scholarly journals Hart and the Metaphysics and Semantics of Legal Normativity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Legal Normativity

Transnational Legal Normativity

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaaa
Keyword(s):  
Legal Normativity

scholarly journals The Why-Question Methodology, The Guise of the Good and Legal Normativity

Jurisprudence ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco
Keyword(s):  
Guise Of The Good ◽  
Legal Normativity

Three Conceptual Problems of Legal Normativity: The Logical Space of Reasons

2020 ◽  
pp. 99-126
Author(s):  
Kenneth Einar Himma
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Logical Space ◽  
Conceptual Problems ◽  
Space Of Reasons ◽  
Legal Normativity

Chapter 5 continues with the second step of a modest analysis of the concept of a legal system. As a prelude to showing how only the Coercion Thesis can explicate law’s presumed conceptual normativity, this chapter is concerned to explicate the concept of normativity and distinguish among several classes of reasons that might be thought to figure into the problems associated with explicating law’s conceptual normativity. It proceeds to identify the class of reasons that the practices constituting something as a system of law must be presumed equipped to provide. The chapter ends with a description of three conceptual problems of legal normativity that must be solved to vindicate the very rationality of adopting legal systems to regulate behavior.

Specificities of Legal Normativity

2021 ◽  
pp. 127-137
Keyword(s):  
Legal Normativity

Legal normativity and spiritual culture

2019 ◽  
pp. 198-212
Author(s):  
Johan van der Walt
Keyword(s):  
Spiritual Culture ◽  
Legal Normativity

Conference Report- Pointed Reasoning on Normativity: Young Researchers in Legal Philosophy Meet in Würzburg

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-204
Author(s):  
Matthias Goldmann
Keyword(s):  
Social Acceptance ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Conference Report ◽  
Social Discourse ◽  
Hans Kelsen ◽  
Basic Norm ◽  
Modes Of Governance ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Legal Normativity ◽  
New Modes Of Governance

“For, he reasons pointedly, that which must not cannot be:” the last two lines of a famous poem by Christian Morgenstern bring the crux of normativity to the point: what is the relationship between facts and norms? The research of the past decades has increased rather than reduced the complexity of this fundamental question for legal theory. First of all, the relationship between facts and norms is still less than clear. Hans Kelsen had argued that facts and norms were to be clearly separated, but once theGrundnorm(basic norm) had turned out to be fictitious, the search for an appropriate description of the relationship between facts and norms began anew. Positivists after Kelsen based normativity on different facts, such as social acceptance or social discourse. Secondly, research on new modes of governance, in particular in the fields of European and international law, has revealed that behaviour can be influenced by “soft” norms and non-normative forms of governance just as much as by “hard” law. These results prompted some to consider legal normativity a matter of degree instead of an on-off issue.

The Metric Approach to Legal Normativity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Triantafyllos Gkouvas
Keyword(s):  
Legal Normativity

Conflicting Norms, Values, and Interests: A Perspective from Legal Academia

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Oeter
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Value Systems ◽  
National Interests ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Competing Interests ◽  
Conflicting Interests ◽  
Specific Interests ◽  
Legal Normativity

AbstractThe analytical tension between legal norms, moral values, and national interests seems no uncharted territory in political science, but has found very little interest in legal academia. For lawyers, moral values and national interests are largely “unknowns,” dealt with by other disciplines. Looking a bit deeper, the picture becomes more nuanced, however. As part of a roundtable on “Balancing Legal Norms, Moral Values, and National Interests,” this essay argues that norms, values, and interests are not different universes of legal normativity, morality, and specific interests, but are interrelated concepts. Values clearly influence norms and often underpin them, while seemingly concrete norms (rules) are themselves often fragile constructs trying to balance competing interests. Value systems are quite diverse within societies, and this is even truer for interests; each society is a dynamic system of social interaction where conflicting interests are constantly playing out. In a way, underlying conflicts of values and interests are constantly being renegotiated in the legal system, with the norms enshrined in the text of statutes and treaties serving to constitute transitory reference points.

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