Big Data and Competition Policy: Market Power, Personalised Pricing and Advertising

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Bourreau ◽  
Alexandre de Streel ◽  
Inge Graef
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy

Recalibrating the governance of remedial clauses in contract law

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-455
Author(s):  
Moshood Abdussalam
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Market Structures ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Commercial Networks

Yawning gaps in bargaining powers between transacting parties have always been a source of concern in commercial relations and the legal governance of such relations. In modern times, the likely implications of gaps in bargaining powers are not only palpable as it concerns the affairs of transacting parties with weaker bargaining powers, but also on the welfare of society, at large. That is particularly so in this milieu of pervasive oligopolistic market structures, organised commercial networks, digitisation, and big data. The imperative to guard against the use of contractually agreed remedial clauses to consolidate market power and as tools for wealth extraction is the concern of this article. To this end, this article makes a case for a recalibration of the rule against penalties in contract law.

The potential of entry barriers in the context of digitalization

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-147
Author(s):  
Aleksey Zazdravnykh
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Digital Transformation ◽  
Entry Barriers ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Significant Growth ◽  
Digital Infrastructure ◽  
Market Operation

The article analyzes the practical aspects of the functioning of some barriers to entry in the era of digital transformation of industry markets. It is noted that under the influence of digitalization processes, both positive changes in the mechanism of market operation are recorded, as well as a number of negative circumstances that have become a serious challenge for antitrust agencies. Control of big data, initial investment in digital infrastructure, and broad technological capabilities of digital blocking of users, against the background of powerful network effects and pronounced economies of scale, carry the potential for significant growth in the market power of individual firms. The article substantiates that such trends theoretically pose a significant threat to competition, and can form new types of entry barriers. At the same time, practical arguments are presented that indicate the ambiguity of this position.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

scholarly journals Rising Corporate Market Power

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ufuk Akcigit ◽  
Wenjie Chen ◽  
Federico Diez ◽  
Romain Duval ◽  
Philipp Engler ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Macroeconomic Policies ◽  
Policy Relevance ◽  
Policy Frameworks ◽  
New Evidence

Corporate market power has risen in recent decades, and new estimates in this note suggest that the likely wave of small and medium-sized enterprise bankruptcies from the ongoing pandemic will further strengthen market concentration. Whether and how policymakers should address this issue is hotly debated. This note provides new evidence on the policy relevance of rising market power and highlights possible implications for the design of competition policy frameworks and macroeconomic policies.

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Concerted Practice ◽  
Collective Dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

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