scholarly journals Speculative Attacks and Financial Architecture: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Heinemann ◽  
Rosemarie Nagel ◽  
Peter Ockenfels
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Speculative Attacks ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Financial Architecture

scholarly journals The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

Econometrica ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 72 (5) ◽  
pp. 1583-1599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Heinemann ◽  
Rosemarie Nagel ◽  
Peter Ockenfels
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Global Games ◽  
Public And Private

Stock Price Reaction to Public and Private Information

CFA Digest ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-46
Author(s):  
Richard D. Long
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Price Reaction ◽  
Stock Price Reaction

The Public and Private Information Sources of Volatility

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Opschoor ◽  
Michel van der Wel ◽  
Dick J. C. van Dijk ◽  
Nicholas Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Information Sources ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public

Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information: An Experimental Analysis of Final Offer Arbitration

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Pecorino ◽  
Michael Solomon ◽  
Mark van Boening
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Final Offer

Eastern and Western European firms public and private information quality: The comparative impact of degree of implementation of IFRS

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arsen Djatej ◽  
Grace Gao ◽  
Robert H.S. Sarikas ◽  
David L. Senteney
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Information Quality ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Western European

scholarly journals Delegated trade and the pricing of public and private information

2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 8-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Taylor ◽  
Robert E. Verrecchia
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Public And Private

Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information

2018 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 18-26
Author(s):  
Haifeng Fu ◽  
Haomiao Yu
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Public And Private

Bargaining with voluntary transmission of private information: An experimental analysis of final offer arbitration

2021 ◽  
Vol 191 ◽  
pp. 334-366
Author(s):  
Paul Pecorino ◽  
Michael Solomon ◽  
Mark Van Boening
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Final Offer

Why Do IPO Offer Prices Only Partially Adjust?

2014 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Özgür Ş. İnce
Keyword(s):  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Structural Model ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
New Information ◽  
Pricing Process ◽  
Ipo Pricing ◽  
Public Offering

This study develops a structural model of the initial public offering (IPO) pricing process that enables the estimation of adjustment rates for public and private pricing information gathered during bookbuilding. The estimated upward adjustment rate of public information is only 21%, significantly less than the 28% rate of private information. Adjustment rates decline towards the IPO date, especially for upward adjustments. The findings contradict information acquisition theories that predict a complete adjustment to public information and highlight the inefficiency of the IPO bookbuilding mechanism in handling new information even when information is publicly available and especially when it is favorable.

Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Signaling Game

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Pecorino ◽  
Mark Van Boening
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Signaling Game ◽  
Strong Case

Abstract We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly disclosure of private information in a signaling game. Under the theory, 100 % of plaintiffs with a weak case are predicted to remain silent, while 100 % of the plaintiffs with a strong case are predicted to voluntarily disclose their type. We find that 75 % of weak plaintiffs remain silent and 67 % of strong plaintiffs reveal their type. In line with theory, weak plaintiffs who reveal their type receive a lower payoff, while strong plaintiffs who reveal their type receive a higher payoff. Plaintiffs with a strong case who reveal their type have a dispute rate which is 50 % points lower than strong plaintiffs who remain silent. Because plaintiffs who reveal their type cannot extract the entire surplus from settlement from the defendant, the incentive to engage in voluntary disclosure is weaker empirically than it is in theory.

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