Effects of Female Board Representation on the Performance of Listed Companies in New Zealand

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geeta Duppati ◽  
Frank Scrimgeour ◽  
Narendar V. Rao ◽  
Michele Schoenber
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Representation

scholarly journals Chairmen's perceptions of female board representation: a study on Nordic listed companies

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 523-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tor Brunzell ◽  
Eva Liljeblom
Keyword(s):  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Nordic Countries ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Female Representation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Gender Diverse ◽  
Board Representation ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to survey chairmen's perceptions of female board representation in five Nordic countries, focussing on whether the chairman's perception of board work is related to gender diversity, and on differences between high- and low-risk firms. Design/methodology/approach – The authors combine data from a questionnaire directed to the chairmen of the boards in Nordic listed companies with data on firm characteristics and board composition. Findings – The authors find that the chairmen (97.5 percent male) are significantly less satisfied with female board members as compared to male ones. The authors also find that firms with nomination committees have more gender diverse boards, as well as indications of a more positively perceived contribution of female representation in high-risk firms. Research limitations/implications – The study is restricted to perceptions of chairmen for listed Nordic firms. The low response rate of 20.1 percent is a severe limitation. Practical implications – The increasing practice of using nomination committees in the Nordic countries seems advantageous from gender balance perspective. Originality/value – The authors contribute to the literature on gender diversity in boards by providing results from a board intern perspective.

Does corporate governance matter in determining CEO compensation in the publicly listed companies in New Zealand? An empirical investigation

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Reddy ◽  
Sazali Abidin ◽  
Linjuan You
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010. Design/methodology/approach – Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance. Findings – After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Research limitations/implications – The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis. Practical implications – The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation. Originality/value – Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

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