Vicarious Liability and Non-Delegable Duty in Common Law Actions Based on Institutional Child Abuse

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil James Foster

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Griffin ◽  
Gemma Briffa

In 2017 Victoria became the first Australian jurisdiction to initiate substantive reforms to its civil liability laws, to address barriers faced by plaintiffs seeking to hold institutions liable for child abuse. The new law, based on recommendations arising from a Victorian inquiry, establishes a statutory duty of care owed by organisations to take reasonable precautions against abuse of children under their care or supervision. On its face, the Wrongs Amendment (Organisational Child Abuse) Act 2017 (Vic) looks like a helpful clarification of this complex area of law. However, when viewed within the context of the work of the Royal Commission on Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, as well as common law principles – particularly strict liability in the areas of non- delegable duty and vicarious liability, and the High Court decision of Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC – we see that barriers and uncertainties remain.



2021 ◽  
pp. 100-118
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses both common law and statute on employers’ liability and vicarious liability. Employers’ liability is concerned with the employer’s personal, non-delegable duty in respect of the physical and psychological safety of his employees. This was established in Wilsons and Clyde Coal v English (1938) and is reinforced by the statutory requirement that employers have compulsory insurance. Vicarious liability involves the employer being liable to a third party for the tort of his employee. This must occur in the course of employment, a concept which was redefined in Lister v Hesley Hall (2002). The employment relationship has been re-examined in the light of institutional child abuse cases.



2019 ◽  
pp. 99-116
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses both common law and statute on employers’ liability and vicarious liability. Employers’ liability is concerned with the employer’s personal, non-delegable duty in respect of the physical and psychological safety of his employees. This was established in Wilsons and Clyde Coal v English (1938) and is reinforced by the statutory requirement that employers have compulsory insurance. Vicarious liability involves the employer being liable to a third party for the tort of his employee. This must occur in the course of employment, a concept which was redefined in Lister v Hesley Hall (2002). The employment relationship has been re-examined in the light of institutional child abuse cases.



Author(s):  
Carol Brennan

This chapter discusses both common law and statute on employers’ liability and vicarious liability. Employers’ liability is concerned with the employer’s personal, non-delegable duty in respect of the physical and psychological safety of his employees. This was established in Wilsons and Clyde Coal v English (1938) and is reinforced by the statutory requirement that employers have compulsory insurance. Vicarious liability involves the employer being liable to a third party for the tort of his employee. This must occur in the course of employment, a concept which was redefined in Lister v Hesley Hall (2002). The employment relationship has been re-examined in the light of institutional child abuse cases.



Tort Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter examines the principle of vicarious liability, a form of secondary liability through which employers may, in certain circumstances, be liable for the torts of their employees, even though the employer themselves may be entirely blameless. The imposition of vicarious liability is one of the most important exceptions to the general approach of the common law whereby liability for any wrongdoing is imposed on, and only on, the wrongdoer(s). A defendant will not be vicariously liable unless the following conditions are met: (a) there is an employer–employee relationship between the defendant and the person for whose actions they are being held liable; (b) the employee committed the tortious act while acting in the course of their employment.



Author(s):  
Daleen Millard ◽  
Eugene Gustav Bascerano

A person whose privacy has been infringed through the unlawful, culpable processing of his or her personal information can sue the infringer’s employer based on vicarious liability or institute action based on the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (POPI). Section 99(1) of POPI provides a person (“data subject”), whose privacy has been infringed, with the right to institute a civil action against the responsible party. POPI defines the responsible party as the person who determines the purpose of and means for processing of personal information of data subjects. Although POPI does not equate a responsible party to an employer, the term “responsible party” is undoubtedly a synonym for “employer” in this context. By holding an employer accountable for its employees’ unlawful processing of a data subject’s personal information, POPI creates a form of statutory vicarious liability.Since the defences available to an employer at common law, and developed by case law, differs from the statutory defences available to an employer in terms of POPI, it is necessary to compare the impact this new statute has on employers. From a risk perspective, employers must be aware of the serious implications of POPI. The question that arises is whether the Act does not perhaps take matters too far.This article takes a critical look at the statutory defences available to an employer in vindication of a vicarious liability action brought by a data subject in terms of section 99(1) of POPI. It compares the defences found in section 99(2) of POPI and the common-law defences available to an employer fending off a delictual claim founded on the doctrine of vicarious liability. To support the argument that the statutory vicarious liability created by POPI is is too harsh, the defences contained in section 99(2) of POPI is further analogised with those available to an employer in terms of section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) and other comparable foreign data protection statutes. 



2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-15
Author(s):  
Jacob Joad

This paper, ‘Limits of Liability’, shall focus on the recent history of the concept of vicarious liability in Anglo-American common law from the 19th century to the present.



Tort Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 607-624
Author(s):  
Kirsty Horsey ◽  
Erika Rackley

This chapter examines the principle of vicarious liability, a form of secondary liability through which employers may, in certain circumstances, be liable for the torts of their employees, even though the employer themselves may be entirely blameless. The imposition of vicarious liability is one of the most important exceptions to the general approach of the common law whereby liability for any wrongdoing is imposed on, and only on, the wrongdoer(s). A defendant will not be vicariously liable unless the following conditions are met: (a) there is an employer–employee relationship between the defendant and the person for whose actions they are being held liable; (b) the employee committed the tortious act while acting in the course of their employment.



2019 ◽  
pp. 504-538
Author(s):  
Andrew Murray

This chapter, which examines pornography and obscenity on the internet, first provides an overview of the UK common law standard known as the Hicklin principle and the Obscene Publications Acts. It then discusses the UK standard and US statutory interventions on pornography, the impact of the case ACLU v Reno on the regulation of sexually explicit content on the internet, pseudo-images, and images depicting child abuse as the most extreme form of pornographic image, and the policing of pseudo-images in the UK and internationally. The chapter also considers the law on non-photographic pornographic images of children, along with private regulation of pornographic imagery and the new Age-verification code for adult websites.



Author(s):  
Hesti Widya Ningrum

Corporate criminal responsibility has a difference in its development between countries with the common law system and those with civil law system. This is also, no exception in Indonesia. Indonesia as a Dutch Colony, which adheres to the civil law system which carries the adagium "deliquere non potest university," where corporations cannot be convicted. By using a normative approach, this article discusses about corporation as subject of criminal law which regulated outside the Criminal Code (KUHP). In Pratice, there have been several cases that punish corporations who commit criminal acts such as corruption. The finding of this article is court in Indonesia, especially corruption court are more likely to use the doctrine of vicarious liability as in common law countries. Contrary, with the conception in the Draft Criminal Code (RKUHP) that is more likely to use identification doctrine on corporate responsibility.



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