scholarly journals The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Drago ◽  
Roberto Galbiati ◽  
Francesco Sobbrio
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Drago ◽  
Roberto Galbiati ◽  
Francesco Sobbrio

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Drago ◽  
Roberto Galbiati ◽  
Francesco Sobbrio

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 3305-3336 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Drago ◽  
Roberto Galbiati ◽  
Francesco Sobbrio

Abstract This study analyzes voters’ response to criminal justice policies by exploiting a natural experiment. The 2006 Italian Collective Pardon Bill, designed and promoted by the incumbent center-left (CL) coalition, unexpectedly released about one-third of the prison population, creating idiosyncratic incentives to recidivate across pardoned individuals. Municipalities where resident pardoned individuals had a higher incentive to recidivate experienced a higher recidivism rate. We show that in those municipalities voters “punished” the CL coalition in the 2008 parliamentary elections. A one standard deviation increase in the incentive to recidivate—corresponding to an increase of recidivism of 15.9%—led to a 3.06% increase in the margin of victory of the center-right (CR) coalition in the post-pardon national elections (2008) relative to the last election before the pardon (2006). We also provide evidence of newspapers being more likely to report crime news involving pardoned individuals and of voters hardening their views on the incumbent national government’s ability to control crime. Our findings indicate that voters keep politicians accountable by conditioning their vote on the observed effects of public policies.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Fazio ◽  
Tommaso Reggiani ◽  
Fabio Sabatini
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
David Godsell

The purpose of this editorial is to describe financial protectionism as a potentially important determinant of financial reporting outcomes. Fear of foreign capital, or capital xenophobia, spurs financial protectionism. Examining the effects of financial protectionism on financial reporting outcomes potentially permits an expansion of positive accounting theory and, in particular, the political cost hypothesis. I first describe extant literature examining the political cost hypothesis. I then describe national-security related drivers of capital xenophobia. Next, I examine settings in which we can observe variation in financial protectionism. I conclude by positing varied paths by which financial protectionism can affect financial reporting outcomes.


Author(s):  
Pinto Mónica ◽  
Kotlik Marcos

This contribution examines the 2008 operation conducted by Colombia against a camp of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) located in the territory of Ecuador. It sets out the facts, the legal positions of both countries, the reactions of other governments in the continent, and how the situation was addressed within the Organization of American States and the Rio Group. It then analyses the operation in light of discussions about the possible exercise of the right to self-defence against non-state actors. The closing section suggests that, although the political cost for Colombia was relatively low, this case contributes to a restrictive interpretation of the right, to self-defence based on the inviolability of territorial integrity.


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