Propaganda, obviously: How propaganda analysis fixates on the hidden and misses the conspicuous

Propaganda analysis has long focused on revealing the rhetorical tricks and hidden special interests behind persuasion campaigns. But what are critics to do when propaganda is obvious? In the late 1930s the Institute for Propaganda Analysis faced this question while investigating the public poli-ticking of A&P, then the largest retailer in the United States. While contemporary critics lambasted A&P for their secretive campaign, particularly their use of front groups, A&P used many relatively overt methods of propaganda to win political victories. Propaganda analysis then, as now, fixated on the concealed, failing to adequately critique conspicuous communicative power.

How Coca-Cola Shaped the International Congress on Physical Activity and Public Health: An Analysis of Email Exchanges between 2012 and 2014

There is currently limited direct evidence of how sponsorship of scientific conferences fits within the food industry’s strategy to shape public policy and opinion in its favour. This paper provides an analysis of emails between a vice-president of The Coca-Cola Company (Coke) and prominent public health figures in relation to the 2012 and 2014 International Congresses of Physical Activity and Public Health (ICPAPH). Contrary to Coke’s prepared public statements, the findings show that Coke deliberated with its sponsored researchers on topics to present at ICPAPH in an effort to shift blame for the rising incidence of obesity and diet-related diseases away from its products onto physical activity and individual choice. The emails also show how Coke used ICPAPH to promote its front groups and sponsored research networks and foster relationships with public health leaders in order to use their authority to deliver Coke’s message. The study questions whether current protocols about food industry sponsorship of scientific conferences are adequate to safeguard public health interests from corporate influence. A safer approach could be to apply the same provisions that are stipulated in the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on eliminating all tobacco industry sponsorship to the food industry.

How Big Tobacco uses disruptive tactics to deny child rights to be tobacco-free

The denial of children's rights is at the heart of the tobacco industry's interference in health policies. Big Tobacco (composed of the five largest tobacco companies) controls 80% of the global market, and mergers and acquisitions have solidified interference on an industrial scale. Driven by shareholder demand for profits, the industry needs children to replace the sick, the dying and those that have stopped smoking. With no apparent intention of ending their marketing of addictive, lethal products, which kill 8 million people a year, the industry is aggressively releasing new products and using front groups, corporate social responsibility (CSR) and philanthropy to disrupt tobacco control. The industry presents itself as caring about children and positions itself as part of the solution, not the problem. While the interference tactics of Big Tobacco are well documented, their misleading concerns about children (while simultaneously denying their rights) demands a more strategic response, with integrated use of treaties and frameworks to protect children. For this review, searches were conducted between 2015 and 2019 for articles in English referring to tobacco industry tactics that harm child health rights. A narrative synthesis was used to combine the evidence and author's experience in industry reporting. The analysis reveals that the tobacco industry delays interventions to protect children by expanding its use of allied front groups, flooding markets with novel products and disrupting tobacco control policies. To combat this approach, stakeholders in health need to reclaim the child health agenda. A variety of existing mechanisms can be used to develop more integrated and policy coherent reporting processes for protecting current and future generations of children.

Preemption in Tobacco Control: A Framework for Other Areas of Public Health

Preemption—when a higher level of government limits the authority of a lower level to enact new policies—has been devastating to tobacco control. We developed a preemption framework based on this experience for anticipating and responding to the possibility of preemption in other public health areas. We analyzed peer-reviewed literature, reports, and government documents pertaining to tobacco control preemption. We triangulated data and thematically analyzed them. Since the 1980s, tobacco companies have attempted to secure state preemption through front groups, lobbying key policymakers, inserting preemption into other legislation, and issuing legal threats and challenges. The tobacco control community responded by creating awareness of preemption through media advocacy, educating policymakers, mobilizing national collaborations, and expanding networks with the legal community. Ten of the 25 state smoke-free preemption laws have been fully repealed. Repeal, however, took an average of 11 years. State preemption has been detrimental to tobacco control by dividing the health community, weakening local authority, chilling public education and debate, and slowing local policy diffusion. Health scholars, advocates, and policymakers should use the framework to anticipate and prevent industry use of preemption in other public health areas.

Tobacco industry’s elaborate attempts to control a global track and trace system and fundamentally undermine the Illicit Trade Protocol

BackgroundThe Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires a global track and trace (T&T) system to reduce tobacco smuggling. Given the tobacco industry’s (TI) historical involvement in tobacco smuggling, it stipulates that T&T ‘shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry’. This paper explores the rationale for & nature of the TI’s effors to influence the ITP & its T&T system.MethodsAnalysis of leaked TI documents and publicly available data; ,investigation of front groups, trademark and patent ownership.FindingsGrowing & diverse sources of evidence indicate that the TI remains involved in tobacco smuggling and that TI cigarettes account for around two-thirds of the illicit cigarette market. The TI therefore has a vested interest in controlling the global T&T system aimed to curtail this behaviour. To this end, Philip Morris International (PMI) adapted its pack marker system, Codentify, to meet T&T requirements, licensed it for free to its three major competitors who then collectively promoted it to governments using front groups and third parties including companies claiming to be independent despite clear TI links. PMI also sought to suggest Codentify was independent by selling some parts of its intellectual property on Codentify while retaining others, leaving a complex web of shared interests. In Africa, British American Tobacco used payments to obtain data suggesting its smaller competitor companies were evading taxes and secure influence with tax authorities. Regulatory capture has been enhanced by a public relations effort involving TI funding for conferences, training, research, and international police and anti-corruption organisations. Collectively this has created public messaging and a powerful network of organisations supportive of the TI’s misleading postion on illicit.ConclusionsGovernments should assume the TI seeks to control T&T systems in order to avoid scrutiny and minimise excise tax payments and that any T&T system based on Codentify, on intellectual property currently or previously owned by the TI, or being promoted or implemented by companies with TI links, is incompatible with the ITP and would not serve to reduce illicit trade.

