Improving Multi-Agency Governance Arrangements Forpreparedness, Planning and Response: Implementing Theintegrated Approach in Australia

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
2011 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. R1-R15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erland W. Nier

There is increasing recognition that prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential perspective. There has since been a strong effort to make a new macroprudential orientation operational, including through the establishment of new macroprudential authorities or ‘committees’ in a number of jurisdictions. These developments raise — and this paper explores — the following three questions. First, what distinguishes macroprudential policy from microprudential policy and what are its key tasks? Second, what powers should be given to macroprudential authorities and what should be their mandate? Third, how can governance arrangements ensure that macroprudential policies are pursued effectively? While arrangements for macroprudential policy will to some extent be country-specific, we identify three basic challenges in setting up an effective macroprudential policy framework and discuss options to address them.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-309
Author(s):  
Gillian Brock ◽  

What weight should we place on self-determination, democracy, human rights and equality in an account of migration justice? Anna Stilz and Andrea Sangiovanni offer insightful comments that prompt us to consider such questions. In addressing their welcome critiques I aim to show how my account can help reduce migration injustice in our contemporary world. As I argue, there is no right to free movement across state borders. However, migrants do have rights to a fair process for determining their rights. Democratic communities should have scope to make many migration decisions, although there are constraints on that self-determination. The migration governance oversight arrangements I favor are compatible with core requirements of agency and responsiveness that are operative in mature democracies. In responding to concerns about objectionable power inequalities that often characterize temporary worker programs, I show why addressing these issues requires various institutional protections that are well enforced. Robust migration governance arrangements can assist in formulating defensible migration policies that we can implement here and now as we aim to reduce migration injustices in our current world.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (03) ◽  
pp. 595-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROSS MILLAR ◽  
TIM FREEMAN ◽  
RUSSELL MANNION ◽  
HUW T. O. DAVIES

AbstractNHS Foundation Trust (FT) hospitals in England have complex internal governance arrangements. They may be considered to exhibit meta-regulatory characteristics to the extent that governors are able to promote deliberative values and steer internal governance processes towards wider regulatory goals. Yet, while recent studies of NHS FT hospital governance have explored FT governors and examined FT hospital boards to consider executive oversight, there is currently no detailed investigation of interactions between these two groups. Drawing on observational and interview data from four case-study sites, we trace interactions between the actors involved; explore their understandings of events; and consider the extent to which the proposed benefits of meta-regulation were realised in practice. Findings show that while governors provided both a conscience and contribution to internal and external governance arrangements, the meta-regulatory role was largely symbolic and limited to compliance and legitimation of executive actions. Thus while the meta-regulatory ‘architecture’ for governor involvement may be considered effective, the soft intelligence gleaned and operationalised may be obscured by ‘hard’ performance metrics which dominate resource-allocation processes and priority-setting. Governors were involved in practices that symbolised deliberative involvement but resulted in further opportunities for legitimising executive decisions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel Rodrigues ◽  
António F Tavares

This work contributes to the literature on water governance by attempting to provide an answer to the question of what are the differences in efficiency of alternative governance arrangements of water utilities. We test hypotheses derived from property rights, principal–agent, and transaction costs theories using a comprehensive database of 260 water utility systems provided by the Portuguese Regulatory Authority of Water and Waste Services. Using endogenous switching regression models estimated through maximum likelihood, the study is designed in two steps. First, we investigate differences in efficiency between in-house options and externalization and find that in-house solutions as a set (direct provision and municipal companies) are more efficient than externalization options (mixed companies and concessions). Second, we test differences in efficiency within both in-house and externalization solutions, and fail to find statistically significant differences in efficiency between in-house bureaucracies and municipal companies and between mixed companies and concessions.


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