14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Concerted Practice ◽  
Collective Dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Collective Dominance

This chapter describes how competition law addresses oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. This chapter is concerned with the related topics of oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. This chapter begins with discussion of the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and of the possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’. It then considers the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

Competition Policy for the New Era

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Collective Wisdom ◽  
Brics Countries ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
The World

This book presents a new stage in the contributions of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to the development of Competition Law and policy. These countries have significant influence in their respective regions and in the world. The changing global environment means greater political and economic role for the BRICS and other emerging countries. BRICS countries are expected to contribute nearly half of all global gross domestic product growth by 2020. For more than a century, the path of Competition Law has been defined by the developed and industrialized countries of the world. Much later, developing countries and emerging economies came on the scene. They experience many of the old competition problems, but they also experience new problems, and experience even the old problems differently. Where are the fora to talk about Competition Law and policy fit for developing and emerging economies? The contributors in this book are well-known academic and practising economists and lawyers from both developed and developing countries. The chapters begin with a brief introduction of the topic, followed by a critical discussion and a conclusion. Accordingly, each chapter is organized around a central argument made by its author(s) in relation to the issue or case study discussed. These arguments are thoughtful, precise, and very different from each another. Each chapter is written to be a valuable freestanding contribution to our collective wisdom. The set of case studies as a whole helps to build a collection of different perspectives on competition policy.

Better Laws for Africa

2019 ◽  
pp. 179-198
Author(s):  
Eleanor M. Fox ◽  
Mor Bakhoum
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Inclusive Development ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
The World ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Good Policy

This chapter explores the core and limits of competition law and policy in terms of the values of inclusive development and poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa. A pro-outsider, pro-inclusive development antitrust policy would value a free and open marketplace without privilege or favor. This perspective is especially critical for African nations and market players without economic power and especially for those populations in societies ruled by a few privileged families or firms, or by autocrats. Pro-outsider competition policy may be implemented not only through competition law enforcement of manageable rules and standards but also through advocacy by the competition authority with partners such as the World Bank, and collaboration with neighbors. The elements of good policy form an interdependent virtuous circle.

Choices and Consequences: Internationalizing Competition Policy After TPP

2019 ◽  
pp. 413-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Francis
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Real Progress ◽  
Shared Goals ◽  
International Systems

The development of international systems for the coordination and constraint of competition law and policy offers a complex blend of rewards and costs. In this chapter, I evaluate the promises and problems of this endeavor in the realms of government procurement, antitrust, and the regulation of state-owned enterprises, and outline some options for internationalization in this area and some of their respective implications. I argue that, in a field dominated by deep conflicts of value and interest, real progress will require creativity and pluralism in the forms and tools of internationalization. I emphasize the importance of regionalism as a complement to multilateralism and bilateralism; frameworks of contingent cooperation as a complement to traditional treaties and networks; and a mixed strategy of linkage to, and separation from, international trade to ensure that jurisdictions are able to pursue their shared goals.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

28. Competition Law: Article 102

EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Number Of Firms

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law

scholarly journals COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN ASSESSMENT

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mia Mahmudur Rahim
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
National Level ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Community Institutions ◽  
Market Opening ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Economic Perspectives ◽  
Collective Dominance

The European Commission, supported by the European Courts, developed the framework for competition law and policy in Europe. One of the main purposes of this policy is to build a conceptual and legal foundation to promote market opening and to strengthen community institutions. In this policy framework, ‘collective dominance’ of firms in the European market is the utmost important issue. To deal with this issue, the competition law of the European Union is now relying more on the extensive network of national-level authorities and applying broadly consistent substantive rules. The notion of ‘collective dominance’ in European competition policy is in transition towards policy based on market-center economic considerations as regulations and guidelines increasingly follow an analytic format based on economic perspectives. 

Crystal ball gazing: where next for UK competition law and policy post-Brexit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Noel Beale ◽  
Paschalis Lois
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Cooperation Agreement ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Potential Interactions ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement broadly sets out the nature of the relationship contemplated between UK and EU competition law and policy following Brexit. The question is whether the UK will capitalize on its newfound discretion to deviate its competition policy from the EU in the future. This article considers some of the potential new directions that might be taken within the UK's competition law landscape, specifically in relation to merger control, antitrust and subsidy control. It explores some of the problems and opportunities created in the wake of Brexit, as well as the legal and practical ramifications of future divergences between UK and EU competition policy. Furthermore, it considers how the Competition and Markets Authority may fare in enforcing new policy, as well as its potential interactions with regimes both within and outside the EU.

Excessive intervention? A review of recent excessive pricing investigations

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-34
Author(s):  
Bojana Ignjatovic ◽  
Paul Hutchinson
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Economic Risks

This article considers the implications of a number of recent cases and court judgments on excessive pricing. It first outlines the economic risks associated with antitrust interventions on excessive pricing. It then seeks to identify a narrow set of specific market conditions to which competition authorities could consider limiting their use of competition law against alleged excessive pricing. The article also highlights the practical challenges in implementing the economic and legal tests for excessive pricing. Finally, it considers whether competition policy is the most appropriate tool with which to ensure that consumers are not charged excessive prices.

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