its main argument is that to deal with the complexity of property we must abstract secondary elements, such as the physical dimensions of some types of assets, and focus on the interaction between transactions. This sequential-exchange framework captures the main problem of property in the current environment of impersonal markets. It also provides criteria to compare private and public ordering, as well as to organize public solutions that enable new forms of private ordering. The analysis applies the lessons in Coase (1960) to property by not only comparing realities but also maintaining his separate definition of property rights and transaction costs. However, it replaces his contractual, single-exchange, framework for one in which contracts interact, causing exchange externalities.

Property institutions and the limits of Coase

Coase's (1960) contractual single-exchange framework is challenged by Arruñada (2017) as a framework that cannot be used to understand the complex nature of property law and related institutions. Arruñada proposes the sequential exchange model as an alternative framework. Differences between the two approaches are considered and some applications in land and natural resources are used to evaluate his critique. These cases support Arruñada's critique of the simple contracting approach to property, showing that for many natural resources private contracting has not been the solution and that a mix of property institutions govern. Contrary to Arruñada, however, I argue that the limits of the single-exchange framework arise not because of sequential exchange, but because assets (parcels of land) are complex and physically connected.

Property as sequential exchange: the forgotten limits of private contract

The contractual, single-exchange framework in Coase (1960) contains the implicit assumption that exchange in property rights does not affect future transaction (i.e., trading) costs. This is pertinent for analyzing use externalities but limits our understanding of property institutions: A central problem of property markets lies in the interaction among multiple transactions, which causes exchange-related and non-contractible externalities. By retaining a single-exchange simplification, the economic analysis of property has encouraged views that: overemphasize the initial allocation of property rights, while some form of recurrent allocation is often needed; pay scant attention to legal rights, although these determine enforceability and, therefore, economic value; and overestimate the power of unregulated private ordering, despite its inability to protect third parties. These three biases have been a misleading policy in many areas, including land titling and business firm formalization.

Rex Seafood, Incorporated: Accounting for Inventory Transactions among Related Parties

ABSTRACT This case is based on an actual inventory accounting dilemma for a fish processing company located in Washington State. Rex Seafood, Incorporated (Rex) and its wholly owned subsidiary, Juneau Supply Company, purchase, process, and sell fish to restaurants and other retail outlets in the state of Washington and surrounding inland states. Rex has an agreement with Condor Enterprises to transport fish purchased from Juneau Supply in Alaska to Rex's facility in Washington for processing. The central issue of the case involves appropriate accounting and reporting for intercompany sales: How should the sales of inventory from Juneau Supply to Condor and the purchases by Rex from Condor be recorded and reported? Using the FASB Accounting Standards Codification, students must determine whether Rex's arrangement with Condor is a product financing arrangement, whether the purchases and sales of inventory should be considered a single exchange transaction, and whether the events should be considered intercompany transactions. In addition, students are asked to consider recording and disclosure implications of recommended solutions. This case is suitable for use in undergraduate Intermediate and graduate Financial Accounting classes.