scholarly journals Emission Permits and Public Pollution Abatement: Can Decentralized Environmental Policies Be Efficient?

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikos Tsakiris ◽  
Panagiotis (Panos) Hatzipanayotou (Xatzipanagiotou) ◽  
Michael S. Michael
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Emission Permits

The efficiency of decentralized environmental policies under global pollution and tradable emission permits

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 541-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikos Tsakiris ◽  
Panos Hatzipanayotou ◽  
Michael S. Michael
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Emission Permits ◽  
Global Pollution ◽  
Tradable Emission Permits

Can Stricter Environmental Regulations Increase Export of the Polluting Good?

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Monica Das ◽  
Sandwip K. Das
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Pollution Haven Hypothesis ◽  
Trade Patterns ◽  
Pollution Haven ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Emission Caps

Abstract According to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), weak environmental policies improve a country's comparative advantage in the polluting sector, thus promoting its expansion. In this paper, we develop a neo-classical general equilibrium model with two goods and two factors and show that the relationship between environmental policies and comparative advantage can be ambiguous. We focus entirely on emission caps or command and control (CAC) programs of regulation and treat abatement as equivalent to a technological retardation. We show that when the technological retardation is Hick neutral, the PHH holds and the Heckscher Ohlin Samuelson (HOS) theorem determines trade patterns between a capital-abundant country and a labor-abundant country that follow different environmental policies. If pollution abatement is capital biased in the polluting sector, the standard trade theorems and the PHH may not hold. The paper derives a sufficient condition under which the PHH would hold. However, if this condition is violated, the PHH as well as the HOS theorem may not hold.

Dynamic optimal control of pollution abatement investment under emission permits

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shoude Li
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Emission Permits

scholarly journals Promotion of Green Technology under Different Environmental Policies

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
John C. Strandholm
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Green Technology ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Tradeable Permits ◽  
Policy Regime ◽  
Abatement Technology ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
Emission Fees

In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely emission fees and quotas. Tradeable permits result in identical outcomes to emission fees. Within each policy regime, the conditions for Nash equilibria are identified where both firms invest in the green technology, neither firm invests in the technology, or only one firm invests. The following extensions are also analyzed: asymmetric adoption costs, increase in the marginal cost of production from adoption, and a type-dependent fee where adoption reduces the emission fee. Social welfare under an emission fee is identical to that under a quota. However, when policy is (not) stringent, firms are more willing to adopt expensive technology under a fee (quota) than under a quota (fee, respectively).

Ecological Limits and the Meaning of Freedom: A Defense of Liberty as Non-Domination

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Augustin Fragnière
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Environmental Policies ◽  
Environmental Constraints ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Global Environmental Problems ◽  
Global Environmental ◽  
Two Alternatives

It is now widely acknowledged that global environmental problems raise pressing social and political issues, but relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to their bearing on the concept of liberty. This must surprise us, because the question of whether environmental policies are at odds with individual liberty is bound to be controversial in the political arena. First, this article explains why a thorough philosophical debate about the relation between liberty and environmental constraints is needed. Second, based on Philip Pettit’s typology of liberty, it assesses how different conceptions of liberty fare in a context of stringent ecological limits. Indeed, a simple conceptual analysis shows that some conceptions of liberty are more compatible than others with such limits, and with the policies necessary to avoid overshooting them. The article concludes that Pettit’s conception of liberty as non-domination is more compatible with the existence of stringent ecological limits than the two alternatives considered.

Possible Inefficiencies in a Duopoly Trading Emission Permits

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 279-303
Author(s):  
Chaim Fershtman
Keyword(s):  
Emission Permits

Why Paper Mills Clean Up: Determinants of Pollution Abatement in Four Asian Countries

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Wheeler ◽  
Mainul Huq ◽  
Raymond S. Hartman
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Paper Mills
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