Change in the Ultimate Rule of a Legal System: Uncertainty, Hard Cases, Commonwealth Precedents, and the Importance of Context

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Oliver
2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-144
Author(s):  
Leonel Severo Rocha ◽  
Fernando Tonet Silva

Resumo: Toda decisão judicial sobre casos difíceis, passa por uma elevada construção interpretativa. Sob um olhar sistêmico, a operatividade do sistema jurídico só pode ser observada se mantida sua integridade, ou seja, por seus próprios códigos. Quando Ulisses busca uma solução para salvar sua vida e de seus grumetes, mantém a estrutura, porém, faz uma decisão através de uma dupla observação: decidir salvar a vida de todos, porém, buscando fundamentos distintos, enquanto uns perdem, momentaneamente, o sentido da audição; Ulisses decide escutar as sereias. A decisão corresponde aos complexos casos, onde mesmo sem o canto das sereias (norma), o caso deve ser resolvido. Nesse sentido, é analisado o acórdão da 7ª Câmara Cível do TJRS, na Apelação nº 70005798004/2003, onde foi discutida a partilha de bens e direitos sucessórios de um genro infiel. O paradoxo apresentado representa o grande santuário da teoria sistêmica e a necessidade de decisão dos Tribunais.   Abstract: Every court decision on hard cases goes through a high interpretive construction. From a systemic perspective, the operability of the legal system can only be observed if maintained their integrity, i.e. their own codes. When Ulysses seeks a solution to save your life and his cabin-cleaning boys, he maintains the structure, however, decides by a double observation: deciding to save everyone’s lives, however, looking for different reasoning basis, while some lose, briefly, their hearing; Ulysses decides to listen to the mermaids. The decision corresponds to the complex cases where even without the mermaid’s singing (norm), the case should be solved. Therefore, the 7th Civil Chamber’s decision in Appeal No. 70005798004/2003, where there has been discussed the sharing of inheritance and property rights of an unfaithful son-in-law, is analyzed. The presented paradox represents the great sanctuary of systems theory and the need for decisions from courts.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 572-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
George O. White III ◽  
Amon Chizema ◽  
Anne Canabal ◽  
Mark J. Perry

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to draw from organizational ecology and institutional theory, the authors suggest that there will be a curvilinear relationship between legal system uncertainty and foreign direct investment (FDI) attraction in Southeast Asia. The authors extend theory by arguing that this is because uncertainty will provide opportunities for FDI that seek this form of operating environment, leveraging legal system uncertainty as a basis for competitive advantage. Design/methodology/approach – The authors test and find support for the hypotheses using FDI data from nine Southeast Asian countries for the years 1995-2005. Findings – In this paper, the authors hypothesize and find that the relationship between legal system uncertainty and FDI attraction is curvilinear in nature, such that FDI attraction decreases with legal system uncertainty down to an inflection point, but then increases beyond this point; and that the relationship between legal system uncertainty and FDI attraction is moderated by government intervention in the host country economy, such that the strength of this relationship is greater when government intervention is high rather than when it is low. Implications of the findings and suggestions for future inquiry are presented. Originality/value – Conventional wisdom suggests that legal system uncertainty will negatively affect FDI attraction. However, to date, research on the effects of legal system uncertainty on FDI attraction in emerging markets has received very little attention. The aim of this research study is to shed new light on how, under certain conditions, legal system uncertainty will attract FDI in Southeast Asia.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Allan

A legal theory, any legal theory, necessarily adopts one of two perspectives or vantages or points-of-view. The author of a legal theory may take up the internal, engaged vantage or the external, detached vantage. If he seeks to explore, say, how judges should decide hard cases then his theory, explicitly or implicitly, will adopt an internal participant’s perspective. Most likely, he will be putting himself in the shoes of the judge (or alternatively, asserting that we are all judges of a sort) in order to convince others of how best this role can be performed. Less likely, will be he who is a revolutionary and who thinks that the judge should decide cases in such a way as to contribute to the subversion of the legal system. In either event, both will be prescribing. Prescription, answering the ‘ought’ and the ‘should’, presupposes an involvement in the question and a concern with some evaluative dispute (though the revolutionary clearly does not accept the norms of his legal system as binding).


1969 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 441-442
Author(s):  
A. I. RABIN

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