Shareholder Primacy vs. Stakeholder Theory: The Law as Constraint and Potential Enabler of Stakeholder Concerns

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ronnegard ◽  
N. Craig Smith
2021 ◽  
pp. 103-132
Author(s):  
Iñigo Zavala Ortiz de la Torre

Existe una pugna entre los defensores de que los accionistas sean la referencia, a la que la dirección de la empresa tiene que mirar cuando adopta sus decisiones; frente a los que creen que, junto a estos se deben tomar en cuenta los intereses de otros stakeholders como son los trabajadores, los acreedores, los proveedores y los clientes. Si bien la doctrina, e incluso las posibilidades legislativas, avalan la segunda postura en los países anglosajones; tanto la práctica, como el análisis de los principales Códigos de Buen Gobierno, nos muestran que en realidad sigue vigente la primera. ¿Porqué? Recibido: 14 enero 2013Aceptado: 18 febrero 2013


Author(s):  
Olivier Weinstein

This chapter reviews the law of directors’ duties in a number of Anglo-American countries to assess what influence directors’ duties have had on the extent to which directors are adopting stakeholder approaches. This data allows conclusions to be drawn regarding the extent to which legal reforms are required in the area of directors’ duties to create an enabling legal framework for corporate social responsibility. The chapter also presents the results of research on the business objectives of corporations, which provides insights into how corporations themselves define their purposes. The legal interpretations of the purpose of the corporation can then be contrasted with interpretations based on directors’ views and what corporations themselves state in their business objectives.


Author(s):  
Andrew C. Wicks ◽  
F.A. Elmore ◽  
David Jonas

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-151
Author(s):  
Alex Proimos

The once dominant and inconsiderate player in corporate governance, the shareholder, has faced increasing pressure from its rival stakeholders (creditors and the general public) and their agents (i.e. the management and directors) eager to unproportionately increase their stake. The idea of shareholder primacy in corporate governance is while previously was losing its dominance as corporate law versus stakeholder theory could be set for an even stronger come back.


2020 ◽  
pp. 383-405
Author(s):  
Darcy L. MacPherson

This article considers the implications of the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Peoples Department Stores v. Wise for the law of directors' fiduciary duties. The Court’s decision is attacked on two grounds. First, the author criticizes the Court’s interpretation and treatment of the phrase "the best interests of the corporation" as found in the Canada Business Corporations Act. It is argued that the decision in Wise rejects the traditional interpretation of this phrase which was previously accepted to mean "the best interests of the shareholders collectively. " This rejection raises the spectre of the debate between the "shareholder primacy " model of directors' duties and broader "pluralist" alternatives. By undercutting the lynchpin of the "shareholder primacy" model, the author suggests that the Court has left a vacuum in the law because the Court failed to outline what is to replace this traditional interpretation, or even to acknowledge the substantive change being made. At the level of process, it is equally suggested that the revision of important principles in corporate law exclusively through the judiciary is fundamentally undesirable, where the law of directors' duties has such a large element of public policy attached to it. The author also proposes that the decision in Wise has resulted in an unacceptable level of uncertainty in the law, and that this uncertainty was neither necessary nor advisable to resolve the case before the Court. Second, the author criticizes the Court's comments indicating that a breach of fiduciary duty requires mala fides on the part of directors. It is argued that this is inconsistent with pre-existing case law.


Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Johnston ◽  
Blanche Segrestin ◽  
Armand Hatchuel

AbstractWe show that professional management began to emerge in UK companies during the first half of the twentieth century, a development which was widely theorised and accepted. However, the managerially-led enterprise was accommodated rather than protected by company law, making it vulnerable to changes in the law. The Cohen Report of 1945 paid no attention to these developments, and led to the introduction, in the Companies Act 1948, of important, but previously little appreciated, changes in the name of enhancing the accountability of directors to shareholders. The shareholders’ statutory right to remove the directors by simple majority overturned existing structures overnight and was an important driver of the hostile takeover, which emerged shortly afterwards. This deprived management of the necessary autonomy to balance the competing interests at stake in the enterprise and to foster innovation. The emergence of the current system of shareholder primacy can be traced back to these developments.


2020 ◽  
pp. 237929812094277
Author(s):  
John F. McArdle ◽  
Alice J. de Koning

We review the film Other People’s Money as a teaching tool for introducing concepts of corporate social responsibility and board governance. The film’s climactic shareholder meeting contains two vivid examples of stakeholder theory and shareholder primacy illustrated through the competing election speeches made by the lead characters. Our article provides step-by-step instructions for how to use the film to explore these concepts and discusses ways to enhance student competency in this area.


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