Self-determination, Democracy, Human Rights, and Migrants’ Rights

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-309
Author(s):  
Gillian Brock ◽  

What weight should we place on self-determination, democracy, human rights and equality in an account of migration justice? Anna Stilz and Andrea Sangiovanni offer insightful comments that prompt us to consider such questions. In addressing their welcome critiques I aim to show how my account can help reduce migration injustice in our contemporary world. As I argue, there is no right to free movement across state borders. However, migrants do have rights to a fair process for determining their rights. Democratic communities should have scope to make many migration decisions, although there are constraints on that self-determination. The migration governance oversight arrangements I favor are compatible with core requirements of agency and responsiveness that are operative in mature democracies. In responding to concerns about objectionable power inequalities that often characterize temporary worker programs, I show why addressing these issues requires various institutional protections that are well enforced. Robust migration governance arrangements can assist in formulating defensible migration policies that we can implement here and now as we aim to reduce migration injustices in our current world.

Author(s):  
Alex Levitov ◽  
Stephen Macedo

International human rights instruments establish both a fundamental right to collective self-determination and a right of individuals to free movement. What principles and priorities should guide us when these two sets of claims come into conflict? When and under what conditions are political communities morally entitled to exclude those who wish to enter? And when, on the other side, do the rights of individuals seeking entry take priority? These issues are both philosophically contested and of great practical import, and this chapter seeks to illuminate them.


Author(s):  
Sarah Song

Chapter 6 examines three rights-based arguments for freedom of movement across borders. Three rights-based arguments have been offered in support of freedom of international movement. The first claims that freedom of movement is a fundamental human right in itself. The second adopts a “cantilever” strategy, arguing that freedom of international movement is a logical extension of existing fundamental rights, including the right of domestic free movement and the right to exit one’s country. The third argument is libertarian: international free movement is necessary to respect individual freedom of association and contract. This chapter shows why these arguments fail to justify a general right to free movement across the globe. What is morally required is not a general right of international free movement but an approach that privileges those whose basic human rights are at stake.


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-105
Author(s):  
Markku Suksi

Abstract New Caledonia is a colonial territory of France. Since the adoption of the Nouméa Accord in 1998, a period of transition towards the exercise of self-determination has been going on. New Caledonia is currently a strong autonomy, well entrenched in the legal order of France from 1999 on. The legislative powers have been distributed between the Congress of New Caledonia and the Parliament of France on the basis of a double enumeration of legislative powers, an arrangement that has given New Caledonia control over many material fields of self-determination. At the same time as this autonomy has been well embedded in the constitutional fabric of France. The Nouméa Accord was constitutionalized in the provisions of the Constitution of France and also in an Institutional Act. This normative framework created a multi-layered electorate that has presented several challenges to the autonomy arrangement and the procedure of self-determination, but the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee have resolved the issues regarding the right to vote in manners that take into account the local circumstances and the fact that the aim of the legislation is to facilitate the self-determination of the colonized people, the indigenous Kanak people. The self-determination process consists potentially of a series of referendums, the first of which was held in 2018 and the second one in 2020. In both referendums, those entitled to vote returned a No-vote to the question of ‘Do you want New Caledonia to attain full sovereignty and become independent?’ A third referendum is to be expected before October 2022, and if that one also results in a no to independence, a further process of negotiations starts, with the potential of a fourth referendum that will decide the mode of self-determination New Caledonia will opt for, independence or autonomy.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-245
Author(s):  
Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko

AbstractInternational constitutionalism relates to processes of limiting traditionally unrestricted powers of states as ultimate subjects, law-makers and law-enforcers of international law. Human rights occupy a central, but very confusing and confused role in the theorisation of international constitutionalism. If feminist scholars have criticised the inadequacies, shortcomings and gaps of international law of human rights at least since 1991, the doctrine of international law theorising constitutionalisation of international law until now has remained blind to these critiques idealising human rights and often using them as the ultimate legitimating factor. Thus, legitimacy and legality become confused and the distinction between them blurred in the doctrine of international constitutionalism. This in turn creates a danger of failure of the constitutionalists project itself, as it will serve to reinforce existing inadequacies and gaps in human rights protection. To illustrate this argument, I discuss some examples related to the protection of women's and migrants' rights. In order to avoid this dangerous development, I argue that international lawyers theorising international constitutionalism shall adopt an adequate, inclusive notion of legitimacy. In order to develop this adequate understanding of legitimacy, they should first take seriously feminist and other critiques of international human rights law and international law more generally. In the final parts of this article I develop my own more detailed proposals on the future of legitimacy and international constitutionalism. In doing so, I draw on the 'self-correcting learning process' developed in the writings of Jürgen Habermas, 'democracy to come' and more general views on the nature of sovereignty and human rights expressed by Jacques Derrida, as well as Levinasian 'responsibility-to-and-for-the-Other'.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-365
Author(s):  
Derek Inman ◽  
Dorothée Cambou ◽  
Stefaan Smis

Prior to the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) many African states held a unified and seemingly hostile position towards the UNDRIP exemplified by the concerns outlined in the African Group's Draft Aide Memoire. In order to gain a better understanding of the protections offered to indigenous peoples on the African continent, it is necessary to examine the concerns raised in the aforementioned Draft Aide Memoire and highlight how these concerns have been addressed at the regional level, effectively changing how the human rights norms contained within the UNDRIP are seen, understood and interpreted in the African context. The purpose of this article is to do just that: to examine in particular how the issue of defining indigenous peoples has been tackled on the African continent, how the right to self-determination has unfolded for indigenous peoples in Africa and how indigenous peoples' right to free, prior and informed consent has been interpreted at the regional level.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-57
Author(s):  
Sheikh Gh. Waleed Rasool ◽  
◽  
Saadia Pasha

The study critically examines Indian approach to use media as a key tool to demonize mass resistance movement in Jammu and Kashmir. Referring to different phases of the movement in Kashmir – 1947, 1965, 1971, 1987, 2000 and 2010 – it argues that India has employed media as a tool to portray Kashmir movement as an instigated one and those who run and support it are mere miscreants and violence mongers. While dubbing the uprising in Kashmir as terrorism, Indian media went overboard to justify massive killings and violations of human rights by the armed forces under the guise of different laws and, to a great extent, succeeded in hoodwinking the attention of international community and human rights organizations from the real situation on the ground. The findings of this study captured six frames of self-determination movement in electical dialecticism theoretical prism. The study sets the course of the line for investigators to study media effects. Keywords: Media in occupation, Peace and state terrorism, Elite media, Media ethics, Dispute, Resolution, Media hype, Democracy, Plebiscite.


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