On Financial Contracting in the Presence of Weak Property Rights

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix C. Muennich
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Financial Contracting ◽  
Weak Property

scholarly journals Property Rights and Finance

2002 ◽  
Vol 92 (5) ◽  
pp. 1335-1356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Johnson ◽  
John McMillan ◽  
Christopher Woodruff
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
New Firms ◽  
Limited Access ◽  
External Finance ◽  
Private Sector Investment ◽  
Weak Property ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
Retained Earnings

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

Transitional Property Rights and Local Developmental History in China

Urban Studies ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Abramson
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Urban Space ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Development Process ◽  
Developmental History ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Official Discourse ◽  
Societal Development ◽  
Weak Property ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy

Among the societies that are moving from a centrally planned economy with weak property rights towards a market-oriented economy with stronger and more privatised property rights, China is undergoing an especially rapid and extensive urbanisation that obscures the diversity and relevance of local pre-Reform property arrangements. Official discourse emphasises the formalisation, clarification and, to some extent, the privatisation of property rights in the name of overall societal development and gradual integration with the global economy. In local informal, popular practice and discourse, however, the invocation of property rights reflects the continuing political relevance of both revolutionary and traditional notions of rights to urban space that challenge a unitary, linear view of the development process.

Weak Property Rights and Holdup in R&D

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bharat N. Anand ◽  
Alexander Galetovic
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Weak Property

scholarly journals Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (10) ◽  
pp. 3401-3433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Ayotte ◽  
Patrick Bolton
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Financial Contracting ◽  
Optimal Property

scholarly journals On the dual nature of weak property rights

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 659-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Hotte ◽  
Randy McFerrin ◽  
Douglas Wills
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Dual Nature ◽  
Weak Property

scholarly journals Political Divide, Weak Property Rights, and Infrastructure Provision: An Empirical Examination of Takings Decisions in Jerusalem

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Ronit Levine-Schnur
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Local Community ◽  
Infrastructure Development ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Community Needs ◽  
Infrastructure Provision ◽  
Weak Property ◽  
Political Communities ◽  
Political Divide ◽  
The City

In this article I use a unique hand-coded dataset of all expropriation exercises in Jerusalem over a twenty-five-year period to test the distribution of the expropriation burden across political communities. I identify the ethnoreligious group to which the impacted landowner belongs and the community that would benefit from the decision. I find that Palestinian property constitutes 38 percent of all land taken over the years, while only 10 percent of all land taken has been repurposed for their local community needs. Conversely, Jewish owners have contributed only 4 percent of all land taken while benefiting from 33 percent of the land taken for their community needs. I also find that land not owned by Jews has a higher propensity to be taken for citywide purposes by ten to twenty-three times than Jewish land, depending on the purpose and the type of property rights involved. This sharp gap can be attributed to the political power relations in the city. The case study enables me to test the relationship between weak property rights and infrastructure provision. As property rights are formally recorded and recognized selectively in some but not in all parts of the city, the article provides the first empirical evidence to the effect of weak property rights on the risk of expropriation. I find that the propensity for noncommunity purpose takings of nonformalized land for which Palestinians claim ownership but have no official records to is significantly higher when compared to formalized Palestinian land. This outcome contradicts the conventional wisdom in the literature that weak property rights help explain limited infrastructure development.

scholarly journals On the Dual Nature of Weak Property Rights

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Hotte ◽  
Randy McFerrin ◽  
Douglas T. Wills
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Dual Nature ◽  
Weak Property
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