Common Law, Common Sense? How Federal Circuit Courts Have Misapplied the Fourth Amendment and Why Officers Must Be Present to Make a Warrantless Arrest for a Misdemeanor Offense

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Fourth Amendment ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Misdemeanor Offense ◽  
Circuit Courts

scholarly journals Arbitration Waiver and Prejudice

2020 ◽  
pp. 397
Author(s):  
Timothy Leake
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
State Courts ◽  
Bright Line ◽  
Consumer Contracts ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Circuit Courts ◽  
Line Standard

Arbitration agreements are common in commercial and consumer contracts. But two parties can litigate an arbitrable dispute in court if neither party seeks arbitration. That presents a problem if one party changes its mind and invokes its arbitration rights months or years after the lawsuit was filed and substantial litigation activity has taken place. Federal and state courts agree that a party can waive its arbitration rights by engaging in sufficient litigation activity without seeking arbitration, but they take different approaches to deciding how much litigation is too much. Two basic methods exist. Some courts say waiver requires the party opposing arbitration to show it would be prejudiced by the delay. Others say that waiver does not require a showing of prejudice. This Note demonstrates that the presence or absence of a prejudice requirement does not accurately capture the disagreements between the federal circuit courts. Indeed, some circuits that impose a prejudice requirement will find waiver in circumstances where other courts that do not impose a prejudice requirement will not. These divergent approaches result in uncertainty, delay, and expense, undermining arbitration’s benefits. To resolve the circuit split, this Note proposes a bright-line standard under which engaging in litigation never supports a finding of waiver. It also shows that this approach is consistent with common law waiver doctrine and the Federal Arbitration Act.

Can a Casualty Loss Be Deducted in the Absence of Physical Damage?

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-74
Author(s):  
Dan L. Schisler ◽  
Andrew M. Wasilick
Keyword(s):  
Physical Damage ◽  
Permanent Reduction ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Circuit Courts ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT When a casualty event (storm, fire, landslide, etc.) does not cause actual physical damage, can a casualty loss deduction be taken by a taxpayer for a permanent reduction in value? There are conflicting opinions by two federal circuit courts, and the definition of “permanent” is still largely undefined. The relevance of this issue is of increased importance with the numerous recent major casualties affecting the U.S. mainland and territories. The 9th Circuit has adamantly held that actual physical damage must occur to have a deductible casualty loss, whereas the 11th Circuit has held that a permanent decrease in value can qualify as a deductible casualty loss even with little or no actual physical damage to the property.

The Intergroup Foundations of Policy Influence

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 729-742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachael K. Hinkle ◽  
Michael J. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Preference Aggregation ◽  
Policy Influence ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Professional Characteristics ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Group Memberships ◽  
Circuit Courts ◽  
Ingroup Favoritism

Most decisions about policy adoption require preference aggregation, which makes it difficult to determine how and when an individual can influence policy change. Examining how frequently a judge is cited offers insight into this question. Drawing upon the psychological concept of social identity, we suggest that shared group memberships can account for differences in policy influence. We investigate this possibility using the demographic and professional group memberships of federal circuit court judges and an original dataset of citations among all published search and seizure cases from federal circuit courts from 1990 to 2010. The results indicate that shared professional characteristics do tend to lead to ingroup favoritism in citation decisions while only partial evidence of such a pattern emerges for demographic group memberships. There is evidence of ingroup favoritism among female and minority judges but none for male or white judges. Overall, judges appear to generally have greater influence on judges with shared characteristics. The findings have vital implications for our understanding of the diversification of policy-making institutions.

Courtroom Proceedings in U.S. Federal Courts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy R. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal District ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
District Courts ◽  
Open Court ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Federal District Courts ◽  
Circuit Courts ◽  
The U.S

This article discusses courtroom proceedings in U.S. federal courts. It begins by examining how federal district courts conduct trials. To make clear how these proceedings run it compares what really happens in most trials compared to how Hollywood portrays trials. In addition, it considers several key rights associated with trial proceedings. From there, it considers how federal circuit courts conduct business in open court. A key aspect of this section is how circuit proceedings differ across the country because each circuit has different rules governing arguments. Finally, it assesses the oral arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court as well as how these proceedings may affect the decisions justices make. In each section it provides a descriptive overview of the processes and then discusses current research and direction for future analyses.

Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law

1947 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 809
Author(s):  
Henry W. Sawyer ◽  
John MacArthur Maguire
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Common Law

The Last Forty Years of the Irish Bar

1929 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-375
Author(s):  
Serjeant A. M. Sullivan
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The Other ◽  
Old Order ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Court Of Chancery ◽  
The Doors

Forty years ago in my old country the legal world was in a state of transition. The old order was changing in a great number of ways. The Judicature Act had just got into swing and although four Courts still opened in the hall beside the Liffey they were soon to be fused into one. These were at that time the Court of Chancery, the Court of Queen's Bench, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Common Pleas, and the doors of these four opened on the Central Hall and their names stood over them. The Court of Chancery stood by itself, but it was thought in those days that you had your choice of three Common Law Courts in which to have your case tried. If you had some merit on your side but thought that the law was against you, you issued your writ in the Queen's Bench, which was presided over by Mickey Morris, as he was invariably called although he was a lord, because Mickey had a good deal of common sense, a great deal of humanity, but his ideas of jurisprudence were peculiarly his own. On the other hand, if you were strongly of opinion that however iniquitous your client was, he had the law on his side, you issued your writ in the Court of Exchequer, presided over by Christopher Palles, the greatest judge before whom I have ever appeared. Christopher Palles decided according to what he believed to be the law, and would pay no attention to any other consideration that might be advanced before him.

scholarly journals Common Law and Common Sense

1918 ◽  
Vol 27 (8) ◽  
pp. 993
Author(s):  
William Renwick Riddell
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Common Law
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