Support Party Strategies on Important Policy Issues: Results from Swedish Minority Governments

The survival of minority governments depends on support from non-cabinet parties that strive to safeguard government stability while also fulfilling their accountability to the electorate. This article argues that non-cabinet parties' propensity to support the government depends on their desire to uphold distinctiveness when accountability is at stake. This even applies to opposition parties that are officially committed to minority government support and, as a trade-off, receive policy pay-offs. By analysing opposition party voting in 23 years of Swedish minority governments (1991–2018), the article suggests that ideologically distant support parties are more likely to oppose the government on their core issues since compromise would involve too-large concessions. These results question our understanding of support party pay-offs as a trade-off for minority government support and highlight the rationality of entering a support agreement, which gives the support party a certain degree of policy influence while also keeping a distinct party profile.

Cabinet Composition, Collegiality, and Collectivity: Examining Patterns in Cabinet Committee Structure

This article examines one arena of decision-making in cabinet government: cabinet committees. It assesses the relationship between the composition of cabinets – their party make-up – and the structure of cabinet committees. Cabinet committees are groups of ministers tasked with specific policy or coordination responsibilities and can be important mechanisms of policymaking and cabinet management. Thus, the structure of committees informs our understanding of how cabinets differ in their distributions of policy influence among ministers and parties, a central concern in parliamentary government. We investigate two such dimensions: collegiality – interaction among ministers – and collectivity, the (de)centralization of influence. We find that cabinet committees in coalitions are significantly more collegial, on average, than single-party cabinets, though this is driven by minority coalitions. At the same time, influence within cabinet committees is less collectively distributed in most types of coalitions than in single-party cabinets.

Digitalization Policy Influence: Implementation of Mobile Learning in the University Educational Process

The digitalization of higher education has led to the emergence of new teaching methods, including mobile learning methods. The purpose of the study is to determine the prospects, advantages, and obstacles to the introduction of mobile learning in the university educational process in the context of the digitalization policy of education. The study presents the prospects for the introduction of mobile learning in the university educational process; identifies the main components of mobile learning, which ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of mobile technologies and types of mobile content that can be used in the university educational process; an analysis of each type has been carried out; the advantages and obstacles of the introduction of mobile learning are highlighted. In conclusion, mobile technologies allow introducing new forms of training organization, involving the interaction of learning subjects with each other not only during lessons but also outside them.

The Politics of ‘Collective Putin’ and Patronage Personalization

This chapter examines the patronage pillar of regime personalisation, determined by the strength of the ruler's patronage network, “Collective Putin.” It charts how Vladimir Putin's patron-client network developed and acquired control across institutions. It introduces original data on patron-client networks in Russia and maps these networks over time. Based on expert surveys of policy influence, it further explains how Putin's patron-client network has grown in dominance over time. The chapter finds that the path toward personalisation in Russia centred on the relatively swift acquisition of control over security and enforcement institutions, but a much more gradual penetration of other institutions by the ruler's network. It also finds that within the ranks of the Russian ruling coalition, this network emerges as dominant in early 2007, which also permitted Vladimir Putin to govern the regime from the subordinate position of prime minister from 2008--12. The patron-client network had further consolidated in strength and scope by 2012. Furthermore, Putin's return to presidential office, which coincided with the strengthening of personalisation on other pillars, made him largely autonomous from his own coalition. As the Russian leader has remained unchallenged in office for a considerable period of time, loyalty to the ruler no longer depended on whether officials had personal ties and belonged to the ruler's patronage network. Instead, loyalty came to be determined by the logic of a personalist system so that all officials regarded the ruler as their overall patron.