Editorial - Plain Packaging Special issue

It gives me great pleasure to write a forward on this topic at a time when there is such a groundswell of international support for plain packaging of tobacco products. World No Tobacco today in 2016 had as its tag line “Get ready for plain packaging” and the world’s health ministers are doing just that.When Australia became the first country in the world to remove all colours and logos on tobacco packs in 2011 – recognising their allure to young new smokers – the tobacco industry tried every move in their book to stop us. Lobbying, donations, advertising campaigns, threats, dodgy research, front groups, overblown claims and legal action dominated our political debate for two years. When all these local manoeuvres failed, the industry switched its effort to ensuring we were the only country to take this step. Writing in November 2016, it is clear that those efforts, both local and international, have manifestly failed. Country after country – France, the UK, Ireland, Canada, Norway, New Zealand – are implementing plain packaging, passing their laws or consulting with the community before introduction and many more countries will move this way in the coming months and years.Plain packaging of tobacco products is now truly an international movement. It is an epidemic of the best sort, as countries catch on to its value, purpose and ease of implementation. We will now see its introduction spread like wildfire around the world.

Why governments cannot afford Codentify to support their track and trace solutions

BackgroundIn anticipation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (ITP) entering into force in 2018, there is a growing demand for information on track and trace (T&T) solutions for tobacco products. This article contrasts the efficacy of Codentify from the perspective of authentication with that of material-based multilayered security technologies.MethodTo calculate the probability of detecting one fraudulent pack under Codentify, we relied on a modified Bernoulli trial experiment with independent repeated sampling without replenishment. The probability is calculated using a multinomial distribution formula adjusted for the fact that both legitimate and non-legitimate packs may be sold in the market.ResultsIn a relatively small market, a law enforcement authority would have to inspect over 27 000 (almost 31 000) packs per week to have a 90% (95%) certainty that it did not miss a fraudulent pack under the Codentify system. A material based T&T solution would require only 45 (59) pack inspections a week to have the same level of confidence.ConclusionsThis study demonstrates the inefficiency of Codentify compared to other solutions that incorporate material-based security features. Signatories to the ITP should reject Codentify due to both its low efficacy and its clear violation of the ITP’s requirement that T&T shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry or its front groups.

Corporate capture of science?

Science can provide a rationale and a basis for policy decisions; therefore, corporate planners see it as a crucial resource. This chapter draws on our structural data to show how science policy organizations play a role in pursuing corporate strategy. Corporations create ‘sound science’ lobby and front groups, and they fund libertarian and neoliberal think tanks and groupings to attack and undermine scientists. They try to influence and capture public and policy debates on issues related to the regulation of addictive substances or services. Specifically, they help to provide a range of experts and advisors that can be tapped by the policy and decision-making apparatus at the national and EU levels. Regulatory systems at national and EU levels are mostly insufficient to monitor or manage the conflicts of interest that arise as a result.

Astroturf, front groups, sock puppets, and the capture of civil society

Civil society is widely thought of as an obstacle to corporate political strategy. This chapter suggests that civil society can be an ally in corporate attempts to undermine public health. It reviews the use of astroturf (i.e. fake grassroots groups) and ‘sock puppets’ (i.e. fake online identities) and discusses these in relation to the corporate-backed ‘sound science’ lobby. The chapter reviews the role of the tobacco and other addictive industries in creating front groups to pursue sectional corporate interests. It looks in turn at interlocking efforts such as the European Science and Environment Forum, the Risk of Freedom briefing, and more recent ventures such as the Institute of Ideas and Spiked the Democracy Institute. These groups are mostly not transparent about their relations with the corporations, and may exhibit some measure of independence from their corporate funders; however, any independence—real or manufactured—is not necessarily a disadvantage.

Interference in public health policy

Despite countries’ commitments to improve nutrition, starting with the protection of breastfeeding, aggressive marketing of breastmilk substitutes continues to promote their indiscriminate use. The baby food industry appears to use similar interference tactics as the tobacco industry to influence public health, promote their products and expand their markets. Learning from the tobacco experience, this paper assesses whether the baby food industry uses any of the six tobacco industry interference tactics recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) and summarizes examples of documented evidence. We conclude that the baby food industry uses all six tactics: (1) manoeuvring to hijack the political and legislative process; (2) exaggerating economic importance of the industry; (3) manipulating public opinion to gain appearance of respectability; (4) fabricating support through front groups; (5) discrediting proven science; and (6) intimidating governments with litigation. There is abundant anecdotal evidence. Published evidence is limited and varies by tactic. Examples of interference are provided for the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Turkey, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Mexico and the United Kingdom, and most for Tactic 3. Interference in public health policies shows commonalities between the two industries. The tobacco control movement offers a useful framework for classifying and addressing interference with public policy by the baby food industry. Revealing the depth and extent of interference used by the baby food industry is critical if countries are to counter interference and implement commitments to improve nutrition.