The Great Battle of Intellectual Property versus State Sovereignty – Is Philip Morris v Uruguay a Good Referee?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michaela S. Halpern
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna B Gilmore ◽  
Allen W A Gallagher ◽  
Andy Rowell

BackgroundThe Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires a global track and trace (T&T) system to reduce tobacco smuggling. Given the tobacco industry’s (TI) historical involvement in tobacco smuggling, it stipulates that T&T ‘shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry’. This paper explores the rationale for & nature of the TI’s effors to influence the ITP & its T&T system.MethodsAnalysis of leaked TI documents and publicly available data; ,investigation of front groups, trademark and patent ownership.FindingsGrowing & diverse sources of evidence indicate that the TI remains involved in tobacco smuggling and that TI cigarettes account for around two-thirds of the illicit cigarette market. The TI therefore has a vested interest in controlling the global T&T system aimed to curtail this behaviour. To this end, Philip Morris International (PMI) adapted its pack marker system, Codentify, to meet T&T requirements, licensed it for free to its three major competitors who then collectively promoted it to governments using front groups and third parties including companies claiming to be independent despite clear TI links. PMI also sought to suggest Codentify was independent by selling some parts of its intellectual property on Codentify while retaining others, leaving a complex web of shared interests. In Africa, British American Tobacco used payments to obtain data suggesting its smaller competitor companies were evading taxes and secure influence with tax authorities. Regulatory capture has been enhanced by a public relations effort involving TI funding for conferences, training, research, and international police and anti-corruption organisations. Collectively this has created public messaging and a powerful network of organisations supportive of the TI’s misleading postion on illicit.ConclusionsGovernments should assume the TI seeks to control T&T systems in order to avoid scrutiny and minimise excise tax payments and that any T&T system based on Codentify, on intellectual property currently or previously owned by the TI, or being promoted or implemented by companies with TI links, is incompatible with the ITP and would not serve to reduce illicit trade.


2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 254-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benn McGrady

In November 2010, 171 Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) unanimously adopted the Punta del Este Declaration on implementation of the Convention. The Declaration follows the filing of an international investment claim against Uruguay by Philip Morris Products (Switzerland) and related companies. The Declaration reaffirms the commitment of the 171 WHO FCTC Parties to implementation of the Convention and addresses the relationship between the WHO FCTC and international trade and investment agreements, particularly in the context of intellectual property rights. This article outlines the Request for Arbitration, sets out the Declaration and the broader normative context in which it arose before touching briefly on the implications of the Declaration.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Fricke

Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde im Zeitraum August bis November 2009 erstellt und befasst sich mit den Auswirkungen des Patentrechtes auf die Ernährungssicherheit in Entwicklungsländern am Beispiel von gentechnisch verändertem Saatgut. Die Thematik der Biopatentierung hat seit der Erstellung dieser Arbeit an Bedeutung gewonnen nicht zuletzt durch die im Dezember ergangene Vorentscheidung zum „Brokkoli“-Patent1 der großen Beschwerdekammer des Europäischen Patentamtes (EPA). Es wurde festgelegt, dass Patente auf „im wesentliche(n) biologischen Verfahren“ (Art. 2a PatG/ Art. 53b EPÜ) nicht zulässig sind. Auch die Verwendung von technischen Verfahrensschritten - in diesem Fall markergestützte Selektion – führt nicht zu einem Patent. Bezugnehmend auf die eingangs gestellte Frage, inwiefern Patente auf Saatgut die Ernährungssicherheit bedrohen, ist festzustellen, dass die Patentierung des Saatgutes nicht im direkten Zusammenhang mit der Ernährungssicherheit steht. Jedoch hat die Patentierung von Saatgut den Anbau landwirtschaftlicher Nutzpflanzen in Monokulturen zu folge, weil Bauern – aufgrund der durch Lizenzgebühren verursachten hohen Kosten – nur noch bestimmte Sorten anbauen und die Sortenwahl durch die Unternehmen vorgegeben wird. Die Folgen der Monokulturen liegen besonders unter dem Aspekt der genetischen Verarmung, also der Abnahme der biologischen Vielfalt, in der Gefährdung der Ernährungssicherheit und der finanziellen Abhängigkeit der Bauern von den Saatgutunternehmen. Dabei ist auf lange Sicht auch die Ernährungssicherheit in den Industrieländern gefährdet, denn auch deren Volkswirtschaften und insbesondere deren Nahrungs- und Futterindustrie sind abhängig von der biologischen Vielfalt des Südens.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aline Jaeckel

AbstractThis article makes the case for the obligation to conserve plant biodiversity to be classified as a common concern of humankind, to justify and indeed prescribe limitations on private intellectual property rights over plants and related processes. Within the biodiversity regime, the notion of ‘common concern of humankind’ subjects the permanent sovereignty of states over natural resources to the interests of humanity. It shifts the obligations of states from managing their own plant biodiversity towards conserving it on behalf of humankind. In contrast, TRIPS requires states to protect private intellectual property rights with little discretion to adequately balance them with public interests. This creates a dichotomy. This article argues that rather than mobilizing state sovereignty as rhetoric to distract from addressing common concerns of humankind, it should be constructed as a concept capable of facilitating these very concerns.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Holden ◽  
Kelley Lee ◽  
Gary Jonas Fooks ◽  
Nathaniel Wander

Processes of regional trade integration may have an important impact on firms' strategies and forms of organization. This article provides an empirical case study of the impact of regional trade integration in the Andean Pact in the 1990s on the strategies and organization of British American Tobacco (BAT), using internal tobacco industry documents. BAT conducted an integrated strategy by lobbying on tax and tariff rates and intellectual property regulations, whilst simultaneously adapting its market strategies and attempting to modify its internal organization. The company incorporated substantial sales in illicit markets into its strategy, and launched new legal export operations within the region, in part to assert ownership over contested trademarks. It attempted to significantly modify its internal organization by better integrating its national operating companies on a regional basis, but was only partially successful in this due to resistance from its powerful Brazilian subsidiary. Changes in intellectual property rules also intensified competition between BAT and its main competitor, Philip Morris, culminating in a legal dispute between the two firms and leading BAT to develop a more coherent strategy on trademark ownership. These findings raise implications for understanding, and regulating, tobacco industry activities worldwide.


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